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> true, because it doesn't make sense to "know" a falsehoood That's a problem right there. Maybe that made sense to the Greeks, but it definitely doesn't make

> true, because it doesn't make sense to "know" a falsehoood That's a problem right there. Maybe that made sense to the Greeks, but it definitely doesn't make any sense in the 21st century. "Knowing" falsehoods is something we broadly acknowledge that we all do.

n4r9 2y ago
Could you elaborate what you mean by that?
- PaulDavisThe1st 2y ago
  We all carry around multiple falsehoods in our heads that we are convinced are true for a variety of reasons. To say that this is not "knowing" is (as another commenter noted) hair-splitting of the worst kind. In every sense it is a justified belief that happens to be false (we just do not know that yet).
  - bee_rider 2y ago
    What exactly does it mean to know something then? As distinct from believing it. Just the justification, and then, I guess it doesn't have to be a very good justification if it can be wrong?
    - PaulDavisThe1st 2y ago
      I think I would say that knowing means that your belief can resist challenges (to some degree) and that it is capable of driving behavior that changes others' beliefs. The strength of the justification is, I would suggest, largely subjective.
      - n4r9 2y ago
        My issue with this definition is that it includes deluded charlatans, can be applied to unfalsifiable (unknowable, even) propositions, and depends on the gullibility and cognitive biases of the general populace. So for example, Jesus "knew" that he was the son of God, even though a more rational interpretation is that he was mistaken in his own belief but charismatic enough to convince many others. (Please replace Jesus for another religion's prophet if you are Christian!) Also I don't think this definition fits with people's intuition. At least, certainly not my own. There are times where I realise I'm wrong about something I thought I knew. When I look back, I don't say "I knew this, and I was wrong". I say "I thought I knew this, but I didn't actually know it".
    - dahart 2y ago
      > What exactly does it mean to know something then? This is one of the best questions ever, not just for philosophers, but for all us regular plebes to ponder often. The number of things I know is very very small, and the number of things I believe dramatically outnumbers the things I know. I believe, but don’t know, that this is true for everyone. ;) It seems pretty apparent, however, that we can’t know everything we believe, or nothing would ever get done. We can’t all separately experience all things known first-hand, so we rely on stories and the beliefs they invoke in order to survive and progress as a species.
    - mrbombastic 2y ago
      I think like many things “know” and “believe” are just a shorthand for convenient communication that makes binary something that is really a continuum of probability. That continuum might be something from loose theory to fundamental truth about the universe in our minds. Justifications and evidence move things down the continuum, such that we might assign a probability a thing is true, things can approach 100% probability but never get there, but we as mortals need to operate in the world as if we know things so we say anything close to 100% we “know”. Even though history tells us even some things we believe to be fundamental truths can be discovered to be wrong.
  - throw310822 2y ago
    > In every sense it is a justified belief that happens to be false Not to mention what does it even mean for something to be false. For the hypothetical savage the knowledge that the moon is a piece of cheese just beyond reach is as true as it is for me the knowledge that it's a celestial body 300k km away. Both statements are false for the engineer that needs to land a probe there (the distance varies and 300k km is definitely wrong).
JadeNB 2y ago
> That's a problem right there. Maybe that made sense to the Greeks, but it definitely doesn't make any sense in the 21st century. "Knowing" falsehoods is something we broadly acknowledge that we all do. I think the philosophical claim is that, when we think we know something, and the thing that we turns out to be false, what has happened isn't that we knew something false, but rather that we didn't actually know the thing in the first place. That is, not our knowledge, but our belief that we had knowledge, was mistaken. (Of course, one can say that we did after all know it in any conventional sense of the word, and that such a distinction is at the very best hair splitting. But philosophy is willing to split hairs however finely reason can split them ….)
- PaulDavisThe1st 2y ago
  The problem with the hair splitting is that it requires differentiating between different brain states over time where the only difference is the content. On Jan 1 2024 I "know" X. Time passes. On Jan 1 2028, I "know" !X. In both cases, there is (a) something it is like to "know" either X or !X (b) discernible brain states the correspond to "knowing" either X or !X and that are distinct from "knowing" neither Thus, even if you don't want to call "knowing X" actually "knowing", it is in just about every sense indistinguishable from "knowing !X". Also, a belief that we had the knowledge that relates to X is indistinguishable from a belief that we had the knowledge that relates to !X. In both cases, we possess knowledge which may be true or false. The knowledge we have at different times alters; at all times we have a belief that we have the knowledge that justifies X or !X, and we are correct in that belief - it is only the knowledge itself that is false.
  - kragen 2y ago
    Maybe the people who use "know" in the way you don't are talking about something other than brain states or qualia. There are lots of propositions like this; if I say, "I fathered Alston", that may be true or false for reasons that are independent of my brain state. Similarly with "I will get home tomorrow before sunset". It may be true or false; I can't actually tell. The same is true of the proposition "I know there are coins in the pocket of the fellow who will get the job", if by "know" we mean something other than a brain state, something we can't directly observe. You evidently want to use the word "know" exclusively to describe a brain state, but many people use it to mean a different thing. Those people are the ones who are having this debate. It's true that you can render this debate, like any debate, into nonsense by redefining the terms they are using, but that in itself doesn't mean that it's inherently nonsense. Maybe you're making the ontological claim that your beliefs about X don't actually become definitely true or false until you have a way to tell the difference? A sort of solipsistic or idealistic worldview? But you seem to reject that claim in your last sentence, saying, "it is only the knowledge itself that is false."
kragen 2y ago
No, I think many people use a definition of "know" that doesn't include "knowing" falsehoods. Possibly you and they have fundamentally beliefs about the nature of reality, or possibly you are just using different definitions for the same word.
- bbor 2y ago
  This is the true analytic answer! More fundamentally, “know” is a move in whatever subtype of the English language game you’re playing at the moment, and any discussions we have about what it “really” or “truly” means should be based on those instrumental concerns. E.g. a neurologist would likely be happy to speak of a brain knowing false information, but a psychologist would insist that that’s not the right word. And that’s not even approaching how this maps to close-but-not-quite-exact translations of the word in other languages…
- mannykannot 2y ago
  I agree that it is not often helpful to to avoid the issue by redefining a term in a way not originally intended (though it may be justified if the original definition is predicated on an unjustifiable (and sometimes tacit) assumption.) Furthermore, OP’s choice of putting “know” in quotes seems to suggest that author is not using the word as conventionally understood (though, of course, orthography is not an infallible guide to intent.) IMHO, Gettier cases are useful only on that they raise the issue of what constitutes an acceptable justification for a belief to become knowledge. Gettier clauses are specifically constructed to be about true beliefs, and so do not challenge the idea that facts are true. Instead, one option to resolve the paradox is to drop the justification requirement altogether, but that opens the question of what, if anything, we can know we know. At this point, I feel that I am just following Hume’s footsteps…
  - kragen 2y ago
    I think making sense of the Gettier debate does depend on using a definition of "know" that isn't just a question of what state the "knower's" brain is in. Gettier's point is not that truth isn't necessary; it's that, generally when people say "know", they are referring not only to brain states and truth, but also something else, specifically, some kind of causal connection between the two. I don't think you can construct a definition of "know" by which Gettier cases aren't "knowing" to which truth is irrelevant.
naasking 2y ago
False propositions are not knowledge, only true propositions are knowledge. Therefore you cannot know something true that is actually false, you can only believe something true that is actually false. Precisely describing how one moves from belief to knowledge is exactly what epistemology is about.
- paganel 2y ago
  > False propositions are not knowledge, only true propositions are knowledge. This is something that a lot of Greeks would have had issues with, most probably Heraclitus, and Protagoras for sure. Restricting ourselves to Aristotelian logic back in the day has been extremely limiting, so much so that a lot of modern philosophers cannot even comprehends how it is to look outside that logic.
  - naasking 2y ago
    > Restricting ourselves to Aristotelian logic back in the day has been extremely limiting, so much so that a lot of modern philosophers cannot even comprehends how it is to look outside that logic. That's arguably good. If you restrict yourself to something that you know is a valid method of ascertaining truth, then you have much higher confidence in the conclusion. The fact that we still struggle even with getting this restricted method shows that restrictions are necessary and good! Then you bootstrap your way to a more comprehensive method of discourse from that solid foundation. Like Hilbert's program, which ultimately revealed some incredibly important truths about logic and mathematics.
    - paganel 2y ago
      That’s the thing, it only ascertains a restricted form of truth (in the case of Aristotelian logic what would be called “Aristotelian” truth), and I’m not sure you can then make the step from “Aristotelian” truth to “Heraclitean” (let’s say) truth, first, because of the sociology of science (for example everything seen as not-“Aristotelian” might be regarded by default as suss and intellectually non-touchable, just look at the bad renown Protagoras still has after 2500 years), and second, and I’m not sure how best to call it, because restricting ourselves for so long focusing on one thing and one thing only when it comes to the foundations of truth has made us “blind” to any other options/possibilities, we can not take our eyes off the cave walls and turn them towards the outside world and towards the light anymore. And to give a concrete example related to this as a whole, people should have known that getting to know something by not knowing it more and more is a valid epistemological take, just look at Christian Orthodox Isichasm and its doctrine about God (paraphrased it goes like this: the more you are aware of the fact that you don’t know God then the more you actually know/experience God”). Christian Orthodox Isichasm is, of course, in direct connection with neo-Platonism/Plotinism, but because the neo-Platonist “doctrine” on truth has never been mathematically formalized (presuming that that would even be possible) then the scientific world chooses to ignore it and only focuses on its own restricted way of looking at truth and, in the end, of experiencing truth.
mistermann 2y ago
> "Knowing" falsehoods is something we broadly acknowledge that we all do. Only in abstract discussions like this one. And in some concrete discussions on certain topics, not "knowing" seems to be essentially impossible for most non-silent participants.

n4r9 2y ago

Could you elaborate what you mean by that?

PaulDavisThe1st 2y ago
We all carry around multiple falsehoods in our heads that we are convinced are true for a variety of reasons. To say that this is not "knowing" is (as another commenter noted) hair-splitting of the worst kind. In every sense it is a justified belief that happens to be false (we just do not know that yet).
- bee_rider 2y ago
  What exactly does it mean to know something then? As distinct from believing it. Just the justification, and then, I guess it doesn't have to be a very good justification if it can be wrong?
  - PaulDavisThe1st 2y ago
    I think I would say that knowing means that your belief can resist challenges (to some degree) and that it is capable of driving behavior that changes others' beliefs. The strength of the justification is, I would suggest, largely subjective.
    - n4r9 2y ago
      My issue with this definition is that it includes deluded charlatans, can be applied to unfalsifiable (unknowable, even) propositions, and depends on the gullibility and cognitive biases of the general populace. So for example, Jesus "knew" that he was the son of God, even though a more rational interpretation is that he was mistaken in his own belief but charismatic enough to convince many others. (Please replace Jesus for another religion's prophet if you are Christian!) Also I don't think this definition fits with people's intuition. At least, certainly not my own. There are times where I realise I'm wrong about something I thought I knew. When I look back, I don't say "I knew this, and I was wrong". I say "I thought I knew this, but I didn't actually know it".
  - dahart 2y ago
    > What exactly does it mean to know something then? This is one of the best questions ever, not just for philosophers, but for all us regular plebes to ponder often. The number of things I know is very very small, and the number of things I believe dramatically outnumbers the things I know. I believe, but don’t know, that this is true for everyone. ;) It seems pretty apparent, however, that we can’t know everything we believe, or nothing would ever get done. We can’t all separately experience all things known first-hand, so we rely on stories and the beliefs they invoke in order to survive and progress as a species.
  - mrbombastic 2y ago
    I think like many things “know” and “believe” are just a shorthand for convenient communication that makes binary something that is really a continuum of probability. That continuum might be something from loose theory to fundamental truth about the universe in our minds. Justifications and evidence move things down the continuum, such that we might assign a probability a thing is true, things can approach 100% probability but never get there, but we as mortals need to operate in the world as if we know things so we say anything close to 100% we “know”. Even though history tells us even some things we believe to be fundamental truths can be discovered to be wrong.
- throw310822 2y ago
  > In every sense it is a justified belief that happens to be false Not to mention what does it even mean for something to be false. For the hypothetical savage the knowledge that the moon is a piece of cheese just beyond reach is as true as it is for me the knowledge that it's a celestial body 300k km away. Both statements are false for the engineer that needs to land a probe there (the distance varies and 300k km is definitely wrong).

JadeNB 2y ago

> That's a problem right there. Maybe that made sense to the Greeks, but it definitely doesn't make any sense in the 21st century. "Knowing" falsehoods is something we broadly acknowledge that we all do. I think the philosophical claim is that, when we think we know something, and the thing that we turns out to be false, what has happened isn't that we knew something false, but rather that we didn't actually know the thing in the first place. That is, not our knowledge, but our belief that we had knowledge, was mistaken. (Of course, one can say that we did after all know it in any conventional sense of the word, and that such a distinction is at the very best hair splitting. But philosophy is willing to split hairs however finely reason can split them ….)

PaulDavisThe1st 2y ago
The problem with the hair splitting is that it requires differentiating between different brain states over time where the only difference is the content. On Jan 1 2024 I "know" X. Time passes. On Jan 1 2028, I "know" !X. In both cases, there is (a) something it is like to "know" either X or !X (b) discernible brain states the correspond to "knowing" either X or !X and that are distinct from "knowing" neither Thus, even if you don't want to call "knowing X" actually "knowing", it is in just about every sense indistinguishable from "knowing !X". Also, a belief that we had the knowledge that relates to X is indistinguishable from a belief that we had the knowledge that relates to !X. In both cases, we possess knowledge which may be true or false. The knowledge we have at different times alters; at all times we have a belief that we have the knowledge that justifies X or !X, and we are correct in that belief - it is only the knowledge itself that is false.
- kragen 2y ago
  Maybe the people who use "know" in the way you don't are talking about something other than brain states or qualia. There are lots of propositions like this; if I say, "I fathered Alston", that may be true or false for reasons that are independent of my brain state. Similarly with "I will get home tomorrow before sunset". It may be true or false; I can't actually tell. The same is true of the proposition "I know there are coins in the pocket of the fellow who will get the job", if by "know" we mean something other than a brain state, something we can't directly observe. You evidently want to use the word "know" exclusively to describe a brain state, but many people use it to mean a different thing. Those people are the ones who are having this debate. It's true that you can render this debate, like any debate, into nonsense by redefining the terms they are using, but that in itself doesn't mean that it's inherently nonsense. Maybe you're making the ontological claim that your beliefs about X don't actually become definitely true or false until you have a way to tell the difference? A sort of solipsistic or idealistic worldview? But you seem to reject that claim in your last sentence, saying, "it is only the knowledge itself that is false."

kragen 2y ago

No, I think many people use a definition of "know" that doesn't include "knowing" falsehoods. Possibly you and they have fundamentally beliefs about the nature of reality, or possibly you are just using different definitions for the same word.

bbor 2y ago
This is the true analytic answer! More fundamentally, “know” is a move in whatever subtype of the English language game you’re playing at the moment, and any discussions we have about what it “really” or “truly” means should be based on those instrumental concerns. E.g. a neurologist would likely be happy to speak of a brain knowing false information, but a psychologist would insist that that’s not the right word. And that’s not even approaching how this maps to close-but-not-quite-exact translations of the word in other languages…
mannykannot 2y ago
I agree that it is not often helpful to to avoid the issue by redefining a term in a way not originally intended (though it may be justified if the original definition is predicated on an unjustifiable (and sometimes tacit) assumption.) Furthermore, OP’s choice of putting “know” in quotes seems to suggest that author is not using the word as conventionally understood (though, of course, orthography is not an infallible guide to intent.) IMHO, Gettier cases are useful only on that they raise the issue of what constitutes an acceptable justification for a belief to become knowledge. Gettier clauses are specifically constructed to be about true beliefs, and so do not challenge the idea that facts are true. Instead, one option to resolve the paradox is to drop the justification requirement altogether, but that opens the question of what, if anything, we can know we know. At this point, I feel that I am just following Hume’s footsteps…
- kragen 2y ago
  I think making sense of the Gettier debate does depend on using a definition of "know" that isn't just a question of what state the "knower's" brain is in. Gettier's point is not that truth isn't necessary; it's that, generally when people say "know", they are referring not only to brain states and truth, but also something else, specifically, some kind of causal connection between the two. I don't think you can construct a definition of "know" by which Gettier cases aren't "knowing" to which truth is irrelevant.

naasking 2y ago

False propositions are not knowledge, only true propositions are knowledge. Therefore you cannot know something true that is actually false, you can only believe something true that is actually false. Precisely describing how one moves from belief to knowledge is exactly what epistemology is about.

paganel 2y ago
> False propositions are not knowledge, only true propositions are knowledge. This is something that a lot of Greeks would have had issues with, most probably Heraclitus, and Protagoras for sure. Restricting ourselves to Aristotelian logic back in the day has been extremely limiting, so much so that a lot of modern philosophers cannot even comprehends how it is to look outside that logic.
- naasking 2y ago
  > Restricting ourselves to Aristotelian logic back in the day has been extremely limiting, so much so that a lot of modern philosophers cannot even comprehends how it is to look outside that logic. That's arguably good. If you restrict yourself to something that you know is a valid method of ascertaining truth, then you have much higher confidence in the conclusion. The fact that we still struggle even with getting this restricted method shows that restrictions are necessary and good! Then you bootstrap your way to a more comprehensive method of discourse from that solid foundation. Like Hilbert's program, which ultimately revealed some incredibly important truths about logic and mathematics.
  - paganel 2y ago
    That’s the thing, it only ascertains a restricted form of truth (in the case of Aristotelian logic what would be called “Aristotelian” truth), and I’m not sure you can then make the step from “Aristotelian” truth to “Heraclitean” (let’s say) truth, first, because of the sociology of science (for example everything seen as not-“Aristotelian” might be regarded by default as suss and intellectually non-touchable, just look at the bad renown Protagoras still has after 2500 years), and second, and I’m not sure how best to call it, because restricting ourselves for so long focusing on one thing and one thing only when it comes to the foundations of truth has made us “blind” to any other options/possibilities, we can not take our eyes off the cave walls and turn them towards the outside world and towards the light anymore. And to give a concrete example related to this as a whole, people should have known that getting to know something by not knowing it more and more is a valid epistemological take, just look at Christian Orthodox Isichasm and its doctrine about God (paraphrased it goes like this: the more you are aware of the fact that you don’t know God then the more you actually know/experience God”). Christian Orthodox Isichasm is, of course, in direct connection with neo-Platonism/Plotinism, but because the neo-Platonist “doctrine” on truth has never been mathematically formalized (presuming that that would even be possible) then the scientific world chooses to ignore it and only focuses on its own restricted way of looking at truth and, in the end, of experiencing truth.

mistermann 2y ago

> "Knowing" falsehoods is something we broadly acknowledge that we all do. Only in abstract discussions like this one. And in some concrete discussions on certain topics, not "knowing" seems to be essentially impossible for most non-silent participants.