3 ms·

We already have heterogeneous cores these days, with E and P, and we have a ton of them as they take little space on the die relative to cache. The solution, it

We already have heterogeneous cores these days, with E and P, and we have a ton of them as they take little space on the die relative to cache. The solution, it seems to me, is to have most cores go brrrrrr and a few that are secure. Given that we have effectively two browser platforms (Chromium and Firefox) and two operating systems to contend with (Linux and Windows), it seems entirely tractable to get the security sensitive threads scheduled to the "S cores".

astrange 2y ago
That's a secure enclave aka secure element aka TPM. Once you start wanting security you usually think up enough other features (voltage glitching prevention, memory encryption) that it's worth moving it off the CPU.
- Dylan16807 2y ago
  That's a wildly different type of security. I just want to sandbox some code, not treat the entire world as hostile.
- tiberious726 2y ago
  Eh, the TPM is a hell of a lot less functional than security processor on a modem arm board. You can seal and unseal based on system state, but once things are unsealed, it's just in memory
ggu7hgfk8j 2y ago
The main security boundary a modern computer upholds is web vs everything else, including protecting one webpage from another. So I think it should be the javascript that should run on these hypothetical cores. Though perhaps a few other operations might choose to use them as well.
- nine_k 2y ago
  Also all the TLS, SSH, Wireguard and other encryption, anything with long-persisted secret information. Everything else, even secret (like displayed OTP codes) is likely too fleeting for a snooping attack to be able to find and exfiltrate it, even if an exfiltration channel remains. Until a better exfiltration method is found, of course :-( I think we're headed towards the future of many highly insulated computing nodes that share little if anything. Maybe they'd have a faster way to communicate, e.g. by remapping fast cache-like memory between cores, but that memory would never be uncontrollably shared the way cache lines are now.

astrange 2y ago

That's a secure enclave aka secure element aka TPM. Once you start wanting security you usually think up enough other features (voltage glitching prevention, memory encryption) that it's worth moving it off the CPU.

Dylan16807 2y ago
That's a wildly different type of security. I just want to sandbox some code, not treat the entire world as hostile.
tiberious726 2y ago
Eh, the TPM is a hell of a lot less functional than security processor on a modem arm board. You can seal and unseal based on system state, but once things are unsealed, it's just in memory

ggu7hgfk8j 2y ago

The main security boundary a modern computer upholds is web vs everything else, including protecting one webpage from another. So I think it should be the javascript that should run on these hypothetical cores. Though perhaps a few other operations might choose to use them as well.

nine_k 2y ago
Also all the TLS, SSH, Wireguard and other encryption, anything with long-persisted secret information. Everything else, even secret (like displayed OTP codes) is likely too fleeting for a snooping attack to be able to find and exfiltrate it, even if an exfiltration channel remains. Until a better exfiltration method is found, of course :-( I think we're headed towards the future of many highly insulated computing nodes that share little if anything. Maybe they'd have a faster way to communicate, e.g. by remapping fast cache-like memory between cores, but that memory would never be uncontrollably shared the way cache lines are now.