3 ms·
Make the BIOS run a checksum of all the hardware. Automatically clear some memory when the laptop is opened so the BIOS can tell. Put important parts inside a
by amelius 2y ago
Make the BIOS run a checksum of all the hardware.
Automatically clear some memory when the laptop is opened so the BIOS can tell.
Put important parts inside an epoxy. Add some transformer wire in the epoxy that will break when somebody tries to tamper with it.
I'm not trying to be exhaustive. But stuff like that.
- mr_mitm 2y agoYou cannot trust the BIOS after an evil maid attack. And there can be sniffers on the physical layer inside the laptop.
- walterbell 2y agoDRTM, SMM attestation and remote attestation have evil maid attacks in their threat model, with a firmware TPM or SoC enclave that isn't subject to mitm. Password keystroke surveillance (from sniffer, optical cameras or RF WiFi Sensing) can be mitigated by removable 2FA/smartcard. TEMPEST info leakage from displays, components or RF implants can be measured, as SDRs and machine learning lower decoding costs, https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41116682 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41116682 Some enterprise PCs can detect when the case cover is opened, e.g. http://h10032.www1.hp.com/ctg/Manual/c07055601.pdf http://h10032.www1.hp.com/ctg/Manual/c07055601.pdf
- rocqua 2y agoAll of those really reduce the risk. But I wouldn't trust them to be able to stop the CIA, KGB, or whatever the Chinese equivalent is.
- walterbell 2y agoNation-state attackers can afford to exploit zero-day vulnerabilities that bypass OS security protections.
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- amelius 2y agoOk, you can make every chip/device communicate with each other using some challenge-response authentication.