4 ms·
> I don't envy the engineers, either at NASA or at Boeing. When I worked at Boeing, I talked with my lead engineer about this. He said there were indeed some e
by WalterBright 2y ago
> I don't envy the engineers, either at NASA or at Boeing.
When I worked at Boeing, I talked with my lead engineer about this. He said there were indeed some excellent engineers who could not live with the possiblity of making a mistake. Boeing would find jobs for them that were not safety critical, like design studies of new aircraft. There they could be productive without the stress.
Personally, I found the stress to be motivating. It meant I was doing something that mattered.
- GMoromisato 2y agoVery interesting insight. Thank you! Right now, I’m sure Starliner engineers are under a lot of stress. But I really believe that the program will get through this and end up being successful.
- WalterBright 2y agoIt's a bit like finals in college. I knew that without the stress from the threat of failing the finals, I wouldn't apply myself to learning the material. Stress brings out the best in people.
- HPsquared 2y agoIt's like "angle of attack" in a wing (funnily enough, given the topic). Increasing it works up to a point (increasing lift) but at the cost of increased drag and, at a certain point, a stall. I've found myself, at different points, "coasting" (gliding) and "stalling" (pulling up too hard when I'm not in the right conditions). Long-term burnout is like being "behind the power curve" and gradually losing energy.
- stavros 2y agoI find the solution of giving non-safety-critical posts to the engineers that care most about safety very indicative of the culture at Boeing.
- eqvinox 2y ago"engineers who could not live with the possiblity of making a mistake" is not the same as "engineers that care most about safety"
- stavros 2y agoYou think they'll be sloppy about safety and then just kill themselves when someone dies?
- ahmedfromtunis 2y agoBack when I started engineering school, we tended to add more constraints to systems than what they actually need believing that we were making them more secure and "safer". "This will make sure we cover edge cases we're not aware of", we thought. Later we discovered such systems are called "hyperstatic" and that they are actually more fragile and more prone to malfunction. What we should've aimed for are isostatic systems, where less constraints meant more stable systems. I'm not saying Boeing engineering aren't aware of this. Of course they do. I just wanted to show an example of how trying to avoid mistakes *may* lead to less safe systems.
- stavros 2y agoSure, but this just assumes they don't know what they're doing (which, well, is probably true). It doesn't refute the point that you want to put people who are obsessive about safety in charge of safety. I work for a healthcare company, and we definitely put in charge of safety people who stress about a patient coming to harm, not people who are so-so about it.
- ethbr1 2y agoI read GP as relocating people who were paralyzed by safety. E.g. the developers who never ship code because they always want to write the better version of the thing, that they thought up while building the current version At some point you have to look at a less than perfect design and answer the question of whether it's good enough for the requirements at hand.
- tracker1 2y agoIt's hard for me to imagine... I've been in a position to work on training software for some aerospace equipment and maintenance, but even that was well defined before I touched it. The closest I've come to that level of stress was working on security provisioning around financial systems. Hard to imagine being responsible directly for people's lives, not just livelihood.
- tiahura 2y ago[flagged]