3 ms·
->Before or after Snowden, Diffie-Hellman (it's Martin Hellman with an “e”) is a good key exchange mechanism! Meanwhile, ~10 years ago https://weakdh.org/imper
by DarkmSparks 2y ago
->Before or after Snowden, Diffie-Hellman (it's Martin Hellman with an “e”) is a good key exchange mechanism!
Meanwhile, ~10 years ago
https://weakdh.org/imperfect-forward-secrecy-ccs15.pdf https://weakdh.org/imperfect-forward-secrecy-ccs15.pdf
After a week-long precomputation for a specified 512-bit
group, we can compute arbitrary discrete logs in that group
in about a minute.
We find that 82% of vulnerable servers use
a single 512-bit group, allowing us to compromise connections
to 7% of Alexa Top Million HTTPS sites. In response, major
browsers are being changed to reject short groups.
We go on to consider Diffie-Hellman with 768- and 1024-bit
groups. We estimate that even in the 1024-bit case, the computations are plausible given nation-state resources.
- littlestymaar 2y ago512 was known to be too low for a looong time, why do you think it was the export-grade security? 1024 being at risk against state-level adversaries isn't shocking to anyone, but there's a significant gap between this and costing $64, and this gap is much bigger than 10 years of Moore's Law (NSA had much more than 32*$64 of available compute ;). You're making grandiose claims and there's nothing that holds in your reasoning, it really feels like I'm discussing physics with a flat-earther…