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> Unisys will pay a $4 million civil penalty; > Avaya. will pay a $1 million civil penalty; > Check Point will pay a $995,000 civil penalty; and > Mimecast w
by MattSteelblade 2y ago
> Unisys will pay a $4 million civil penalty;
> Avaya. will pay a $1 million civil penalty;
> Check Point will pay a $995,000 civil penalty; and
> Mimecast will pay a $990,000 civil penalty.
With the exception of Mimecast, these are companies that are bringing in billions of dollars in revenue annually. How is this supposed to deter them?
- 0xffff2 2y agoThey pay the penalty and they are expected fix the issue. If they don't, there will be additional enforcement actions.
- Mistletoe 2y agoDoing anything at all probably costs more than $1M.
- alephnerd 2y agoNot that much more. Furthermore, security vendors like Avaya and Unisys could arguably be in breach of contract with customers because it could be argued that they misrepresented their internal security protocols to customers.
- ensignavenger 2y agoUnisys and Avaya are both reporting losses. This fine makes it even more of a loss. Further, if they don't mend their ways, the SEC will give them an even bigger fine.
- alephnerd 2y ago> How is this supposed to deter them Unisys and Avaya are both security vendors. This absolutely is a bad look for them, as almost every Security RFP asks about internal controls and how a vendor has remediated against these issues, and this is ammunition for any competitor to ask a prospect to re-evaluate purchases from either due to misrepresenting their security procedures. Furthermore, Unisys only has an operating profit of around $200M a year, so a $4M fine is fairly brutal (that's an entire security team's operating budget for a company at Unisys' size). Avaya's is smaller still, so that $1M is fairly brutal for them
- teeray 2y agoThe law should be written to require a mandatory percentage of revenue. That will wake them up.
- kmeisthax 2y agoIt will not. The reason why companies get breached is because the systems being breached are all legacy. Company A buys company B who bought company C, which merged with company D. C fires D's old IT department, because it's redundant, so now D's billing system is being managed by C's IT department. C then sells itself to B, who has a much more robust billing system. At this point, it'd make sense to replace the billing system from D, but everyone who knew how it worked got fired in the C/D merger. So it sits around because nobody wants to break that part of the business. Then A buys B and does another round of layoffs, so anyone who even knew about this is gone. Ten years and hundreds of iterations of this exact cycle later, you get an e-mail from a stranger saying they found all your customer records being sold on a cybercrime forum. Your IT department scrambles to remediate a breach in a system they've never heard of that nobody remembers installing or maintaining. It's just always been there. Corporate amnesia runs deep. People are finding forgotten old servers running unpatched versions of Windows Server 2003 that were so ritualistically overlooked you'd need to be high on Class Z mnestics just to perceive them. Every enterprise IT department is like this. That's why companies get breached so damned often. There is never enough time in the budget to properly document legacy systems, nor are the decision-makers at the top even aware of the fact that they exist. Their job is to eat things, and they eat voraciously. If you want to stop this from happening, you need to make M&A illegal, not just inflict more pain to the invisible arms the corporate body cannot perceive pain from.
- philipov 2y agoWell, you've convinced me. M&A should be illegal.
- akira2501 2y ago> Every enterprise IT department is like this. That's because it's not understood what a liability allowing this to occur is. Perhaps if we fine them based on revenue they would understand that IT is a core part of their company and can no longer live on the edges of the business units.
- Hilift 2y agoThe fines are symbolic. Even if you look at the fine for the hotel data breach in 2018, that was only $52 million (US) and $23 million (UK), total of $75 million. And the Equifax breach? An executive VP of IT sold $584k of shares right after the breach and before the press release. Nothing happened to him, he said he was unaware of the breach. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/08/549434187/3-equifax-executives-sold-stock-days-after-hack-that-wasnt-disclosed-for-a-month https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/08/549434187... The SW supply chain attack is one of the most brilliant cyber attacks in recent history. They hit a train load of gold bars, and had a much as 14 months of dwell time with potentially 18,000 customers. Discovery must have been disappointing for the attackers. If you follow the most important rule, secrecy, you get plausible deniability and small-er fines.
- SpicyLemonZest 2y agoIt's not a case of deterrence. As the orders linked from the press release describe, all four of these companies have been cooperating extensively with the SEC to fix things up and agreed to continue doing so as part of the settlement.
- advisedwang 2y agoSEC likely offered low settlements here to get agreements without having to battle in court whether SEC even has the authority to do this. Now that they have to some degree established authority here* they can go for enforcement harder and push companies further on disclosure. * ie a practical precedent, not a legal one
- Terretta 2y agoWhat really gets attention is "consent orders" where if the regulated entity doesn't clean up the act, then that line of business, or the whole entity, gets shut down. Often you may see this result in a divestiture, as in, unable to clean up, so we'll sell the client base to someone with better systems. (In theory. Almost inevitably, this drags a few legacy systems over anyway.)