8 ms·

I thought Whatsapp and signal share the same encryption

bawolff 2y ago
The attack wasn't targeting the encryption part of whatsapp (afaik). Encryption is important but it often is not the weakest link in the security chain.
mjg59 2y ago
The encryption isn't alleged to have been compromised. The app itself deals with a lot of untrusted input (eg, thumbnailing video files you've been sent) so there's a meaningful attack surface outside the protocol itself.
- ruined 2y ago
  note for signal users: in settings, you can disable link previews and automatic media download.
  - stavros 2y ago
    Why are link previews a problem? Presumably I only generate previews for links I've vetted.
    - 3eb7988a1663 2y ago
      It seems like most of the exploits come down to blowing up a parser of one data format or another. Myriad from which to choose, they are written in C for historical reasons, and probably play fast and loose with validation in the name of performance.
      - stavros 2y ago
        True, I guess you're right.
NolF 2y ago
The group exploited a bug in WhatsApp to deliver the spyware. It wasn't an E2E issue. > A U.S. judge ruled on Friday in favor of Meta Platforms' (META.O), opens new tab WhatsApp in a lawsuit accusing Israel's NSO Group of exploiting a bug in the messaging app to install spy software allowing unauthorized surveillance.
kjkjadksj 2y ago
People have to start assuming that any communication method in use is compromised. There’s just no way on earth orgs like the NSA would throw their hands up in the air and not find multiple different avenues into an app like signal. Its one of the most downloaded messaging apps. Investment into compromising it is very worth while. People should just assume everything involving a cell phone or computer is inherently insecure. Meanwhile for some analog methods (one time pads, even cupping a hand and whispering into anothers ear, etc), the power balance isn’t so lopsided between the state and the individual as it is with digital communications where everything is probably compromised in some way by now.
- eastbound 2y ago
  Password managers are such a high target that I wonder how we’ve convinced people to put all their passwords in the same software.
  - aucisson_masque 2y ago
    Back to using the same password everywhere then. Bitwarden is already a big step up from what most people are doing, then if you want to hide from gouvernement you better make sure you save your password on extremely secured device. But that's another treat level from the average Joe.
  - dghlsakjg 2y ago
    Depends on your threats. I’m more worried about financial scams than I am anything related to government. Password managers with random passwords are an excellent guard against that threat. If I were worried about state actor threats, any keys or passwords would be memorized.
    - saagarjha 2y ago
      I'm not sure that would be a good idea. Do you, personally, want to be the weak link in the chain to something a nation state wants?
upofadown 2y ago
It was a buffer overflow in a VOIP stack: * https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/14/18622744/whatsapp-spyware-nso-pegasus-vulnerability https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/14/18622744/whatsapp-spyware... Interestingly enough, Signal (and others) had the same sort of vulnerability on Android from a WebRTC stack: * https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/08/exploiting-android-messengers-part-3.html https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/08/exploiting-an... The big issue in both cases is that the exploit was triggered before the user answered the call. I think the moral here is that a secure messenger should not execute inherently insecure code (i.e.complex code) on behalf of entities that are not really well trusted by the user. The default should be always plain text.
- xvector 2y ago
  The other moral here is to stop using memory unsafe languages. It's just so incredibly dumb that we keep making excuses for this.
  - mountainmonk 2y ago
    Does Rust make RCE impossible?, I don't think it does. There is the option of not having data and code sharing the same stack, that seems like a better solution to me but that's such an option is not usually talked about.
    - saagarjha 2y ago
      It makes this kind easy pivot to RCE impossible. Attacks these days are generally more sophisticated than simple buffer overflows, fwiw. Targeting function pointers from a heap overwrite gives the same capabilities.
    - hulitu 2y ago
      > Does Rust make RCE impossible?, I don't think it does. Well, RCE (cargo) is built into it. /s
  - hi41 2y ago
    I think most influential companies such as Microsoft snd Google have said that c and c++ need to be deprecated. I think replacing old code with memory safe languages takes time, effort and money. Hopefully in a decade we can this can be fully done.

The attack wasn't targeting the encryption part of whatsapp (afaik). Encryption is important but it often is not the weakest link in the security chain.

mjg59 2y ago

The encryption isn't alleged to have been compromised. The app itself deals with a lot of untrusted input (eg, thumbnailing video files you've been sent) so there's a meaningful attack surface outside the protocol itself.

ruined 2y ago
note for signal users: in settings, you can disable link previews and automatic media download.
- stavros 2y ago
  Why are link previews a problem? Presumably I only generate previews for links I've vetted.
  - 3eb7988a1663 2y ago
    It seems like most of the exploits come down to blowing up a parser of one data format or another. Myriad from which to choose, they are written in C for historical reasons, and probably play fast and loose with validation in the name of performance.
    - stavros 2y ago
      True, I guess you're right.

NolF 2y ago

The group exploited a bug in WhatsApp to deliver the spyware. It wasn't an E2E issue. > A U.S. judge ruled on Friday in favor of Meta Platforms' (META.O), opens new tab WhatsApp in a lawsuit accusing Israel's NSO Group of exploiting a bug in the messaging app to install spy software allowing unauthorized surveillance.

kjkjadksj 2y ago

People have to start assuming that any communication method in use is compromised. There’s just no way on earth orgs like the NSA would throw their hands up in the air and not find multiple different avenues into an app like signal. Its one of the most downloaded messaging apps. Investment into compromising it is very worth while. People should just assume everything involving a cell phone or computer is inherently insecure. Meanwhile for some analog methods (one time pads, even cupping a hand and whispering into anothers ear, etc), the power balance isn’t so lopsided between the state and the individual as it is with digital communications where everything is probably compromised in some way by now.

eastbound 2y ago
Password managers are such a high target that I wonder how we’ve convinced people to put all their passwords in the same software.
- aucisson_masque 2y ago
  Back to using the same password everywhere then. Bitwarden is already a big step up from what most people are doing, then if you want to hide from gouvernement you better make sure you save your password on extremely secured device. But that's another treat level from the average Joe.
- dghlsakjg 2y ago
  Depends on your threats. I’m more worried about financial scams than I am anything related to government. Password managers with random passwords are an excellent guard against that threat. If I were worried about state actor threats, any keys or passwords would be memorized.
  - saagarjha 2y ago
    I'm not sure that would be a good idea. Do you, personally, want to be the weak link in the chain to something a nation state wants?

upofadown 2y ago

It was a buffer overflow in a VOIP stack: * https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/14/18622744/whatsapp-spyware-nso-pegasus-vulnerability https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/14/18622744/whatsapp-spyware... Interestingly enough, Signal (and others) had the same sort of vulnerability on Android from a WebRTC stack: * https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/08/exploiting-android-messengers-part-3.html https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/08/exploiting-an... The big issue in both cases is that the exploit was triggered before the user answered the call. I think the moral here is that a secure messenger should not execute inherently insecure code (i.e.complex code) on behalf of entities that are not really well trusted by the user. The default should be always plain text.

xvector 2y ago
The other moral here is to stop using memory unsafe languages. It's just so incredibly dumb that we keep making excuses for this.
- mountainmonk 2y ago
  Does Rust make RCE impossible?, I don't think it does. There is the option of not having data and code sharing the same stack, that seems like a better solution to me but that's such an option is not usually talked about.
  - saagarjha 2y ago
    It makes this kind easy pivot to RCE impossible. Attacks these days are generally more sophisticated than simple buffer overflows, fwiw. Targeting function pointers from a heap overwrite gives the same capabilities.
  - hulitu 2y ago
    > Does Rust make RCE impossible?, I don't think it does. Well, RCE (cargo) is built into it. /s
- hi41 2y ago
  I think most influential companies such as Microsoft snd Google have said that c and c++ need to be deprecated. I think replacing old code with memory safe languages takes time, effort and money. Hopefully in a decade we can this can be fully done.