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How exactly would doctors fund their own residency programs? They already graduate from medical school $500k in debt. There's no more room to squeeze them furth
by nradov 2y ago
How exactly would doctors fund their own residency programs? They already graduate from medical school $500k in debt. There's no more room to squeeze them further. And teaching hospitals have no real incentive to fund more residency program slots. Their customers aren't willing to pay more for it. In game theory terms this is essentially a free rider problem: many entities in the healthcare system would benefit from a larger supply of physicians but they all want someone else to pay for education.
There have been some attempts to introduce market dynamics such as high-deductible health plans (HDHP) with HSAs. Those can work fairly well for a minority of engaged and intelligent consumers but overall aren't an effective solution to systemic problems.
Classical supply and demand economics don't function very well in healthcare. Demand is effectively infinite: sick people want all the healthcare they can get (even if it doesn't really help them much or causes iatrogenic harm) and they think someone else should pay for it. Thus the only way to constrain total system costs is by artificially limiting supply and imposing some sort of rationing. So the real argument ends up being about how we do the rationing.
- mindslight 2y ago> How exactly would doctors fund their own residency programs? I said hospitals. You'd do your residency and then have a commitment to keep working at the hospital for say 3 years (or otherwise repaying the training). > In game theory terms this is essentially a free rider problem Yes, this is exactly what I mean by founded on negative sum interactions. Every player is focused on avoiding costs rather than providing value. In a sane market, when a business can't find employees they offer higher wages, overtime, train new employees, etc. That's positive sum that grows the industry, rather than just throwing their hands up and letting the shortages build. > There have been some attempts to introduce market dynamics such as high-deductible health plans (HDHP) with HSAs I guess if you squint really hard, just subjecting patients to even more unknown charges is some kind of attempt? I'm talking about things like making providers beholden to the basic legal norms of commerce that apply everywhere else. End this nonsense where providers won't answer questions about how much anything costs, but then shake you down after the fact with a volley of fraudulent bills - that foundation is already askew from how every other industry works. Imagine going to the grocery store, and then receiving bills over the next year from the cashier, shelf stocker, distributor, etc, all claiming that you're also responsible for paying them. Healthy industries work by consolidating costs and making prices legible. The healthcare industry is stuck in a state of doing the exact opposite, but yet has managed to entrench itself with the entitlement of still getting paid. If providers want to be able to bill patients directly then they need to do the work of forming actual contracts based on fixed price services, estimated work, hourly rates, etc (once again like every other industry). Or if you've got a healthcare plan and go to providers they point you to, the only entity you should ever be receiving bills from is the plan itself. > Thus the only way to constrain total system costs is by artificially limiting supply and imposing some sort of rationing. So the real argument ends up being about how we do the rationing. So just scrap the entire concept of individual agency? Are you a doctor or something? And lest people jump on me for not just toeing the party line of "single payer" - as I said this is orthogonal to who may be ultimately paying. Furthermore, if we're going to be paying for a base level of care with public funds (which we're already doing for a large part), then we want to be spending that money wisely and not squandering it on a system sick with organizational cancer.
- s1artibartfast 2y agoIt is a billing problem. Simple as that. Residents provide a vast amount of care, both under the supervision of an attending physician, that currently goes uncharged. Federal residency payments to hospitals forbids charging for it, and insurance refuses to pay for it. It is enough to cover the salary and cost of the residents. You are right that the current state is a free-rider problem. Free rider problems have tons of solutions, in both through markets and public policy. A free rider problem doesn't mean we must throw up our hands and give up. Instead, it suggests the type of solutions which are applicable.
- nradov 2y agoThat's not accurate and the problem is hardly simple. Medicare already reimburses teaching hospitals at higher rates. https://www.cms.gov/medicare/payment/prospective-payment-systems/acute-inpatient-pps/indirect-medical-education-ime https://www.cms.gov/medicare/payment/prospective-payment-sys... What solution are you suggesting here exactly? Who should pay for graduate medical education, and how will we incentivize or force them to do it?
- s1artibartfast 2y agoI wasn't suggesting a solution. I was highlighting one of the current problems with residency funding. Hospitals need to be able to make money of residents, not lose money on residents. If I were to suggest a solution, the first step would be allow all hospitals to bill for work done by residents. IF they can make money on residents the entire problem goes away. If a resident fixes your broken arm with the same quality as regular doctor, I think the hospital should be charging the payer the same. From the papers I have seen, unbilled procedures by residents is more than enough to cover their salary. IF it doesnt get there, we could talk about contractual solutions, but the first step should always be figuring out the true value of their work. PS, I don't pretend to understand the intricacies of the law you linked, but it does not seem to address the issue on first read. It seems that Medicare will pay an arbitrary premium set by Congress on healthcare services not performed by residents to compensate for the fact that neither Medicare nor private insurance pays for the healthcare services that are provided by residents.