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I work in this field. Some notes here "Unlike ADS-B in a plane, AIS can only be turned off in rare circumstances." AIS can and does get turned off all the tim
by TrackerFF 2y ago
I work in this field. Some notes here
"Unlike ADS-B in a plane, AIS can only be turned off in rare circumstances."
AIS can and does get turned off all the time. Different countries have different laws on this, so you will see very different patterns on where AIS goes dark. Sometimes vessels will turn off their AIS as soon as they leave some EEZ for international waters, sometimes they just turn it off if there's little risk of getting caught. As the article says, AIS is primarily used for safety measures - and is what it was designed for. But most developed countries have since started to use AIS for maritime surveillance, and have in the later years codified in laws / regulated how vessels of certain size must use their AIS transponders. VMS, which has a much greater capability in sending out data (catch logs, for example), has become more and more common.
It is also difficult to know whether or not a ship deliberately turns off its AIS transponder, or if it is in an area with poor coverage. AIS data is collected via satellites and land based antennas - some data providers also provide signal strength to give a clue. When presenting AIS data in court, we never, ever say that a vessel has turn off their AIS transponders - only present the data and some probabilities.
Bogus AIS tracks is a massive, massive problem. I frequently analyze areas where as much as 100% of the "traffic" turns out to be junk. They _can_ be pretty easy to filter out if there is some pattern of randomness, and a lot of the junk is just that - the AIS messages are just scattered uniformly around the globe, leading to impossible speeds. 99% of junk tracks are either registered as Chinese, or some micro-nations with little to no maritime activity.
Spoofing is also a problem. In my work, we've been analyzing the Russian tanker movement closely for a couple of years now, and some of the spoofing has been really sloppy - so sloppy that the public quickly noticed. This is my favorite, because it was so low effort: https://gcaptain.com/blink-and-youll-miss-it-russia-deploys-second-stealth-lng-tanker-to-sanctioned-gas-project/ https://gcaptain.com/blink-and-youll-miss-it-russia-deploys-...
(if you look at the data, you'll see that they just spoofed the AIS messages with a constant speed for two week straight, going through the exact same positions multiple times).
With that said, the average of the data gives you nice patterns. There's a ton of variance due to all the fake data, missing data, faulty data, etc. - so in a day-to-day job a lot of your work is to figure out whether or not the dataset is a valid one.
- brk 2y agoWhat's the motivation for the bogus data? Just adding noise to obscure real vessel activity? Similarly, the entire AIS tracking system needs a layer of authentication. I ran an AIS station for several years that fed data to Marinetraffic, and I could have stuffed whatever data I wanted into their database with no apparent restrictions or checks.
- mschuster91 2y ago> What's the motivation for the bogus data? Some people just want to see the world burn. Vandals and trolls basically. IIRC there have been multiple incidents of people spoofing genitalia shaped tracks (on top of an even larger multitude of actual pilots steering air and water craft to draw genitalia). Easy enough to do, all you need is a transmitter (which are getting very cheap these days thankfully) and something that can output a stream of fake GPS positions in NMEA format on a serial port. Others run broken or misconfigured equipment and either don't know, don't care or do it intentionally with plausible deniability (Chinese ships in non-China waters stealing fish are a huge problem [1]). At least a lot of the dumbasses and breakages can actually be filtered - AIS Class A transmitters on large ships can reach up to 100km, AIS Class B transmitters (everyone else) about 40km, ADS-B on aircraft about 500km. That means even as a solo operator of an AIS/ADS receiver, you can safely discard anything more than these distances away from your coordinates, it's likely garbage, just like stuff that moves at impossible speeds - you won't get a boat at more than 100 km/h, a small prop aircraft like a Cessna at more than 500 km/h (unless it's nose-dive crashing), or a civilian airliner at more than 1.200 km/h. [1] https://www.seaaroundus.org/industrial-fleets-operating-indian-ocean-turn-off-monitoring-systems-fail-reporting-obligations/ https://www.seaaroundus.org/industrial-fleets-operating-indi...
- mcculley 2y agoSome do not want their competitors to know where they are. Some vessels are fishing in illegal waters or violating sanctions.
- causal 2y agoThanks for sharing! I'm trying to understand what bogus AIS tracks means - are you saying these are AIS messages injected into the network somehow, or actual AIS radio signals that somehow ended up transmitted from the wrong place? I'm assuming the former, which sounds more like an authentication problem?