4 ms·

What's interesting to me is that Apple's stance of not unlocking iPhones for law enforcement has led to this paranoia on law enforcements part. Honestly? Good.

MBCook 2y ago
Apple doesn’t have a stance of not unlocking phones for law enforcement. They give law enforcement whatever they’re asked for by subpoena. Apple‘s stance is to build strong encryption so that they can’t access customers data. What they have refused to do is weaken that encryption so that they could start complying with future requests or sign tampered with firmware that would allow the decryption without user authorization.
- skygazer 2y ago
  They also refused to make a build (signed by Apple) which would remove any of those protections, though technically possible, but would have tainted their products as backdoored. They were prepared to argue forcing them to do that would be the government compelling speech, a violation of the First Amendment, a precedent the FBI didn’t want, and so turned to a CellBright type service instead. Apple did make public statements at the time against backdooring devices which might be construed as a stance.
- TowerTall 2y ago
  As far as I know the iCloud backup are unencrypted so law enforcement can just request a backup of those instead.
  - philistine 2y ago
    You're not up-to-date and your language is not exact: 1. Your backups are encrypted in transit and at rest. You have a key, Apple also has one. 2. You can optionally ask Apple to get rid of its key to your backup. (https://support.apple.com/en-us/108756 https://support.apple.com/en-us/108756)
    - fsflover 2y ago
      In other words, the parent is correct: by default it's not encrypted against Apple (no e2ee).
      - kaba0 2y ago
        It's encrypted, period. Apple having the key doesn't make it plain text.
        fsflover 2y ago
        It depends on your threat model. Against Apple (forced to give the info) it is effectively plain text.
        philistine 2y ago
        That's why we use the term end-to-end encrypted.
        fsflover 2y ago
        Yes, which is exactly what I wrote in brackets. Still got downvoted.
        deleted 2y ago
        [deleted]
- voxic11 2y ago
  Apple does have this stance. They have been subpoenaed before to assist in unlocking older iPhones that don't have as strong protection of user data as modern iPhones and they refused those orders as well. Basically older iPhones without the modern secure enclave enforced the password attempt lockout period in software so the FBI obtained a court order to force apple to create and sign a new version of iOS that would not enforce the lockout period, which would allow the FBI to guess the password. Apple refused to create this new version of iOS and the FBI eventually retracted their request. Modern iPhones enforce the lockout period in the secure enclave hardware so this is no longer something Apple could even possibly assist with. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple%E2%80%93FBI_encryption_dispute#Apple_ordered_to_assist_the_FBI https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple%E2%80%93FBI_encryption_d...
  - EMIRELADERO 2y ago
    > Modern iPhones enforce the lockout period in the secure enclave hardware so this is no longer something Apple could even possibly assist with. You mean in the sillicon itself? If it's done in the Secure Enclave's firmware then Apple could assist with unlocking.
    - kbolino 2y ago
      I would think that the secure enclave controls the device (un-)locking process and also wouldn't install OTA firmware updates nor accept commands from USB-connected peripherals while the device is locked.
      - altairprime 2y ago
        Settings > Passcode > Allow access when locked: [_] Accessories. Off by default, providing a one hour timeout since last phone unlock; or instantly, upon biometric rejection or after holding power-volume-up to reach the power off menu. Macs are typically enabling an equivalent to this by default as well now, as of the latest macOS update.
    - MBCook 2y ago
      That’s what I meant by this: > …sign tampered with firmware that would allow the decryption without user authorization. Apple wrote the firmware for everything. I assume they could write firmware to not need authorization, embedded in a copy of iOS, and sign everything so it could be installed on a phone through DFU. They have been unwilling to do so. I think they’re right not to. But I suspect it is technically possible.
- kubectl_h 2y ago
  > Apple doesn’t have a stance of not unlocking phones for law enforcement. Yes and they have also made it such that they can't bypass all that by providing a mechanism to unlock the phone. Hence they don't unlock the phone.
- briffle 2y ago
  > Apple‘s stance is to build strong encryption so that they can’t access customers data. In the US and EU, where it is politically easy. https://support.apple.com/en-us/111754 https://support.apple.com/en-us/111754
  - mlindner 2y ago
    More correctly: In states where individual rights are protected.
deleted 2y ago
[deleted]
_fat_santa 2y ago
My conspiracy theory here is that Apple knows that this is how law enforcement goes about unlocking phones with tech like Cellbrite so they add in code to thwart that effort but keep quiet so they can have the plausible deniability of it just being a bug.
- WorldMaker 2y ago
  Easier to assume it's a theft ring deterrent, eliminating some of the routes to social engineering that theft rings have been using, further reducing the usefulness of collecting large numbers of stolen iPhones in the same central place.
  - nxobject 2y ago
    It's good if the countermeasures against the two things are indistinguishable.

MBCook 2y ago

Apple doesn’t have a stance of not unlocking phones for law enforcement. They give law enforcement whatever they’re asked for by subpoena. Apple‘s stance is to build strong encryption so that they can’t access customers data. What they have refused to do is weaken that encryption so that they could start complying with future requests or sign tampered with firmware that would allow the decryption without user authorization.

skygazer 2y ago
They also refused to make a build (signed by Apple) which would remove any of those protections, though technically possible, but would have tainted their products as backdoored. They were prepared to argue forcing them to do that would be the government compelling speech, a violation of the First Amendment, a precedent the FBI didn’t want, and so turned to a CellBright type service instead. Apple did make public statements at the time against backdooring devices which might be construed as a stance.
TowerTall 2y ago
As far as I know the iCloud backup are unencrypted so law enforcement can just request a backup of those instead.
- philistine 2y ago
  You're not up-to-date and your language is not exact: 1. Your backups are encrypted in transit and at rest. You have a key, Apple also has one. 2. You can optionally ask Apple to get rid of its key to your backup. (https://support.apple.com/en-us/108756 https://support.apple.com/en-us/108756)
  - fsflover 2y ago
    In other words, the parent is correct: by default it's not encrypted against Apple (no e2ee).
    - kaba0 2y ago
      It's encrypted, period. Apple having the key doesn't make it plain text.
      - fsflover 2y ago
        It depends on your threat model. Against Apple (forced to give the info) it is effectively plain text.
        philistine 2y ago
        That's why we use the term end-to-end encrypted.
        fsflover 2y ago
        Yes, which is exactly what I wrote in brackets. Still got downvoted.
        deleted 2y ago
        [deleted]
voxic11 2y ago
Apple does have this stance. They have been subpoenaed before to assist in unlocking older iPhones that don't have as strong protection of user data as modern iPhones and they refused those orders as well. Basically older iPhones without the modern secure enclave enforced the password attempt lockout period in software so the FBI obtained a court order to force apple to create and sign a new version of iOS that would not enforce the lockout period, which would allow the FBI to guess the password. Apple refused to create this new version of iOS and the FBI eventually retracted their request. Modern iPhones enforce the lockout period in the secure enclave hardware so this is no longer something Apple could even possibly assist with. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple%E2%80%93FBI_encryption_dispute#Apple_ordered_to_assist_the_FBI https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple%E2%80%93FBI_encryption_d...
- EMIRELADERO 2y ago
  > Modern iPhones enforce the lockout period in the secure enclave hardware so this is no longer something Apple could even possibly assist with. You mean in the sillicon itself? If it's done in the Secure Enclave's firmware then Apple could assist with unlocking.
  - kbolino 2y ago
    I would think that the secure enclave controls the device (un-)locking process and also wouldn't install OTA firmware updates nor accept commands from USB-connected peripherals while the device is locked.
    - altairprime 2y ago
      Settings > Passcode > Allow access when locked: [_] Accessories. Off by default, providing a one hour timeout since last phone unlock; or instantly, upon biometric rejection or after holding power-volume-up to reach the power off menu. Macs are typically enabling an equivalent to this by default as well now, as of the latest macOS update.
  - MBCook 2y ago
    That’s what I meant by this: > …sign tampered with firmware that would allow the decryption without user authorization. Apple wrote the firmware for everything. I assume they could write firmware to not need authorization, embedded in a copy of iOS, and sign everything so it could be installed on a phone through DFU. They have been unwilling to do so. I think they’re right not to. But I suspect it is technically possible.
kubectl_h 2y ago
> Apple doesn’t have a stance of not unlocking phones for law enforcement. Yes and they have also made it such that they can't bypass all that by providing a mechanism to unlock the phone. Hence they don't unlock the phone.
briffle 2y ago
> Apple‘s stance is to build strong encryption so that they can’t access customers data. In the US and EU, where it is politically easy. https://support.apple.com/en-us/111754 https://support.apple.com/en-us/111754
- mlindner 2y ago
  More correctly: In states where individual rights are protected.

deleted 2y ago

[deleted]

_fat_santa 2y ago

My conspiracy theory here is that Apple knows that this is how law enforcement goes about unlocking phones with tech like Cellbrite so they add in code to thwart that effort but keep quiet so they can have the plausible deniability of it just being a bug.

WorldMaker 2y ago
Easier to assume it's a theft ring deterrent, eliminating some of the routes to social engineering that theft rings have been using, further reducing the usefulness of collecting large numbers of stolen iPhones in the same central place.
- nxobject 2y ago
  It's good if the countermeasures against the two things are indistinguishable.