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I doubt we see the same isolationism w.r.t. China, who remain Trump's main bogeyman (other than immigrants). The policy will probably make less sense, since as
by sobellian 2y ago
I doubt we see the same isolationism w.r.t. China, who remain Trump's main bogeyman (other than immigrants). The policy will probably make less sense, since as you mentioned his tariffs and transactional diplomacy may confound US efforts to build an anti-China alliance in the Pacific.
It would probably be a poor move for China to blockade Taiwan (an act of war). If the US decides to intervene, it would be very painful for China without a pre-emptive strike on US bases in the region. For all the talk of Trump as an anti-war candidate, he didn't seem to say no to many military strikes as POTUS, and this hypothetical would represent the US' best possible entry into a war over Taiwan.
- aprentic 2y agoChina has repeatedly demonstrated 2 things WRT Taiwan. They're patient and they're serious about their red lines. I can't recall a single instance where China announced anything about Taiwan that wasn't reactive. They just keep repeating the "one China" policy. Their official stance is that there's no need to invade Taiwan because Taiwan is already part of China and they reserve the right to use force to enforce their territorial integrity. The practical manifestation of that policy has been that China and the US both get to pretend that their view on Taiwan is the reality and nobody will do anything if the other side doesn't rock the boat. Their red line is a formal declaration of independence by Taiwan. As near as I can tell, all but one of their "military exercises" has been in response to actions that get close to that line in diplomatic terms https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/10/chinas-military-exercises-around-taiwan-trends-and-patterns/ https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/10/chinas-military-exercises-a... During many of those exercises effectively blockaded Taiwan. They did that for a week after Pelosi's visit and they experienced no pain in response. I draw 3 conclusions from these observations: 1) China will not invade Taiwan without some external stimulus 2) China is prepared to blockade Taiwan in the event of any attempts at secession 3) China has established that secessionist behavior is casus belli for a blockade in the eyes of the international community