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Apple memory holed its broken promise for an OCSP opt-out
- cyberpunk 2y agoHow does one go about creating a little snitch rule to prevent these connections?
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- frankjr 2y agoPaste the following on the All Rules view [link redacted] (Posting a link because HN formatting breaks the format).
- lapcat 2y agoThat's obsolete. macOS now uses ocsp2.apple.com. The process is "trustd".
- frankjr 2y agoThanks. Does that depend on macOS version? Better to block both I guess.
- lapcat 2y ago> Does that depend on macOS version? Yes, though I couldn't say offhand when exactly it changed.
- phi0 2y agoI've checked my DNS logs and there hasn't been a single hit against ocsp.apple.com over the last year, but around 20-30 hits for ocsp2.apple.com per day per device. (iphone, macMini, macbook) Just blocking ocsp2.apple.com is probably fine if you're running anything recent-ish.
- JBiserkov 2y agoBlock ocsp3.apple.com while you're at it. And ocsp4. And 5. Block them all!
- Wowfunhappy 2y agoDoes Little Snitch support regex? Perhaps it should be `ocsp\d*\.apple\.com`
- FireBeyond 2y agoWell, let's not forget the little dance Apple did to make their programs and the system be able to bypass packet filters like Little Snitch... ... and then claim it was necessary for "updates and upgrades". Not sure why TextEdit.app needed a kernel network extension for "updates and upgrades". They also denied it was possible until it was provably demonstrated that they did. I like Apple stuff, everything I use is Apple. But too many see them as infallible or go to the whataboutism for missteps like these.
- flemhans 2y agoOddly enough, UTM VMs also bypass Little Snitch, making me wonder if you could always just bypass LS by running a VM in your evil app.
- wpm 2y agoWill it bypass it regardless of the virtualization engine, or only if you're using the Hypervisor framework for macOS VMs?
- frankjr 2y agoDepends on the network adapter in use. E.g. a bridged adapter will bypass it, an emulated vlan won't.
- lloeki 2y agoAh that clarifies things, I was confused for a moment. Well, the goal of a bridged net adapter for VMs is to make the VM as if it were physically plugged in directly into the network, independently of the host, so it makes sense for it not to be affected by a firewall. > running a VM in your evil app. IIRC back then, creating a bridged net adapter required a special entitlement (special as in you can't get it without explicitly asking Apple for it and the dev cert for it has additional entries, like for kernel extensions). Dunno if that's still the case.
- IndySun 2y agorelated... https://mjtsai.com/blog/2023/04/28/bypassing-little-snitch-with-empty-tcp-packets/ https://mjtsai.com/blog/2023/04/28/bypassing-little-snitch-w...
- ProllyInfamous 2y agoLittle Snitch WAS NEVER A GOOD PRODUCT if you're worried about DNS-leaks. Fact: Little Snitch resolves the IP address (i.e. does domain-to-IP lookup) before the Deny/Allow dialogue ever appears onscreen. Only by pressing "Allow" does Little Snitch then allow/initiate connections to the already-resolved IP ADDRESS.
- maeil 2y agoThen do you have a suggested alternative?
- ProllyInfamous 2y ago/r/PiHole I run four, locally [50+ users]. Local DNS Server issues default lookup server @x.x.x.2 (e.g. minimal blocklist PageAd, CloudFare), for maximal client compatibility. Users can thereafter upgrade levels of blocking by manually increasing DNS IP +1 (e.g. x.x.x.3 for stricter blocking, whereas default x.2 only blocks seven very common trackers), at host-level. They can also manually enter x.x.x.1 and thereafter have no DNS-restrictions [this is the router itself, which each x.x.x.N itself resolves to, via our ISP's own DNS serverlist]. Our x.x.x.5 is top-notch white-page browsing, but many applications won't work (e.g. banking; although surprisingly Youtube still works although you do have to watch pre-roll ads). I have one user who there-after has his own local subnet/PiHole, although you can hop-up to PiHoles, as long as the subnet is a child or sibling of that DNS-resolver.
- keleftheriou 2y agoShameful behavior by Apple.
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- saagarjha 2y agoIt's really quite unfortunate how much of Apple software is designed around "privacy is when you trust Apple" :/
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- flarex 2y agoNot really they are moving into homomorphic encryption where the entire query and processing is encrypted and Apple has no knowledge of the what you actually requested.
- walterbell 2y agoFollowing through on a public privacy promise does not require R&D.
- TimSchumann 2y agoI was unaware there exists a fully homomorphic encryption scheme that has the right trade offs between security and computational effort to make this economically viable for even moderate to small workloads. I’ve always thought it was either far too time or far too space intensive to be practical. Do you have sources on this, either from Apple or academic papers of the scheme they’re planning on using?
- timenova 2y agoThey posted about this recently [0][1]. They are using Homomorphic Encryption in iOS 18 for Live Caller ID Lookups. [0] https://www.swift.org/blog/announcing-swift-homomorphic-encryption/ https://www.swift.org/blog/announcing-swift-homomorphic-encr... [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41111129 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41111129
- rpdillon 2y agoI've posted about this above a little after you did. Reading the article, I'm unable to determine whether or not this has any practical utility outside of niche applications or if it has the potential to be broadly useful. Has anyone reviewed the SDK that can render an opinion?
- Spivak 2y agoHonestly I can imagine the preference being axed when OSCP is the macOS antivirus and I'm pretty sure I know what the first thing any malicious software is gonna do if it's able to be turned off. macOS preferences aren't magically locked away from the rest of system, regular users can change their own user preferences, and root can change system preferences. An antivirus has to still work against an attacker who has root. It's why you can't block certain apps/domains from the firewall as well. You could put the preference in recovery mode along with disabling SIP and I think that would accomplish everyone's goals.
- lapcat 2y ago> OSCP is the macOS antivirus It's not. There are multiple layers of security, including notarization and XProtect. > I'm pretty sure I know what the first thing any malicious software is gonna do. What? > macOS preferences aren't magically locked away from the rest of system, regular users can change their own user preferences, and root can change system preferences. An antivirus has to still work against an attacker who has root. You sound confused about admin vs. root. Anyway, if you have a local attacker running on your Mac, then it's already too late for OCSP.
- Spivak 2y agoThose aren't so much layers as the different parts, and OSCP is how notarization actually provides security, the developer cert is what's being checked to run the app. This scheme isn't really designed to prevent attacks so to speak, it's to stop the malicious software on everyone's system all at once. You can say theoretically it's too late because the software is already doing what it's doing and you should consider the machine compromised. But the rubber meets the road for regular users who aren't going to wipe their machines in response to malware and so this lets you purge it. I don't think I'm confused about admin vs root. I'm talking about the System Administrator user, The oops I ran malware with sudo user, uid 0, the user who is only constrained by the kernel via SIP. But yeah, admin is the more common use-case for regular users and I'm not sure the point you're making, malware can get admin and if you put the preference somewhere changeable by admin then welp. You could put the preference in recovery mode same as SIP, I think that would be fine.
- hansvm 2y agoCan you get around that nonsense by turning off wireless radios before launching apps?
- wkat4242 2y agoYes you can. If there's no network it will skip the check. It's not very practical though. Better to block the address with little snitch or a hosts file
- lightedman 2y agoHOSTS hasn't worked very well for a long time, the OS often ignores it.
- wkat4242 2y agoOh ok thanks! I didn't know that, I've used it for other stuff but mainly third party software. I've never tried to block this.
- latexr 2y agoDo you have a source? I regularly use /etc/hosts and never saw any inkling of it being ignored, but do see plenty of cases that confirm it is not.
- minkles 2y agoOk I understand the technical considerations here. But really what is the risk surface for me here as a dumb end user who uses apps from the store and a few things off homebrew and not a lot else? I mean I've got a large pile of Apple crap sitting here. Is this even remotely worrisome enough to shift it and move to something else? The CSAM thing probably was. This? I don't know. (I could probably do everything I need to do on Linux - I just don't want to)
- odo1242 2y agotl;dr: Apple can see what apps (or at least what app developers' apps) are installed by a specific IP address through OCSP. It used to be unencrypted and therefore visible to the internet, it is now only visible to Apple. Apple said they don't keep logs, but theoretically they could if they wanted to.
- chatmasta 2y agoIIRC this request happened every time you open the app, not just at install time. So Apple has a log of (IP, AppID, TimeOpened).
- _twor 2y agoWhat are Apple up to? Very long term?
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- jesprenj 2y agoRegarding OCSP, off-topic for Apple: Firefox enables OCSP by default. This means that for every TLS connection an OCSP plaintext HTTP request will be made to the certificate authority that signed the certificate of the website the browser is connecting to. This means that the certificate authority receives very well timestamped information about the exact domains you are visiting if you are using Firefox and don't disable OCSP and the website you're connecting to does not use OCSP stapling (most don't). Note that disabling OCSP will make Firefox unable to get certificate revocation information (maybe it still uses system's revocation store, I'm not sure about that, but it certainly does not use more privacy preserving CRLs).
- mananaysiempre 2y agoFor intermediates, Firefox distributes OneCRL[1] based on CCADB[2] data and the Mozilla Root Program’s own trust decisions. For leaf certificates, they announced the CRLite[3,4] experiment a while ago but it’s not clear how far along it is. [1] https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2015/03/03/revoking-intermediate-certificates-introducing-onecrl/ https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2015/03/03/revoking-interm... [2] https://www.ccadb.org/ https://www.ccadb.org/ [3] https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2020/01/09/crlite-part-1-all-web-pki-revocations-compressed/ https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2020/01/09/crlite-part-1-a... [4] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=crlite https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=crlite
- lol768 2y agoIt's a trade-off though, isn't it? Everyone seems upset about OCSP as of late, but the domains being sent in plaintext is not exactly limited to just OCSP - we've had this with SNI and DNS. The advantages of OCSP are that you get a real-time understanding of the status of a certificate and you're not needing to download large CRLs which are stale very quickly. If you set security.OCSP.require appropriately, you don't have any risk of the browser failing open, either. It seems to me like the people who most dislike OCSP are CAs who have to maintain the infrastructure capable of responding to queries. I have really limited sympathy, that should be part of running a CA. The privacy concerns could be solved by mandating OCSP stapling, and you could then operate the OCSP responders purely for web-servers and folks doing research. Unfortunately the ship has sailed with ballot SC63 now, and we are where we are. I don't necessarily agree that OCSP as a concept was unfixable, though.
- katzinsky 2y agoThis kind of stuff is a major reason I completely cut all Apple stuff out of my life. When you're network is all Linux everything actually does "just work" more so than it ever did with OSX. Everything is just an SSH away, it's really pretty amazing.
- gjsman-1000 2y agoSSH is built in to macOS and can be enabled in a few clicks. https://support.apple.com/lt-lt/guide/mac-help/mchlp1066/mac https://support.apple.com/lt-lt/guide/mac-help/mchlp1066/mac
- boffinAudio 2y ago... except the ssh bin is also tracked with OCSP ..
- kjkjadksj 2y agoCan’t you disable it though or block the connection?
- katzinsky 2y agoBut you don't have to on Linux. Like there's just so much crap you have to do to make these non-free OSes pleasant or private and it's always blowing up. Linux mostly "just works" OOTB.
- talldayo 2y agoNo developer should be rationally expected to do that. SSH doesn't ship with telemetry or tracking, you shouldn't have to modify the default to make the software behave the way it was intended to; this is runtime-level coercion. You either consider it a feature, or you see it as a bug. Plus, if you know what OCSP is and care about it, chances are you don't use MacOS anymore. Nobody who conscientiously objects to OCSP tracking should be assenting to the rest of MacOS and it's perverse sense of "security".
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- boffinAudio 2y agoI feel the same way about this as I do with the whole NSA clustfuck: If I had access to my own data and could do what I wanted with it, I'd be fine with it.
- randomusername0 2y ago[flagged]