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The entire point is to protect against those (like the owner of the hardware) who have physical access.
by cwillu 2y ago
The entire point is to protect against those (like the owner of the hardware) who have physical access.
- ls612 2y agoSo basically this is the best kind of vuln; not exploitable remotely, and unpatchable so you will always be able to get root on your own hardware.
- zokier 2y agoAMD has patches for all impacted platforms, and a method to verify that patch has been applied.
- cwillu 2y agoa method that can't be spoofed though?
- whaleofatw2022 2y agoTAO tho...
- numpad0 2y agoI think this type of implements are also used to make payments work on devices, in addition to enabling DRM.
- zb3 2y agoIn that case it doesn't seem it's really the "owner" of that hardware..
- dmkolobov 2y agoThe operators own the hardware and lease it to customers for computation. Those customers do not trust the operators to not peek at their Super Sensitive Data. TEE is a way for the operator to provide assurances to their customers that they will not, and more importantly cannot, exfiltrate customer data. This is in theory. In practice, as demonstrated by the article, these assurances are not bulletproof.
- zb3 2y agoThis makes sense for enterprise use cases, but then the soc manufacturer shouldn't be able to do this as well.. otherwise customers still need to trust the manufacturer. So I was referring to the case where there exists an entity that has some equivalent of "private keys" that makes it possible to control the TEE/attestation..
- dmkolobov 2y agoAh that makes sense. I would think as long as the manufacturer and the operator are not the same entity then the danger in that regard would be mitigated.