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Please correct me where I'm mistaken. * This password list has been public for a long time, and is easy to access: hidden excel column on a public spreadsheet.

Please correct me where I'm mistaken. * This password list has been public for a long time, and is easy to access: hidden excel column on a public spreadsheet. * BIOS access means the intruder can change boot devices, boot their own OS, infect the BIOS with a virus, change boot devices back, compromise the vote host OS. * Keycard security isn't tight security. Any amature physical penetration tester would just use a primitive attack on the door to get around it. E.g.: Grab the handle from under the door with a wire. Youtube has a ton of examples. * This could have been done months ago, and over a long period of time. * The intruder could clean up logs and any other traces of their actions. Where am I technically wrong here? I'm sure I'm missing something obvious. It sounds like what you would do with BIOS passwords if you wanted to do something nasty. I haven't seen these questions addressed anywhere. I hear some people say "but we use paper ballots". Then why do you have a BIOS password? If it's all paper where does the computer fit in? All of this is honest curiosity, I'm not sure how the voting system works.

gruez 2y ago
>I hear some people say "but we use paper ballots". Then why do you have a BIOS password? If it's all paper where does the computer fit in? All of this is honest curiosity, I'm not sure how the voting system works. Not sure about Colorado specifically, but in many jurisdictions voters mark paper ballots, which go into a machine to be tabulated, and are finally deposited into a box for safe keeping/future recounts.
- quercusa 2y ago
  You get to feed the ballot into the (literal) black box yourself, it beeps and tells you your vote has been recorded. What did it record? Who knows?
  - gruez 2y ago
    > What did it record? Who knows? How is it any different than traditional voting, where you drop your ballot into a black box and trust the poll workers would count it correctly? You can do random spot checks select boxes to make sure the machine is tabulating correctly. If they're all correct, you can be reasonably sure the others are correct as well, unless your adversary has incredible luck.
    - zmgsabst 2y ago
      Historically, you open the box and count them in front of anyone who wants to watch — using enough polling sites that’s a relatively short task at each. Moving ballots, machine counting, etc are all relatively modern inventions — and seem to greatly weaken the consensus mechanism for little benefit.
    - roenxi 2y ago
      In traditional voting, there is a pretty decent chance you know the person who does the counting or can find someone in your community who can personally vouch for them. Living in my small town at one stage, I knew several of the tabulators personally and all of them by reputation. That is an extreme case, but even in a city these people are somewhat known quantities. With a voting machine that wasn't verified by a hand count it'd be relying on who-knows-who, who-knows-where with an uncertain risk profile.
      - EGreg 2y ago
        Seriously? You are saying that you just trust some people not to manipulate the votes? Why not use a Merkle Tree or a Blockchain to verify that your vote was included in the total ? They were invented to remove trust in middlemen. Mutually distrusting parties can maintain the vote tallying. That’s how elections should be done.
        nicoburns 2y ago
        In a hand count you might get the odd bad actor, but you're unlikely to get large scale systematic bias, which is much easier to introduce in a machine counting system.
        EGreg 2y ago
        “the odd bad actor” is incredibly optimistic, almost like there is already a bias against ever digitizing or using cryptography for adding security to a manual process with tons of ways to corrupt an election Elections around the world do not match this optimistic characterization. If they did, we’d all trust the outcomes of: Belarus’ election of Lukashenko Venezuela’s election of Maduro Crimean 2014 referendum Kosovo’s independence referendum (Note you probably think the last one was a lot more reliable than the first three — a lot of it has to do with living in a certain part of the world and believing the national media, which is only possible because the voting system and results can be so untrustworthy as to not allow regular people around the world to check anything, so propaganda is given free reign. Science and reliable knowledge usually doesn’t work this way.) In fact, let’s be clear… the “dictators” WANT the elections to have many ways to corrupt them, they WOULDN’T want a blockchain or merkle tree, that should tell you a lot And the “war hawks” in countries like USA who oppose their geopolitical rivals also want the elections and referendums to not be secure and clear, so they can cast doubt on them (eg Crimea) while at the same time claiming others (like Kosovo) are completely legit and justify unprecedented actions . As an aside, the vast majority of both Crimea[1] (94%) and Kosovo[2] (99%) that turned out to vote in referendums in 1991 voted for independence, so we all pretty much know what the public wanted later too, but it doesn’t affect the spin put on the later referendums and conflicts anyway If elections were secured by cryptography, the People around the world would have far more confidence, rather than listening to their own media propaganda spin the ambiguities, and the wars might even be avoided. 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Crimean_autonomy_referendum https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Crimean_autonomy_referend... 2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Kosovan_independence_referendum https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Kosovan_independence_refe...
  - deleted 2y ago
    [deleted]
  - treyd 2y ago
    The idea is that the machine just provides a preliminary count, a official manual count happens over the following several hours. If there's a discrepancy then the only the manual count counts and the machine can be identified as problematic.
    - sgerenser 2y ago
      No manual count happens unless the results of the election are in question (very close race, evidence of impropriety, etc.)
      - HelloMcFly 2y ago
        Selective audits are standard practice though, where issues can trigger a broade r manual recount
  - dragonwriter 2y ago
    The actual ballots are stored, a selective audit is done to verify the electronic count, and in the event that raises issues a full manual recount can be done. The electronic voting system issues in the 2000 elections motivated the Help America Vote Act of 2002 under which voter-verified paper records for audit purpose required for all voting machines (this requirement became effective in 2006); effectively, “voting machines” add ballot marking machines that may also be involved in convenience tabulation, but are always audited against hand counts of paper ballots, which are the ultimate authority.
- bryan0 2y ago
  FTA: “Colorado voter votes on a paper ballot, which is then audited during the Risk Limiting Audit to verify that ballots were counted according to voter intent.”
- breatheoften 2y ago
  I voted early in person in Colorado a few days ago. Use a machine to entry my votes. Votes were printed onto a piece of paper. I checked to make sure the marks on the paper matched what I entered into the machine and then dropped it into the ballot box (not a machine just a box that collected the ballots). It was pretty sane and didn't seem like there was a lot to worry over related to the electronic entry system. As to how the votes on the ballots are tallied - if those machines are compromised seems like a definite problem -- though there is at least the option to hand count the ballots to compare against ...
  - floating-io 2y ago
    In my locale there is a header on the physical ballot that contains a bunch of barcodes, presumably to make your votes machine readable. It then prints the votes in text below. I absolutely hate that fact. I am a human, I cannot read barcodes without a computer. Therefore, I cannot tell if the important part of what was recorded is correct. Not sure if Colorado's are the same...
    - Dalewyn 2y ago
      The value of absolute transparency is why nothing will beat paper ballots written and marked in plain English counted by hand with anyone and everyone who cares about election integrity watching the process.
      - sadeshmukh 2y ago
        I mean, if you're willing to spend that much, and it'll be very expensive, then sure. It's just technophobia - machines are going to be more accurate than a human (who also can make a mistake!).
        Dalewyn 2y ago
        >machines are going to be more accurate Says who? Also, what does "accurate" here actually mean? Speaking as someone who actually understands computers and machines: I agree with the commons (who are simpletons with regards to computers and machines) that machines cannot be trusted to be "accurate" (whatever that means) or even trusted in general. Especially when a simpler, confirmable-by-anyone method exists: Having someone count paper ballots by hand in the presence of anyone and everyone. That includes mistakes and errors. The value here is anyone and everyone can and will immediately understand (and thus accept) what is going on. Also, why are we even putting the integrity of the very foundation of our democracy on the table in exchange for convenience and cost of all things? Are we serious? It should be a good thing we are taking precious time and money to make sure our democracy is working properly. I thought democracy was actually fucking important.
liquidise 2y ago
CO resident here. CO mails paper ballots to everyone* about a month before election day. You can choose to vote in person, or mail in/drop off your paper ballot anytime prior to election night. My understanding is what while the ballots are paper, many (all?) are tabulated digitally. It certainly appears to be laid out in a way that benefits digital reading, and i believe that is what the machines in question are responsible for. * for some definition of "everyone"
- wannacboatmovie 2y ago
  [flagged]
  - ForHackernews 2y ago
    Another example of "Everything looks suspicious when you don’t know how anything works."[0] Mailed ballots are verified against voter registrations and signatures are checked against the signature on file. This woman with a bunch of ballots for former residents of her apartment would gain essentially nothing and open herself to serious criminal penalties if she tried to vote as anyone except herself. [0] https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/elon-musk-election-misinformation-trump-dominion-rcna176096 https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/elon-musk-electi...
    - deleted 2y ago
      [deleted]
    - bhk 2y ago
      The article you cite says nothing in direct response to the parent comment (ballot harvesting, etc.). It also includes some misinformation, saying " signature verification is a critical part of ensuring that only valid ballots from eligible voters get counted" ... while many states, including Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, North Carolina, and Georgia, do not verify signatures. https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-14-how-states-verify-voted-absentee-mail-ballots https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-14-how-st... Another example of "Nothing looks suspicious when your eyes are closed"?
wannacboatmovie 2y ago
[flagged]
- nkrisc 2y ago
  [flagged]
  - wannacboatmovie 2y ago
    [flagged]
    - gruez 2y ago
      There's a pretty wide range of possibilities between "videos were all faked because this is the most secure election in history" and "let's not take the video at face value and await further verification because it's election season and there's plenty of bad actors trying to sow distrust in the election system by posting misleading/manipulated videos".
      - wannacboatmovie 2y ago
        The implication of the videos was that this was malice (and that generates clicks) yet if you read between the lines, it's simply incompetency - uncalibrated touchscreens. My point is local jurisdictions do not have the knowledge or resources to properly maintain or deal with electronic voting machines (of which there appears to be no national standard) and maintain integrity. If they can't remember to perform basic maintenance like calibrate the screens, what other steps are missed or ignored?
    - ForHackernews 2y ago
      Which do you suppose is more likely... A) There was a voting machine that had a miscalibrated touchscreen that will be corrected before election day. B) An evil democrat conspiracy is going to steal the election in Kentucky
      - 2y ago
CaliforniaKarl 2y ago
> Where am I technically wrong here? I'm sure I'm missing something obvious. As I understand that article, BIOS access requires two passwords, and the list only provides one of the two passwords. So, instead of "password list" I would say "partial-password list". The list also misses "There is 24/7 video camera recording on all election equipment." Of course, you can raise concerns and failure modes about video recordings, but that all brings up the question "Were those recordings compromised?" You should not assume that they were.
mc32 2y ago
Here’s a telling interview by someone doing journalism rather than running cover: https://youtu.be/NLi-0WI-f7M?si=o8qktF4d25E3oJ-s https://youtu.be/NLi-0WI-f7M?si=o8qktF4d25E3oJ-s It’s interesting that she made excuses for herself but previously had no quarter for someone who landed in similar position.
- flyingcircus3 2y ago
  It's only interesting when you oversimplify the two situations for the express purpose of sowing distrust. The only reason you've left out the details that Tina Peters actually facilitated physical access to voting machines with both required passwords, while this current leak was not even sufficient for someone to repeat Peters' actions, is that it would be absolutely devastating to your entire argument.
blackeyeblitzar 2y ago
It is important that the voting system have credibility for everyone - regardless of party. Has anyone done a ground up exercise of rethinking the process and the involved technologies from a cybersecurity standpoint? It would be great to offer voters verification of their votes while maintaining secrecy. But right now I feel like we are stuck, with one half the country having doubts about the process and the other half insisting that it is absolutely perfect. It isn’t enough for the process to be either correct or trustworthy. It has to be both.
- JumpCrisscross 2y ago
  > Has anyone done a ground up exercise of rethinking the process and the involved technologies from a cybersecurity standpoint? Chesterton’s fence.
  - sethammons 2y ago
    I take it that you mean that before you tear down this system, understand why it is the way it is. And, yeah, sure. I don't think that invalidates reimagining the solution from what may be new/updated first principles.
  - blackeyeblitzar 2y ago
    This feels a lot like the people who simply tell others to become a poll worker when they start asking hard questions about the system. I get the wisdom in this but it can also be a waste of time. In other (non electoral) situations, many big improvements can and have happened without needing to endlessly understand existing things. In this case it is clear we don’t have verifiable elections - you don’t need to understand anything deeply to know this, since it is apparent with your own ballot. So instead let’s design for something better.
    - JumpCrisscross 2y ago
      > you don’t need to understand anything deeply to know this, since it is apparent with your own ballot Are you giving up the secret ballot in your scheme?
EasyMark 2y ago
In texas you pick your items on computer and it spits out a paper ballot that you can look at to verify it's what you voted for. The info is also included in a qr code like form for a reader. In the event that something looks off it can be verified by humans. I figured something similar was done all over.
- deleted 2y ago
  [deleted]
- kodablah 2y ago
  This is not the case everywhere in Texas. In many places, you fill in a paper ballot at a booth and feed it into a machine at the end with nothing printed afterwards.
ZYbCRq22HbJ2y7 2y ago
Here is a video explaining Colorado's voting system: https://vimeo.com/842943160 https://vimeo.com/842943160 It has a surprisingly(?) low view count for how riled up everyone is about all this. If you want more insight into this system, here is a test plan from August of this year on the Election Assistance Commission's website: https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/ClearVote%202.5%20Test%20Plan%20TP-01-01-CBG-07-01.01.pdf https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/ClearVote%20... It also has a list of bug fixes like: > Changed the ClearCount API to require authentication before uploading files (such as ballot images and tabulation results) to the server. And software details like: - MySQL 8 - Ubuntu 20 - Windows 10 IoT Enterprise LTSC 2021 - Windows Enterprise IoT 21H2 release - Python 3 - CIS SCAP Ubuntu 20.04 revision 1.1.0 Here is a summary of an audit done on a previous version last year: https://elections.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2023/10/clear-ballot-clearvote-2.4-nystec-review-report.pdf https://elections.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2023/10/clea...

gruez 2y ago

>I hear some people say "but we use paper ballots". Then why do you have a BIOS password? If it's all paper where does the computer fit in? All of this is honest curiosity, I'm not sure how the voting system works. Not sure about Colorado specifically, but in many jurisdictions voters mark paper ballots, which go into a machine to be tabulated, and are finally deposited into a box for safe keeping/future recounts.

quercusa 2y ago
You get to feed the ballot into the (literal) black box yourself, it beeps and tells you your vote has been recorded. What did it record? Who knows?
- gruez 2y ago
  > What did it record? Who knows? How is it any different than traditional voting, where you drop your ballot into a black box and trust the poll workers would count it correctly? You can do random spot checks select boxes to make sure the machine is tabulating correctly. If they're all correct, you can be reasonably sure the others are correct as well, unless your adversary has incredible luck.
  - zmgsabst 2y ago
    Historically, you open the box and count them in front of anyone who wants to watch — using enough polling sites that’s a relatively short task at each. Moving ballots, machine counting, etc are all relatively modern inventions — and seem to greatly weaken the consensus mechanism for little benefit.
  - roenxi 2y ago
    In traditional voting, there is a pretty decent chance you know the person who does the counting or can find someone in your community who can personally vouch for them. Living in my small town at one stage, I knew several of the tabulators personally and all of them by reputation. That is an extreme case, but even in a city these people are somewhat known quantities. With a voting machine that wasn't verified by a hand count it'd be relying on who-knows-who, who-knows-where with an uncertain risk profile.
    - EGreg 2y ago
      Seriously? You are saying that you just trust some people not to manipulate the votes? Why not use a Merkle Tree or a Blockchain to verify that your vote was included in the total ? They were invented to remove trust in middlemen. Mutually distrusting parties can maintain the vote tallying. That’s how elections should be done.
      - nicoburns 2y ago
        In a hand count you might get the odd bad actor, but you're unlikely to get large scale systematic bias, which is much easier to introduce in a machine counting system.
        EGreg 2y ago
        “the odd bad actor” is incredibly optimistic, almost like there is already a bias against ever digitizing or using cryptography for adding security to a manual process with tons of ways to corrupt an election Elections around the world do not match this optimistic characterization. If they did, we’d all trust the outcomes of: Belarus’ election of Lukashenko Venezuela’s election of Maduro Crimean 2014 referendum Kosovo’s independence referendum (Note you probably think the last one was a lot more reliable than the first three — a lot of it has to do with living in a certain part of the world and believing the national media, which is only possible because the voting system and results can be so untrustworthy as to not allow regular people around the world to check anything, so propaganda is given free reign. Science and reliable knowledge usually doesn’t work this way.) In fact, let’s be clear… the “dictators” WANT the elections to have many ways to corrupt them, they WOULDN’T want a blockchain or merkle tree, that should tell you a lot And the “war hawks” in countries like USA who oppose their geopolitical rivals also want the elections and referendums to not be secure and clear, so they can cast doubt on them (eg Crimea) while at the same time claiming others (like Kosovo) are completely legit and justify unprecedented actions . As an aside, the vast majority of both Crimea[1] (94%) and Kosovo[2] (99%) that turned out to vote in referendums in 1991 voted for independence, so we all pretty much know what the public wanted later too, but it doesn’t affect the spin put on the later referendums and conflicts anyway If elections were secured by cryptography, the People around the world would have far more confidence, rather than listening to their own media propaganda spin the ambiguities, and the wars might even be avoided. 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Crimean_autonomy_referendum https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Crimean_autonomy_referend... 2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Kosovan_independence_referendum https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Kosovan_independence_refe...
- deleted 2y ago
  [deleted]
- treyd 2y ago
  The idea is that the machine just provides a preliminary count, a official manual count happens over the following several hours. If there's a discrepancy then the only the manual count counts and the machine can be identified as problematic.
  - sgerenser 2y ago
    No manual count happens unless the results of the election are in question (very close race, evidence of impropriety, etc.)
    - HelloMcFly 2y ago
      Selective audits are standard practice though, where issues can trigger a broade r manual recount
- dragonwriter 2y ago
  The actual ballots are stored, a selective audit is done to verify the electronic count, and in the event that raises issues a full manual recount can be done. The electronic voting system issues in the 2000 elections motivated the Help America Vote Act of 2002 under which voter-verified paper records for audit purpose required for all voting machines (this requirement became effective in 2006); effectively, “voting machines” add ballot marking machines that may also be involved in convenience tabulation, but are always audited against hand counts of paper ballots, which are the ultimate authority.
bryan0 2y ago
FTA: “Colorado voter votes on a paper ballot, which is then audited during the Risk Limiting Audit to verify that ballots were counted according to voter intent.”
breatheoften 2y ago
I voted early in person in Colorado a few days ago. Use a machine to entry my votes. Votes were printed onto a piece of paper. I checked to make sure the marks on the paper matched what I entered into the machine and then dropped it into the ballot box (not a machine just a box that collected the ballots). It was pretty sane and didn't seem like there was a lot to worry over related to the electronic entry system. As to how the votes on the ballots are tallied - if those machines are compromised seems like a definite problem -- though there is at least the option to hand count the ballots to compare against ...
- floating-io 2y ago
  In my locale there is a header on the physical ballot that contains a bunch of barcodes, presumably to make your votes machine readable. It then prints the votes in text below. I absolutely hate that fact. I am a human, I cannot read barcodes without a computer. Therefore, I cannot tell if the important part of what was recorded is correct. Not sure if Colorado's are the same...
  - Dalewyn 2y ago
    The value of absolute transparency is why nothing will beat paper ballots written and marked in plain English counted by hand with anyone and everyone who cares about election integrity watching the process.
    - sadeshmukh 2y ago
      I mean, if you're willing to spend that much, and it'll be very expensive, then sure. It's just technophobia - machines are going to be more accurate than a human (who also can make a mistake!).
      - Dalewyn 2y ago
        >machines are going to be more accurate Says who? Also, what does "accurate" here actually mean? Speaking as someone who actually understands computers and machines: I agree with the commons (who are simpletons with regards to computers and machines) that machines cannot be trusted to be "accurate" (whatever that means) or even trusted in general. Especially when a simpler, confirmable-by-anyone method exists: Having someone count paper ballots by hand in the presence of anyone and everyone. That includes mistakes and errors. The value here is anyone and everyone can and will immediately understand (and thus accept) what is going on. Also, why are we even putting the integrity of the very foundation of our democracy on the table in exchange for convenience and cost of all things? Are we serious? It should be a good thing we are taking precious time and money to make sure our democracy is working properly. I thought democracy was actually fucking important.

liquidise 2y ago

CO resident here. CO mails paper ballots to everyone* about a month before election day. You can choose to vote in person, or mail in/drop off your paper ballot anytime prior to election night. My understanding is what while the ballots are paper, many (all?) are tabulated digitally. It certainly appears to be laid out in a way that benefits digital reading, and i believe that is what the machines in question are responsible for. * for some definition of "everyone"

wannacboatmovie 2y ago
[flagged]
- ForHackernews 2y ago
  Another example of "Everything looks suspicious when you don’t know how anything works."[0] Mailed ballots are verified against voter registrations and signatures are checked against the signature on file. This woman with a bunch of ballots for former residents of her apartment would gain essentially nothing and open herself to serious criminal penalties if she tried to vote as anyone except herself. [0] https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/elon-musk-election-misinformation-trump-dominion-rcna176096 https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/elon-musk-electi...
  - deleted 2y ago
    [deleted]
  - bhk 2y ago
    The article you cite says nothing in direct response to the parent comment (ballot harvesting, etc.). It also includes some misinformation, saying " signature verification is a critical part of ensuring that only valid ballots from eligible voters get counted" ... while many states, including Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, North Carolina, and Georgia, do not verify signatures. https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-14-how-states-verify-voted-absentee-mail-ballots https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-14-how-st... Another example of "Nothing looks suspicious when your eyes are closed"?

wannacboatmovie 2y ago

[flagged]

nkrisc 2y ago
[flagged]
- wannacboatmovie 2y ago
  [flagged]
  - gruez 2y ago
    There's a pretty wide range of possibilities between "videos were all faked because this is the most secure election in history" and "let's not take the video at face value and await further verification because it's election season and there's plenty of bad actors trying to sow distrust in the election system by posting misleading/manipulated videos".
    - wannacboatmovie 2y ago
      The implication of the videos was that this was malice (and that generates clicks) yet if you read between the lines, it's simply incompetency - uncalibrated touchscreens. My point is local jurisdictions do not have the knowledge or resources to properly maintain or deal with electronic voting machines (of which there appears to be no national standard) and maintain integrity. If they can't remember to perform basic maintenance like calibrate the screens, what other steps are missed or ignored?
  - ForHackernews 2y ago
    Which do you suppose is more likely... A) There was a voting machine that had a miscalibrated touchscreen that will be corrected before election day. B) An evil democrat conspiracy is going to steal the election in Kentucky
    - 2y ago

CaliforniaKarl 2y ago

> Where am I technically wrong here? I'm sure I'm missing something obvious. As I understand that article, BIOS access requires two passwords, and the list only provides one of the two passwords. So, instead of "password list" I would say "partial-password list". The list also misses "There is 24/7 video camera recording on all election equipment." Of course, you can raise concerns and failure modes about video recordings, but that all brings up the question "Were those recordings compromised?" You should not assume that they were.

mc32 2y ago

Here’s a telling interview by someone doing journalism rather than running cover: https://youtu.be/NLi-0WI-f7M?si=o8qktF4d25E3oJ-s https://youtu.be/NLi-0WI-f7M?si=o8qktF4d25E3oJ-s It’s interesting that she made excuses for herself but previously had no quarter for someone who landed in similar position.

flyingcircus3 2y ago
It's only interesting when you oversimplify the two situations for the express purpose of sowing distrust. The only reason you've left out the details that Tina Peters actually facilitated physical access to voting machines with both required passwords, while this current leak was not even sufficient for someone to repeat Peters' actions, is that it would be absolutely devastating to your entire argument.

blackeyeblitzar 2y ago

It is important that the voting system have credibility for everyone - regardless of party. Has anyone done a ground up exercise of rethinking the process and the involved technologies from a cybersecurity standpoint? It would be great to offer voters verification of their votes while maintaining secrecy. But right now I feel like we are stuck, with one half the country having doubts about the process and the other half insisting that it is absolutely perfect. It isn’t enough for the process to be either correct or trustworthy. It has to be both.

JumpCrisscross 2y ago
> Has anyone done a ground up exercise of rethinking the process and the involved technologies from a cybersecurity standpoint? Chesterton’s fence.
- sethammons 2y ago
  I take it that you mean that before you tear down this system, understand why it is the way it is. And, yeah, sure. I don't think that invalidates reimagining the solution from what may be new/updated first principles.
- blackeyeblitzar 2y ago
  This feels a lot like the people who simply tell others to become a poll worker when they start asking hard questions about the system. I get the wisdom in this but it can also be a waste of time. In other (non electoral) situations, many big improvements can and have happened without needing to endlessly understand existing things. In this case it is clear we don’t have verifiable elections - you don’t need to understand anything deeply to know this, since it is apparent with your own ballot. So instead let’s design for something better.
  - JumpCrisscross 2y ago
    > you don’t need to understand anything deeply to know this, since it is apparent with your own ballot Are you giving up the secret ballot in your scheme?

EasyMark 2y ago

In texas you pick your items on computer and it spits out a paper ballot that you can look at to verify it's what you voted for. The info is also included in a qr code like form for a reader. In the event that something looks off it can be verified by humans. I figured something similar was done all over.

deleted 2y ago
[deleted]
kodablah 2y ago
This is not the case everywhere in Texas. In many places, you fill in a paper ballot at a booth and feed it into a machine at the end with nothing printed afterwards.

ZYbCRq22HbJ2y7 2y ago

Here is a video explaining Colorado's voting system: https://vimeo.com/842943160 https://vimeo.com/842943160 It has a surprisingly(?) low view count for how riled up everyone is about all this. If you want more insight into this system, here is a test plan from August of this year on the Election Assistance Commission's website: https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/ClearVote%202.5%20Test%20Plan%20TP-01-01-CBG-07-01.01.pdf https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/ClearVote%20... It also has a list of bug fixes like: > Changed the ClearCount API to require authentication before uploading files (such as ballot images and tabulation results) to the server. And software details like: - MySQL 8 - Ubuntu 20 - Windows 10 IoT Enterprise LTSC 2021 - Windows Enterprise IoT 21H2 release - Python 3 - CIS SCAP Ubuntu 20.04 revision 1.1.0 Here is a summary of an audit done on a previous version last year: https://elections.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2023/10/clear-ballot-clearvote-2.4-nystec-review-report.pdf https://elections.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2023/10/clea...