9 ms·

>Surely eventually I'm going to get a hit where all three nodes in the circuit are my nodes that are logging everything? The word "eventually" is doing a lot o

>Surely eventually I'm going to get a hit where all three nodes in the circuit are my nodes that are logging everything? The word "eventually" is doing a lot of heavy lifting here. Let's say you actually manage to add 1000 servers to the tor network somehow without getting detected. The network currently sits at just under 8000 nodes. For simplicity, lets also ignore that there are different types of nodes and geographical considerations and instead just ask what is the probability that someone randomly chooses three nodes that you own. The answer is less than 0.14%. If that someone decided to use 4 nodes to be extra-safe, that number goes down to 0.015%. And it decreases exponentially for every additional relay he adds. Combine this with the fact that tor nodes are actively monitored and regularly vetted for malicious behaviour[1], and these attacks become increasingly difficult. Could someone like the NSA with limitless resources do it? Quite probably, sure. But could you or any other random guy do it? Almost certainly not. [1] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wikis/Criteria-for-rejecting-bad-relays https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wiki... Edit: For all the cynics and doomsayers here, consider this: Tor has been around for a long time, but there has never been an uptick in arrests that could be correlated to cracking the core anonymity service. If you look closely at the actual high profile cases where people got busted despite using tor, these people always made other mistakes that led authorities to them.

mzs 2y ago
So if there are greater than only 357 people on topics the GP is interested in that's better than 50/50 odds.
whimsicalism 2y ago
> Could someone like the NSA with limitless resources do it? Sure Yes, this is obviously the sort of adversary we would be discussing. > , lets also ignore that there are different types of nodes causing your number to be an underestimate > The answer is less than 0.14%. So almost certainly thousands of people
- sigmoid10 2y ago
  >Yes, this is obviously the sort of adversary we would be discussing. OP explicitly asked about himself, not some government organisation. >causing your number to be an underestimate Not necessarily. It might even be an overestimate if the attacker fails to supply enough nodes of the right kind. >So almost certainly thousands of people We're talking about a targeted attack. Of course the statistics game works better when you don't target specific people and just fish randomly. But there are probably more cost effective methods as well.
  - whimsicalism 2y ago
    > We're talking about a targeted attack From OP: " I can't target a specific person, but eventually I can find someone who has all three bounces through tor nodes I control, no" > Not necessarily. It might even be an overestimate if the attacker fails to supply enough nodes of the right kind. Assuming they match the existing distribution of nodes, they will only have better results.
    - sigmoid10 2y ago
      That's assuming a lot given the rest of the statement.
alasdair_ 2y ago
>The answer is less than 0.14%. Is this per circuit? So if someone switches circuits every X hours, the chance of being caught after a year is actually quite high? And even catching 0.14% of pedophiles would probably be worth it to the FBI or whatever, nevermind Iran catching dissidents or whatever. My point is that is seems very cheap to do this (I as a random staff engineer could do it myself) and catch some people. A nation state could easily catch a much higher percentage if they increased the number of logging nodes slowly and carefully and deliberately did things like use many isps and update the servers gradually etc.
- whimsicalism 2y ago
  The happy equilibrium is that if you have enough adversary nation-state intelligence services doing this and not sharing information, they'll cancel each other out and provide free node hosting.
- qwery 2y ago
  You're misusing probability and ignoring critical information. There's 1000 red marbles added to a jar with 8000 blue marbles (9000 total). Take three marbles from the jar randomly, one at a time. The odds of getting three red marbles is ~0.14%. That's all. Tor nodes are not randomly picked marbles. The Tor network is not a jar.
  - whimsicalism 2y ago
    they’re using probability correctly. if you have a critique state it clearly
PeterisP 2y ago
If someone would do the thing-to-be-detected (e.g. accessing CSAM) every day, then that 0.14% probability of detection turns out to be 40% for a single year (0.9986^365) or 64% over two years, so even that would deanonymize the majority of such people over time.
- sigmoid10 2y ago
  That assumes you could run thousands of malicious tor nodes for several years without being detected. Unless you have vast resources and time, this is unlikely.
  - mistercheph 2y ago
    I can't think of anyone with vast resources and time that would want to deanonymize cybercriminals
    - sigmoid10 2y ago
      Top commenter specifically asked about himself.
    - colechristensen 2y ago
      Outside of 3 letter agencies which is obvious, I have known people who would do this for fun or whatever other personal motivation. A lot of "hacker" mentality projects involve putting a tremendous amount of effort into something with questionable utility. People climb mountains because they're there.
  - worldsayshi 2y ago
    But it doesn't seem unfeasible for a state actor that wants to track their population then?
    - ziddoap 2y ago
      The comment that spawned this chain starts with: >Let's say I as a private individual
dumbo-octopus 2y ago
You don’t need all the middle nodes. Just the entry and exit, and enough data to do packet timing analysis to correlate them. It’s in fact shockingly easy for a well provisioned actor to trace tor traffic, and this is something the TOR project openly admits. They’re financed by the US Government after all…
- basedrum 2y ago
  Tor does have padding defenses to protect against that. Also, according to their latest blog post on their finances, while it is true they have money from the US Government, that was only ~50% of their income (I think that was 2023). For the FUD part of that comment, see the "U.S. Government Support" section of https://blog.torproject.org/transparency-openness-and-our-2021-and-2022-financials/ https://blog.torproject.org/transparency-openness-and-our-20...
  - dumbo-octopus 2y ago
    “Only half” is hilarious. Thanks for that. And if you trust the NSA can’t overcome correlation in the presence of “padding defenses”, then sure: TOR is secure.
    - 867-5309 2y ago
      I wonder how many tor users actually know this. tor would probably not exist in the same capacity without that funding
- tru3_power 2y ago
  Sounds like https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.07285 https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.07285
- alphan0n 2y ago
  Onion sites do not utilize an exit node.
  - dumbo-octopus 2y ago
oconnore 2y ago
> Could someone like the NSA with limitless resources do it? Quite probably, sure. If you're not worried about a fairly well-resourced government agency uncovering whatever network activity you believe needs to be anonymized, why would you be using Tor at all?
- echoangle 2y ago
  Depends on what you’re doing. The NSA isn’t going to expose themselves by tipping off law enforcement about small time drug deals. If you’re sharing CSAM or planning terrorist attacks, it might be different.
  - stackghost 2y ago
    >If you’re sharing CSAM or planning terrorist attacks, it might be different. They'll just employ parallel construction to avoid exposure.
- CapitalistCartr 2y ago
  Because you're an enemy of the Iranian, Saudi, North Korean, etc. gov't. Because your ex-spouse wants to murder you. Because you just escaped Scientology, or another cult. Because you're a criminal. The NSA doesn't handle that. Because you're a journalist talking to sources in the industry you're investigating.
  - adamrezich 2y ago
    Those second and third points are pretty laughably paranoid-fantasy reasons to use Tor—even if one found oneself in either situation.
    - throwme0827349 2y ago
      Respectfully, a large number of people rightfully fear for their lives, safety, and freedom due to being stalked or abused by a current or former partner. I have personally known several. Using victims' devices and communications in order to locate, and then harass, trap, or attack them, is commonplace for stalkers.
derefr 2y ago
You know what's easier than waiting around to get really lucky? Using those same network-health dashboards as DDoS target lists, to temporarily degrade/shut down the whole network except for your own nodes. Also, big nodes route more Tor circuits each. Costs more to run them, and they intentionally don't function as exit nodes (to avoid the "obvious" attack) — but just having a bunch of these big nodes in the network handling only middle hops, biases the rest of the network away from handling middle hops, toward handling end hops. Which means that if you then run a ton of tiny nodes...
- deleted 2y ago
  [deleted]
alasdair_ 2y ago
>Edit: For all the cynics and doomsayers here, consider this: Tor has been around for a long time, but there has never been an uptick in arrests that could be correlated to cracking the core anonymity service. If you look closely at the actual high profile cases where people got busted despite using tor, these people always made other mistakes that led authorities to them. Yeah, the stated reason is always something else. But this just reminds me of "parallel construction" - what if they were found in on way and then (to hide the source) the claim was that they were found in another way?
throwaway37821 2y ago
75% [0] of all Tor nodes are hosted within 14 Eyes [1] countries, so it would actually be quite trivial for the NSA to de-anonymize a Tor user. It baffles me that Tor Browser doesn't provide an easy way to blacklist relays in those countries. [0] Here, you can do the math yourself: https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#aggregate/all https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#aggregate/all [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Eyes#Fourteen_Eyes https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Eyes#Fourteen_Eyes > Edit: For all the cynics and doomsayers here, consider this: Tor has been around for a long time, but there has never been an uptick in arrests that could be correlated to cracking the core anonymity service. If you look closely at the actual high profile cases where people got busted despite using tor, these people always made other mistakes that led authorities to them. Maybe someone, somewhere, has decided that allowing petty criminals to get away with their crimes is worth maintaining the illusion that Tor is truly private. It's also worth noting that it's significantly easier to find the mistakes someone has made that could lead to their identity if you already know their identity.
- DabbyDabberson 2y ago
  Its important to realize that TOR is primarily funded and controlled by the US Navy. The US benefits from the TOR being private. It provides a channel for operatives to exfiltrate data out of non-NATO countries very easily.
  - try_the_bass 2y ago
    > The US benefits from the TOR being private. Slight correction: The US benefits from TOR being private to _everyone but the US_
    - wheelerwj 2y ago
      I’m glad I didn’t have to scroll too far to see your comment. In fact, A major power wins by creating a mote just big enough that only they can cross.
      - 2y ago
halfcat 2y ago
> there has never been an uptick in arrests If it was effective, would there have been a down tick in arrests at some point? Or if the arrest rate stayed the same, would that suggest it never “worked” to begin with? It’s like the movie trope of the detective who finds out the truth via some questionable means which isn’t admissible in court. When you know the truth you can push harder and call every bluff until you get admissible evidence.
- AstralStorm 2y ago
  Or you can use more... underhanded means that never result in an arrest.
panarky 2y ago
> what is the probability that someone randomly chooses three nodes that you own. The answer is less than 0.14%. You calculated the probability that a specific person randomly chooses three nodes of the 1,000. But that's not the scenario you're responding to. >> I can't target a specific person, but eventually I can find someone who has all three bounces through tor nodes I control Tor estimates that 2.5 million people use the network per day. Let's assume that in a month, 10 million people use it. Let's also assume that 80% of monthly users are not committing crimes, while the 20% who are criminals make an average of four Tor connections per month. With those assumptions we could expect a malicious operator who controls 1,000 nodes could capture the sessions of 10,940 criminals in a given month. Spending less than fifty cents per suspect is less than trivial.
- ClumsyPilot 2y ago
  > could capture the sessions of 10,940 criminals in a given month Let’s say to do that, and now you have found 10k people accessing pirate bay in countries where it is blocked. Also you captured someone who lives in Siberia and watches illegal porn, now what? Many of these will not be actionable, like not criminals you would have interest in.
  - panarky 2y ago
    An autocratic regime of a large nation locks up its critics and other undesirables in camps. 100,000 activists who haven't been caught yet switch to Tor for anonymity. For $60,000, the regime monitors Tor for a year, identifies 6,500 activists, and marches them off to the camps. And by discrediting Tor the regime pushes the other 93,500 activists even farther underground, constraining their ability to recruit, limiting their ability to coordinate with each other, and reducing what they can publish about what's happening to their country.
    - deleted 2y ago
      [deleted]
    - hkt 2y ago
      > reducing what they can publish about what's happening to their country. To what audience? It isn't quite what you're getting at in your post but this is worth saying: graffiti, zines, contact with journalists, radio operations like pirate radio, all of it is much more established and less uncertain in risk profile than being online. Crucially it may also be more effective.
itake 2y ago
1/ if a user sends 10,000 requests, you're saying 14 of them might see 3 compromised nodes? 2/ Police can use parallel construction. Although, given enough time (in theory) parallel construction is eventually exposed.
- avidiax 2y ago
  > given enough time (in theory) parallel construction is eventually exposed. Parallel construction has existed for decades. It's even in "The Wire". It has never been tested in court, probably because it is nearly impossible to discover outside of being the agents that implement it.
  - fragmede 2y ago
    it's not been tested in court, but it's not some crazy Internet theory. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/08/us-drug-agency-gets-intel-from-nsa-then-lies-about-its-origins-to-build-cases/ https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/08/us-drug-agency-g...
  - itake 2y ago
    The police used self-powered GPS devices[1] to track criminals. These devices are used in various situations, such as when someone violates parole. The police don’t need to report the violation immediately. Instead, they wait for the person to re-enter their jurisdiction, then catch and arrest them. Parallel construction wasn't tested, but the means of them catching criminals this way was tested in court. [0] - https://www.gps.gov/news/2012/01/supremecourt/ https://www.gps.gov/news/2012/01/supremecourt/ [1] - if the device got power from the vehicle, it would be considered "break and entering" and thus would require a warrant.
- yencabulator 2y ago
  1/ tor-browser by default sticks to the same circuit for one origin for the session, so that'd have to be 10,000 separate sites or 10,000 separate sessions.
verbify 2y ago
> Edit: For all the cynics and doomsayers here, consider this: Tor has been around for a long time, but there has never been an uptick in arrests that could be correlated to cracking the core anonymity service. If you look closely at the actual high profile cases where people got busted despite using tor, these people always made other mistakes that led authorities to them. During WW2, the British cracked the German codes. They would create pretexts for "discovering" where German ships would be, so that the Germans wouldn't suspect that they cracked their codes. It's impossible for us to know if the US government have cracked Tor, because the world would look identical to us whether they had or hadn't. If the only evidence they have is via Tor, and the individual is a small fry, they will prefer they get away with it rather than let people know that Tor has been cracked. I just assume the NSA are spending their budgets on something, although maybe it is stuff like side channel attacks.
- avidiax 2y ago
  These pretexts for "discovering" are a "bedrock principle" in law enforcement called parallel construction. The NSA sharing data with the DEA becomes a "routine traffic stop" that finds the drugs. The court would not allow the NSA evidence or anything found as a result, but through parallel construction, the officer lies in court that it was a "routine stop", and judicial review never occurs.
- chiefalchemist 2y ago
  > these people always made other mistakes that led authorities to them. Says who? The intelligent community entity that busted them? If they're using a tool to discover X or Y they're not to let anyone know that. For example, I live in the NYC area. A couple of times per year there's a drug bust on the New Jersey Turnpike of a car headed to NYC. The story is always a "random" police stop ends up in a drug bust. Random? My arse. Of the thousands of cars on the NJTP the cops just happened to pick the one loaded with drugs? A couple times a year? I don't buy it. But what are they going to say? They have someone on the inside that tipped them off? That's not going to happen. The intelligence community doesn't deal in truth and facts. It deals in misinformation and that the ends justify the means. What they're doing and what they say they're doing are unlikely the same.
Eduard 2y ago
> If you look closely at the actual high profile cases where people got busted despite using tor, these people always made other mistakes that led authorities to them. Assuming tor always was or became broken and is exploitable by law enforcement, authorities would try to maintain a false believe of tor's integrity so as to crack high profile cases for as long as possible. Within this scenario, it is plausible to assume that authorities can decipher and discover information that can be used as the official pretextual charge / minor reason ("they made the mistake to use their public email address on the dark net forum") in order to not spill the beans on the actual means (here, tor being broken).
bigbacaloa 2y ago
[dead]
deleted 2y ago
[deleted]
moss2 2y ago
I think the FBI/CIA/NSA could afford 8000 nodes if they wanted to.
jrochkind1 2y ago
What you say is reasonable and I agree and hold that position. > Tor has been around for a long time, but there has never been an uptick in arrests that could be correlated to cracking the core anonymity service. If I were an intelligence agency that had "cracked" tor -- I'd probably make sure nobody would notice I had access, so I could keep eavesdropping. Not do anything that could expose my access. It certainly could be happening. Nothing is 100%. Nothing. Just a fact. Tor is probably pretty good at what it does. (and keep in mind, for what we're talking about in this kind of attack, all I get access to is network contacts, not the actual messages, right?)

mzs 2y ago

So if there are greater than only 357 people on topics the GP is interested in that's better than 50/50 odds.

whimsicalism 2y ago

> Could someone like the NSA with limitless resources do it? Sure Yes, this is obviously the sort of adversary we would be discussing. > , lets also ignore that there are different types of nodes causing your number to be an underestimate > The answer is less than 0.14%. So almost certainly thousands of people

sigmoid10 2y ago
>Yes, this is obviously the sort of adversary we would be discussing. OP explicitly asked about himself, not some government organisation. >causing your number to be an underestimate Not necessarily. It might even be an overestimate if the attacker fails to supply enough nodes of the right kind. >So almost certainly thousands of people We're talking about a targeted attack. Of course the statistics game works better when you don't target specific people and just fish randomly. But there are probably more cost effective methods as well.
- whimsicalism 2y ago
  > We're talking about a targeted attack From OP: " I can't target a specific person, but eventually I can find someone who has all three bounces through tor nodes I control, no" > Not necessarily. It might even be an overestimate if the attacker fails to supply enough nodes of the right kind. Assuming they match the existing distribution of nodes, they will only have better results.
  - sigmoid10 2y ago
    That's assuming a lot given the rest of the statement.

alasdair_ 2y ago

>The answer is less than 0.14%. Is this per circuit? So if someone switches circuits every X hours, the chance of being caught after a year is actually quite high? And even catching 0.14% of pedophiles would probably be worth it to the FBI or whatever, nevermind Iran catching dissidents or whatever. My point is that is seems very cheap to do this (I as a random staff engineer could do it myself) and catch some people. A nation state could easily catch a much higher percentage if they increased the number of logging nodes slowly and carefully and deliberately did things like use many isps and update the servers gradually etc.

whimsicalism 2y ago
The happy equilibrium is that if you have enough adversary nation-state intelligence services doing this and not sharing information, they'll cancel each other out and provide free node hosting.
qwery 2y ago
You're misusing probability and ignoring critical information. There's 1000 red marbles added to a jar with 8000 blue marbles (9000 total). Take three marbles from the jar randomly, one at a time. The odds of getting three red marbles is ~0.14%. That's all. Tor nodes are not randomly picked marbles. The Tor network is not a jar.
- whimsicalism 2y ago
  they’re using probability correctly. if you have a critique state it clearly

PeterisP 2y ago

If someone would do the thing-to-be-detected (e.g. accessing CSAM) every day, then that 0.14% probability of detection turns out to be 40% for a single year (0.9986^365) or 64% over two years, so even that would deanonymize the majority of such people over time.

sigmoid10 2y ago
That assumes you could run thousands of malicious tor nodes for several years without being detected. Unless you have vast resources and time, this is unlikely.
- mistercheph 2y ago
  I can't think of anyone with vast resources and time that would want to deanonymize cybercriminals
  - sigmoid10 2y ago
    Top commenter specifically asked about himself.
  - colechristensen 2y ago
    Outside of 3 letter agencies which is obvious, I have known people who would do this for fun or whatever other personal motivation. A lot of "hacker" mentality projects involve putting a tremendous amount of effort into something with questionable utility. People climb mountains because they're there.
- worldsayshi 2y ago
  But it doesn't seem unfeasible for a state actor that wants to track their population then?
  - ziddoap 2y ago
    The comment that spawned this chain starts with: >Let's say I as a private individual

dumbo-octopus 2y ago

You don’t need all the middle nodes. Just the entry and exit, and enough data to do packet timing analysis to correlate them. It’s in fact shockingly easy for a well provisioned actor to trace tor traffic, and this is something the TOR project openly admits. They’re financed by the US Government after all…

basedrum 2y ago
Tor does have padding defenses to protect against that. Also, according to their latest blog post on their finances, while it is true they have money from the US Government, that was only ~50% of their income (I think that was 2023). For the FUD part of that comment, see the "U.S. Government Support" section of https://blog.torproject.org/transparency-openness-and-our-2021-and-2022-financials/ https://blog.torproject.org/transparency-openness-and-our-20...
- dumbo-octopus 2y ago
  “Only half” is hilarious. Thanks for that. And if you trust the NSA can’t overcome correlation in the presence of “padding defenses”, then sure: TOR is secure.
  - 867-5309 2y ago
    I wonder how many tor users actually know this. tor would probably not exist in the same capacity without that funding
tru3_power 2y ago
Sounds like https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.07285 https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.07285
alphan0n 2y ago
Onion sites do not utilize an exit node.
- dumbo-octopus 2y ago

oconnore 2y ago

> Could someone like the NSA with limitless resources do it? Quite probably, sure. If you're not worried about a fairly well-resourced government agency uncovering whatever network activity you believe needs to be anonymized, why would you be using Tor at all?

echoangle 2y ago
Depends on what you’re doing. The NSA isn’t going to expose themselves by tipping off law enforcement about small time drug deals. If you’re sharing CSAM or planning terrorist attacks, it might be different.
- stackghost 2y ago
  >If you’re sharing CSAM or planning terrorist attacks, it might be different. They'll just employ parallel construction to avoid exposure.
CapitalistCartr 2y ago
Because you're an enemy of the Iranian, Saudi, North Korean, etc. gov't. Because your ex-spouse wants to murder you. Because you just escaped Scientology, or another cult. Because you're a criminal. The NSA doesn't handle that. Because you're a journalist talking to sources in the industry you're investigating.
- adamrezich 2y ago
  Those second and third points are pretty laughably paranoid-fantasy reasons to use Tor—even if one found oneself in either situation.
  - throwme0827349 2y ago
    Respectfully, a large number of people rightfully fear for their lives, safety, and freedom due to being stalked or abused by a current or former partner. I have personally known several. Using victims' devices and communications in order to locate, and then harass, trap, or attack them, is commonplace for stalkers.

derefr 2y ago

You know what's easier than waiting around to get really lucky? Using those same network-health dashboards as DDoS target lists, to temporarily degrade/shut down the whole network except for your own nodes. Also, big nodes route more Tor circuits each. Costs more to run them, and they intentionally don't function as exit nodes (to avoid the "obvious" attack) — but just having a bunch of these big nodes in the network handling only middle hops, biases the rest of the network away from handling middle hops, toward handling end hops. Which means that if you then run a ton of tiny nodes...

deleted 2y ago
[deleted]

alasdair_ 2y ago

throwaway37821 2y ago

75% [0] of all Tor nodes are hosted within 14 Eyes [1] countries, so it would actually be quite trivial for the NSA to de-anonymize a Tor user. It baffles me that Tor Browser doesn't provide an easy way to blacklist relays in those countries. [0] Here, you can do the math yourself: https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#aggregate/all https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#aggregate/all [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Eyes#Fourteen_Eyes https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Eyes#Fourteen_Eyes > Edit: For all the cynics and doomsayers here, consider this: Tor has been around for a long time, but there has never been an uptick in arrests that could be correlated to cracking the core anonymity service. If you look closely at the actual high profile cases where people got busted despite using tor, these people always made other mistakes that led authorities to them. Maybe someone, somewhere, has decided that allowing petty criminals to get away with their crimes is worth maintaining the illusion that Tor is truly private. It's also worth noting that it's significantly easier to find the mistakes someone has made that could lead to their identity if you already know their identity.

DabbyDabberson 2y ago
Its important to realize that TOR is primarily funded and controlled by the US Navy. The US benefits from the TOR being private. It provides a channel for operatives to exfiltrate data out of non-NATO countries very easily.
- try_the_bass 2y ago
  > The US benefits from the TOR being private. Slight correction: The US benefits from TOR being private to _everyone but the US_
  - wheelerwj 2y ago
    I’m glad I didn’t have to scroll too far to see your comment. In fact, A major power wins by creating a mote just big enough that only they can cross.
    - 2y ago

halfcat 2y ago

> there has never been an uptick in arrests If it was effective, would there have been a down tick in arrests at some point? Or if the arrest rate stayed the same, would that suggest it never “worked” to begin with? It’s like the movie trope of the detective who finds out the truth via some questionable means which isn’t admissible in court. When you know the truth you can push harder and call every bluff until you get admissible evidence.

AstralStorm 2y ago
Or you can use more... underhanded means that never result in an arrest.

panarky 2y ago

> what is the probability that someone randomly chooses three nodes that you own. The answer is less than 0.14%. You calculated the probability that a specific person randomly chooses three nodes of the 1,000. But that's not the scenario you're responding to. >> I can't target a specific person, but eventually I can find someone who has all three bounces through tor nodes I control Tor estimates that 2.5 million people use the network per day. Let's assume that in a month, 10 million people use it. Let's also assume that 80% of monthly users are not committing crimes, while the 20% who are criminals make an average of four Tor connections per month. With those assumptions we could expect a malicious operator who controls 1,000 nodes could capture the sessions of 10,940 criminals in a given month. Spending less than fifty cents per suspect is less than trivial.

ClumsyPilot 2y ago
> could capture the sessions of 10,940 criminals in a given month Let’s say to do that, and now you have found 10k people accessing pirate bay in countries where it is blocked. Also you captured someone who lives in Siberia and watches illegal porn, now what? Many of these will not be actionable, like not criminals you would have interest in.
- panarky 2y ago
  An autocratic regime of a large nation locks up its critics and other undesirables in camps. 100,000 activists who haven't been caught yet switch to Tor for anonymity. For $60,000, the regime monitors Tor for a year, identifies 6,500 activists, and marches them off to the camps. And by discrediting Tor the regime pushes the other 93,500 activists even farther underground, constraining their ability to recruit, limiting their ability to coordinate with each other, and reducing what they can publish about what's happening to their country.
  - deleted 2y ago
    [deleted]
  - hkt 2y ago
    > reducing what they can publish about what's happening to their country. To what audience? It isn't quite what you're getting at in your post but this is worth saying: graffiti, zines, contact with journalists, radio operations like pirate radio, all of it is much more established and less uncertain in risk profile than being online. Crucially it may also be more effective.

itake 2y ago

1/ if a user sends 10,000 requests, you're saying 14 of them might see 3 compromised nodes? 2/ Police can use parallel construction. Although, given enough time (in theory) parallel construction is eventually exposed.

avidiax 2y ago
> given enough time (in theory) parallel construction is eventually exposed. Parallel construction has existed for decades. It's even in "The Wire". It has never been tested in court, probably because it is nearly impossible to discover outside of being the agents that implement it.
- fragmede 2y ago
  it's not been tested in court, but it's not some crazy Internet theory. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/08/us-drug-agency-gets-intel-from-nsa-then-lies-about-its-origins-to-build-cases/ https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/08/us-drug-agency-g...
- itake 2y ago
  The police used self-powered GPS devices[1] to track criminals. These devices are used in various situations, such as when someone violates parole. The police don’t need to report the violation immediately. Instead, they wait for the person to re-enter their jurisdiction, then catch and arrest them. Parallel construction wasn't tested, but the means of them catching criminals this way was tested in court. [0] - https://www.gps.gov/news/2012/01/supremecourt/ https://www.gps.gov/news/2012/01/supremecourt/ [1] - if the device got power from the vehicle, it would be considered "break and entering" and thus would require a warrant.
yencabulator 2y ago
1/ tor-browser by default sticks to the same circuit for one origin for the session, so that'd have to be 10,000 separate sites or 10,000 separate sessions.

verbify 2y ago

> Edit: For all the cynics and doomsayers here, consider this: Tor has been around for a long time, but there has never been an uptick in arrests that could be correlated to cracking the core anonymity service. If you look closely at the actual high profile cases where people got busted despite using tor, these people always made other mistakes that led authorities to them. During WW2, the British cracked the German codes. They would create pretexts for "discovering" where German ships would be, so that the Germans wouldn't suspect that they cracked their codes. It's impossible for us to know if the US government have cracked Tor, because the world would look identical to us whether they had or hadn't. If the only evidence they have is via Tor, and the individual is a small fry, they will prefer they get away with it rather than let people know that Tor has been cracked. I just assume the NSA are spending their budgets on something, although maybe it is stuff like side channel attacks.

avidiax 2y ago
These pretexts for "discovering" are a "bedrock principle" in law enforcement called parallel construction. The NSA sharing data with the DEA becomes a "routine traffic stop" that finds the drugs. The court would not allow the NSA evidence or anything found as a result, but through parallel construction, the officer lies in court that it was a "routine stop", and judicial review never occurs.
chiefalchemist 2y ago
> these people always made other mistakes that led authorities to them. Says who? The intelligent community entity that busted them? If they're using a tool to discover X or Y they're not to let anyone know that. For example, I live in the NYC area. A couple of times per year there's a drug bust on the New Jersey Turnpike of a car headed to NYC. The story is always a "random" police stop ends up in a drug bust. Random? My arse. Of the thousands of cars on the NJTP the cops just happened to pick the one loaded with drugs? A couple times a year? I don't buy it. But what are they going to say? They have someone on the inside that tipped them off? That's not going to happen. The intelligence community doesn't deal in truth and facts. It deals in misinformation and that the ends justify the means. What they're doing and what they say they're doing are unlikely the same.

Eduard 2y ago

> If you look closely at the actual high profile cases where people got busted despite using tor, these people always made other mistakes that led authorities to them. Assuming tor always was or became broken and is exploitable by law enforcement, authorities would try to maintain a false believe of tor's integrity so as to crack high profile cases for as long as possible. Within this scenario, it is plausible to assume that authorities can decipher and discover information that can be used as the official pretextual charge / minor reason ("they made the mistake to use their public email address on the dark net forum") in order to not spill the beans on the actual means (here, tor being broken).

bigbacaloa 2y ago

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deleted 2y ago

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moss2 2y ago

I think the FBI/CIA/NSA could afford 8000 nodes if they wanted to.

jrochkind1 2y ago

What you say is reasonable and I agree and hold that position. > Tor has been around for a long time, but there has never been an uptick in arrests that could be correlated to cracking the core anonymity service. If I were an intelligence agency that had "cracked" tor -- I'd probably make sure nobody would notice I had access, so I could keep eavesdropping. Not do anything that could expose my access. It certainly could be happening. Nothing is 100%. Nothing. Just a fact. Tor is probably pretty good at what it does. (and keep in mind, for what we're talking about in this kind of attack, all I get access to is network contacts, not the actual messages, right?)