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> It’s a side show, and a distraction from the main business I'm pissed this is accepted as normal for the IT sector, while in railroad engineering and aviatio

> It’s a side show, and a distraction from the main business I'm pissed this is accepted as normal for the IT sector, while in railroad engineering and aviation (where human lives are at stake) you'd get your licenses and certificates revoked. Therac-25 something.

TeMPOraL 2y ago
Security != safety. Safety in civil engineering and aviation is paramount. Security is an annoying, bolt-on side issue at best, nonexistent typically (e.g. railroads). Therac-25 was a safety event, not a cybersecurity event.
- blueflow 2y ago
  IT security is a thing at all because software safety is near non-existent.
  - stavros 2y ago
    How are you going to retain safety in a compromised software system?
    - blueflow 2y ago
      You don't? Safety is not having that compromise in the first place. Like, if the code can handle all input correctly, then there is no exploit path. Regardless of whether the input comes from an attacker or not.
      - stavros 2y ago
        You said "security is a thing because safety is nonexistent". This means that, if you had safety, you wouldn't need security. I'm asking you to explain how a perfectly safe system wouldn't need security, as someone who compromised it would be able to simply undo all the safety.
        blueflow 2y ago
        How do you compromise a safe system?
        stavros 2y ago
        Say I wrote software to control a gamma ray knife, it's perfectly safe and it always does the right thing and shuts down properly when it detects a weird condition. Compromising it would simply be a matter of changing a few bytes in the executable, or replacing the executable with another one. This seems so obvious to me that I think you may have non-standard definitions of either safety or security.
        blueflow 2y ago
        > Compromising it would simply be a matter of changing a few bytes in the executable, or replacing the executable with another one. The executable is part of the system that's supposed to be safe. That you have no means to modify it is an aspect of safety. With your example, imagine that program would be running on an AVR with boot fuses burnt.
        stavros 2y ago
        Ah, there's the non-standard definition. Safety means that the system performs as designed while the design invariants hold. Security means someone malicious can't change the invariants.
        blueflow 2y ago
        Cite your standard.
        stavros 2y ago
        Nah, I'm OK.
    - TeMPOraL 2y ago
      You aren't, for the same reason you aren't going to retain safety in an airplane or a nuclear reactor when men with guns are shooting people and pushing random panels (and/or the other way around). Even with "defense in depth", there's clear separation between parts that do the important stuff, and parts that protect the parts that do the important stuff from being used against the rules. I'd go as far as dividing cybersecurity into two major areas of concern: 1) The part that constrains software systems to conform to some make-believe reality with rules stricter than natural -- this is trying to make the abstract world function more like physical reality we're used to; 2) The rules and policies - who can access what, when, why, and what for. Area 1) should very much be a bolt-on third-party thing everyone should ideally take for granted. Area 2) is a responsibility of each organization/project individually, but it also small and mostly limited to issues specific to that organization/project. It maps to physical reality like this: Area 1) are the reinforced walls, floor and ceiling, and blast doors that can only be opened via a key card[0]; Area 2) are the policies and procedures of giving and revoking keycards to specific people in the company. -- [0] - Or by crossing some wires deep in the reader, because accidents happen and cutting through blast doors cost money. I.e. real-life security and safety systems often feature overrides.
- mcmoor 2y ago
  Also security attack in those engineering fields are not nearly as scalable as attack on computer systems. So you don't have as much need to cover every single hole because the damage won't be as much.
krisoft 2y ago
> while in railroad engineering and aviation (where human lives are at stake) you'd get your licenses and certificates revoked Is that true? The safest train is the one which is stationary. Cut off the wheels, and drop the rail cars on secure foundations (carefully) and you just protected yourself from 90% of possible accidents. If you remove everything flamable and weld the doors shut you got rid of 9% more. Do you see why this is silly? Because the main business of rails is to transport people and stuff. You won’t be railroad engineering long if you don’t keep that in mind.
tpmoney 2y ago
> I'm pissed this is accepted as normal for the IT sector, while in railroad engineering and aviation (where human lives are at stake) you'd get your licenses and certificates revoked. Therac-25 something. You're confusing a statement of the way the world *Is* as an endorsement of the way it *Ought* to be. Ask yourself this: WHY do you get your licenses and certificates revoked in railroads and aviation? Because without that threat of punishment, the railroad and aviation companies would choose to spend their money on other things that are their actual business and not on the distractions that safety and security are otherwise. It takes the force of law to mandate that the companies do something that is contrary to their actual interests and goals. See also Boeing.

TeMPOraL 2y ago

Security != safety. Safety in civil engineering and aviation is paramount. Security is an annoying, bolt-on side issue at best, nonexistent typically (e.g. railroads). Therac-25 was a safety event, not a cybersecurity event.

blueflow 2y ago
IT security is a thing at all because software safety is near non-existent.
- stavros 2y ago
  How are you going to retain safety in a compromised software system?
  - blueflow 2y ago
    You don't? Safety is not having that compromise in the first place. Like, if the code can handle all input correctly, then there is no exploit path. Regardless of whether the input comes from an attacker or not.
    - stavros 2y ago
      You said "security is a thing because safety is nonexistent". This means that, if you had safety, you wouldn't need security. I'm asking you to explain how a perfectly safe system wouldn't need security, as someone who compromised it would be able to simply undo all the safety.
      - blueflow 2y ago
        How do you compromise a safe system?
        stavros 2y ago
        Say I wrote software to control a gamma ray knife, it's perfectly safe and it always does the right thing and shuts down properly when it detects a weird condition. Compromising it would simply be a matter of changing a few bytes in the executable, or replacing the executable with another one. This seems so obvious to me that I think you may have non-standard definitions of either safety or security.
        blueflow 2y ago
        > Compromising it would simply be a matter of changing a few bytes in the executable, or replacing the executable with another one. The executable is part of the system that's supposed to be safe. That you have no means to modify it is an aspect of safety. With your example, imagine that program would be running on an AVR with boot fuses burnt.
        stavros 2y ago
        Ah, there's the non-standard definition. Safety means that the system performs as designed while the design invariants hold. Security means someone malicious can't change the invariants.
        blueflow 2y ago
        Cite your standard.
        stavros 2y ago
        Nah, I'm OK.
  - TeMPOraL 2y ago
    You aren't, for the same reason you aren't going to retain safety in an airplane or a nuclear reactor when men with guns are shooting people and pushing random panels (and/or the other way around). Even with "defense in depth", there's clear separation between parts that do the important stuff, and parts that protect the parts that do the important stuff from being used against the rules. I'd go as far as dividing cybersecurity into two major areas of concern: 1) The part that constrains software systems to conform to some make-believe reality with rules stricter than natural -- this is trying to make the abstract world function more like physical reality we're used to; 2) The rules and policies - who can access what, when, why, and what for. Area 1) should very much be a bolt-on third-party thing everyone should ideally take for granted. Area 2) is a responsibility of each organization/project individually, but it also small and mostly limited to issues specific to that organization/project. It maps to physical reality like this: Area 1) are the reinforced walls, floor and ceiling, and blast doors that can only be opened via a key card[0]; Area 2) are the policies and procedures of giving and revoking keycards to specific people in the company. -- [0] - Or by crossing some wires deep in the reader, because accidents happen and cutting through blast doors cost money. I.e. real-life security and safety systems often feature overrides.
mcmoor 2y ago
Also security attack in those engineering fields are not nearly as scalable as attack on computer systems. So you don't have as much need to cover every single hole because the damage won't be as much.

krisoft 2y ago

> while in railroad engineering and aviation (where human lives are at stake) you'd get your licenses and certificates revoked Is that true? The safest train is the one which is stationary. Cut off the wheels, and drop the rail cars on secure foundations (carefully) and you just protected yourself from 90% of possible accidents. If you remove everything flamable and weld the doors shut you got rid of 9% more. Do you see why this is silly? Because the main business of rails is to transport people and stuff. You won’t be railroad engineering long if you don’t keep that in mind.

tpmoney 2y ago

> I'm pissed this is accepted as normal for the IT sector, while in railroad engineering and aviation (where human lives are at stake) you'd get your licenses and certificates revoked. Therac-25 something. You're confusing a statement of the way the world *Is* as an endorsement of the way it *Ought* to be. Ask yourself this: WHY do you get your licenses and certificates revoked in railroads and aviation? Because without that threat of punishment, the railroad and aviation companies would choose to spend their money on other things that are their actual business and not on the distractions that safety and security are otherwise. It takes the force of law to mandate that the companies do something that is contrary to their actual interests and goals. See also Boeing.