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Breaking NATO Radio Encryption [video]
- kensai 2y agoLet’s hope Putin does not watch this space!
- omolobo 2y ago[dead]
- ElectRabbit 2y agoBest case would be: they see the the analysis and say "fuck - that stuff is good. Not worth spending a second trying to analyze and decrypt it."
- ryao 2y agoWhy did the NSA not report this flaw to NATO before this became a standard? The NSA had differential cryptanalysis before anyone else. It is odd that they did not catch/report the problem.
- teh_infallible 2y agoMaybe they wanted to decrypt NATO radio messages?
- exe34 2y agobeing part of NATO, can't they just get a copy of the keys from somebody? or is it a case of "they might turn on us, better keep an ace"?
- ahartmetz 2y agoSeems less likely to happen than, well, what we have now. Russia has a lot of good mathematicians btw.
- Dalewyn 2y agoThe first step in being discrete is being discrete. That is to say, if you want to crack NATO communiques your first step is to not call them up and ask for the goods. Whether this is ethically good or not is tangential and an exercise left to each reader.
- pm3003 2y agoNATO Keys are distributed to every NATO member through distribution agencies. A good chunk of them (and the algorithms and cipher equipment) are produced by the US and shared (with some limitations) with NATO. I don't know the scope of algorithm sharing but I believe there are some limitations for NATO access to US-shared algorithms. It's probably a case of 'nobody cares too much'. The standardization process is very long and the industry probably had already put them into their equipments. ALE is not used that much and from what I can gather manual frequency establishment is often preferred. I'm not sure what the actual operational impact of this DoS would be, and if some spoofing is possible, but the actual communication is encrypted by different protocols depending on the type of comms (RATT, IP-like, Voice) so actually deciphering comms wouldn't be possible. See Jerry Proc's website (https://jproc.ca/crypto/ https://jproc.ca/crypto/) for background knowledge.
- Liftyee 2y agoCould they have thought it was NOBUS? https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/NOBUS https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/NOBUS
- exabrial 2y agoI agree. I find it incredibly difficult to believe this wasn’t a known issue until now. The NSA/CIA have unbelievable computing and analysis power available. Anyway, IDRTFA, but I hope this was at least reported before the release of the talk. This sort of thing could get a lot of people killed.
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- ryao 2y agoFrom what I read elsewhere, it was reported to NATO and NATO did not respond.
- wkat4242 2y ago> This sort of thing could get a lot of people killed. NATO is not at war. People aren't dying. And I wouldn't be surprised if it's at least partly used to "leak" info to other state actors. Part of the cold war not turning hot was the mutual understanding of what went on in each block's military due to espionage. Without that, things could easily misinterpreted (and almost did a couple times like with able archer, which emphasizes the importance of this). Some things could not be shared officially but leaving it out in a not-fully-unbreakable form might well have been a way of hinting the enemy about intentions.
- wakawaka28 2y ago>NATO is not at war. People aren't dying. Ahem, NATO countries are assisting Ukraine in drone and missile attacks on Russia as we speak and foolishly floating the idea of adding Ukraine to NATO. Russian leadership has repeatedly said stuff along the lines of "Make no mistake, we are at war with NATO because Ukraine alone doesn't have the capabilities to do what it's been doing to attack us." So yes, NATO is essentially at war.
- quickthrowman 2y ago> foolishly floating the idea of adding Ukraine to NATO Nobody in NATO is seriously suggesting Ukraine be added to NATO, especially right now.
- therealdkz 2y ago[dead]
- atoav 2y agoBecause they A) are not that capable and did not know about it B) knew about it, but sat on it for their own egoistical reasons Both are rather a bad look
- lokimedes 2y agoOr C) Blue team analysis is not offered the same resources and interest as Red team analysis. There’s also the “don’t ascribe to maliciousness what can be caused by bureaucracy“
- atoav 2y agoWhat you describe in C falls under A) are not that capable and did not know about it - investing all into offence means you're not capable in defense. Making sure the encryption of the major military alliance you're part of doesn't fall apart seems like a serious miss, no matter how we slice it. Be the reason bureaucratic, malicous or financial.
- crest 2y agoThere're more options, but those require multiple nation states to work together in a conspiracy (everyone in the know) and all others to be incompetent. Given just publicly known facts and Occam's razor…
- meitham 2y agoLikely a honey trap. NATO’s adversaries can waste budget listening on this leaving the real comms unchecked, plus the advantage of throwing some false comms in the event of war.
- dogma1138 2y agoIn practice this isn’t a very useful attack. You need hours of encrypted and unencrypted data and you can then only decrypt the encrypted transmissions of the targeted node. The NSA if it knew about it most likely did disclosed the vulnerability, it was just deemed not significant enough to redesign, manufacture and re-issue millions of new radios. These radios aren’t rated for secret communications anyhow. By the time you manage to decrypt what you want the information would likely be stale since all of the information passed over radios will be tactical in nature at best. There are still other defenses like spread spectrum transmission and frequency hopping that make intercepts harder. The main threat model against radios isn’t actually message interception but rather basic SigInt that would be able to detect, identify and track transmissions. On the battlefield that’s the most useful intelligence you’ll get especially during war time. Any interception beyond that would take days if not weeks to be properly analyzed and disseminated this isn’t something that it done on a regiment or division levels.
- ryao 2y agoThank you for this insightful answer.
- ugjka 2y agoSo you need 2 hours of both encrypted and unencrypted data at same time to make this attack work, is this feasible? And if you just flip the switch on devices to use more bits in the encryption the attack becomes unfeasible. Piss poor that NATO never replied to them.
- nielsole 2y agoIf you know the call signs you would get exactly that, wouldn't you? (I watched the talk only half attentively)
- nine_k 2y agoShouldn't actual session keys rotate all the time, to prevent exactly that?
- pm3003 2y agoThey probably replied but: - anything serious is probably highly classified as is everything relating to COMSEC. - The standard seems to be a US-one used by NATO (MIL-STD as opposed to a STANAG). - I know ALE is used for link establishment but maybe it's going to be superseded in the military for the next-gen radio equipment?
- 0_____0 2y agoFor those without a free hour to watch, here's the slide deck? I am not a cryptography or digital radio expert, so grain of salt and all that. Slide 14 shows real world feasibility, I think it's safe to say that while theoretically possible it's unlikely that this creates a significant real world issue. One bit of info I don't know - how long is a set of exchanged keys used for in most situations? https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/9856/11598 https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/9856/11598
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- XorNot 2y agoYeah I was looking for that. When I was in basic training the security of radio crypto was described as maybe a week in the field. Any attack taking years isn't going to be operationally relevant. I suspect this protocol was developed basically as a computational complexity trade off to keep within those sorts of boundaries.
- adamtaylor_13 2y agoWhat are all these ccc.de links getting posted recently? Was there some sort of hacker convention?
- distances 2y ago38c3, the 38th Chaos Communication Congress, is currently running. https://events.ccc.de/congress/2024/infos/startpage.html https://events.ccc.de/congress/2024/infos/startpage.html
- ganoushoreilly 2y agoYes, the Chaos Computer Club in Germany. 27-30 Dec (So currently ongoing).
- gunalx 2y agoOne of the greater hacker conferences in the year. (I am a huge fan of CCC and all events they do)
- Lockal 2y agoYes, the root post is here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42537631 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42537631
- solarkraft 2y agoYup, europe’s largest.
- mcint 2y agoEach year, between Christmas and New Years. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_Communication_Congress https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_Communication_Congress
- SpaghettiCthulu 2y agoSounds like this isn't anything new? The cited papers are from 2021, 2022, and 2023.
- jaeckel 2y agoIt's an evolution of said papers and AFAIU improves the attack to a level that makes it executable.
- anilakar 2y agoUhh, Charlie as the eavesdropper instead of Eve. Please do not reinvent industry standard terms.
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- flanifan 2y agovideo no longer available.
- flanifan 2y agoIt seems all videos from https://media.ccc.de/ https://media.ccc.de/ for 2024 aren't, a technical problem maybe
- rurban 2y agoThe attack is known since 2022. https://github.com/dansarie/halfloop/ https://github.com/dansarie/halfloop/ https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/9856 https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/9856