4 ms·
This Theo quote from 18 years ago gets brought up a lot. It's referring to a different era in virtualization (it practically predates KVM, and certainly widespr
by tptacek 2y ago
This Theo quote from 18 years ago gets brought up a lot. It's referring to a different era in virtualization (it practically predates KVM, and certainly widespread use of KVM). You can more or less assume he's talking about running things under VMWare.
In the interim:
* The Linux virtualization interface has been standardized --- everything uses the same small KVM interface
* Security research matured and, in particular, mobile device jailbreaking have made the LPE attack surface relevant, so people have audited and fuzzed the living hell out of KVM
* Maximalist C/C++ hypervisors have been replaced by lightweight virtualization, which codebases are generally written in memory-safe Rust.
At the very least, the "nearly full kernel" thing is totally false now; that "extra" kernel (the userland hypervisor) is now probably the most trustworthy component in the whole system.
I would be surprised if even Theo stuck up for that argument today, but if he did, I think he'd probably get rinsed.
- Veserv 2y agoAre you claiming it has no security vulnerabilities? If yes, care to present a proof. If no, then please estimate how big of a bug bounty would result in a reported critical vulnerability. If I put up a 1 G$ bug bounty, do you think somebody would be able to claim it within a year? How about 10 M$? Please justify this in light of Google only offering 250 k$ [1] for a vulnerability that would totally compromise the security foundation of the multi-billion (trillion?) dollar Google Cloud. Please also justify why the number you present is adequate for securing the foundation of the multi-trillion dollar cloud industry. I will accept that element on its face if you say the cost would be 10 G$, but then I will demand basic proof such as formal proofs of correctness. [1] https://security.googleblog.com/2024/06/virtual-escape-real-reward-introducing.html https://security.googleblog.com/2024/06/virtual-escape-real-...
- tptacek 2y agoI have no idea who you're talking to, but nobody on this thread has claimed anything has "no security vulnerabilities". If you think there isn't an implicit 7-figure bounty on KVM escapes, we are operating from premises too far apart for further discussion to be productive. My bigger problem though: I gave you a bunch of substantive, axiomatic arguments, and you responded to none of them. Of the three of them, which were you already aware of? How did your opinion change after learning about the other ones? You cited a 2007 Theo argument in 2024, so I'm going to have trouble with the idea that you were aware of all of them; again, I think even Theo would be correcting your original post. later You've written about the vulnerability brokers you know in other posts here; I assume we can just have a substantive, systems based debate about this claim, without needing to cite Theo or Joanna Rutkowska or whatever.
- Veserv 2y agoYou presented arguments, but did not present any substantive, quantitative effects attributed to those changes. You have presented no quantitative means of evaluating security. Furthermore, you have presented no empirical evidence that those changes actually result in meaningful security. No, I do not mean “better”, I mean meaningful, as in can protect against commercially-motivated hackers. None of the systems actually certified to protect against state-actors used such a nonsensical process as imagining improvements and then just assuming things are better. Show a proof of correctness and a NSA pentest that fails to find any vulnerabilities, then we can start talking. Barring that, the explicit, above-board bug bounty provides a okay lower bound on security. You really need a more stable process, but it is at least a starting point. And besides that, a 7-figure number is paltry. Google Cloud brings in, what, 11 figures? The operations of a billion dollar company should not be secured to a level of only a few million dollars. So again, proofs of correctness and demonstrated protection against teams with tens to hundreds of millions in budget (i.e team of 5 competent offensive security specialists for 2 years, NSO group for a year, etc.). Anything less is insufficient to bet trillions of dollars of commerce and countless lives on.
- tptacek 2y agoSo that's a no, then. Actual LOL at "an NSA pentest". Slightly later A friend points out I'm being too harsh here, and that lots of products do in fact get NSA pentests. They just never get the pentest report. We regret the error.
- Veserv 2y agoI see, you are unfamiliar with actual high security development and certification. Common Criteria SKPP [1]. “AVA_VLA EXP.4.3E The NSA evaluator shall perform independent penetration testing. AVA_VLA _EXP.4.4E The NSA evaluator shall determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a high attack potential.” Which has been successfully certified against [2] for use in the F-22 and F-35. Sneering dismissal of the existence of high security systems with actual empirical evidence while demanding recognition for unproven systems is ridiculous. Oh, and by the way, the SKPP, like Level A1, required formal specifications and proofs. So, no, a demand to prove such systems are secure is not a winning move. [1] https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/ppfiles/pp_skpp_hr_v1.03.pdf#page117 https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/ppfi... [2] https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/st_vid10362-vr.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfi...