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Does the last part of your comment imply that USA should just give up and accept all its adversaries already have backdoors and nothing can be done about it?

nonrandomstring 2y ago
> accept all its adversaries already have backdoors This is actually a really useful hypothetical standpoint to work out security from. Designing systems that start from the assumption of insecurity helps us build more robust protocols and management. Qubes OS starts from the position that all VMs are or soon will be compromised. Zero-trust in network design assumes the bad guys already have the whole network. Plenty out there would like to shrug and say "the endpoints are all rotten too" (especially with phones which are a veritable hell to secure) and move trust into the application via trusted execution methods. > and nothing can be done about it? No, That doesn't follow. It's prudent to be realistic about threats. but there's always a way out, at a cost. The cost, in a complexity crisis, is throwing away a lot of what we've done.
- pdimitar 2y ago
  Yeah I am completely with you and I agree. But it seems that reducing costs is more important even compared to preventing people on life support in hospitals from dying. What a world.
- warkdarrior 2y ago
  > Qubes OS starts from the position that all VMs are or soon will be compromised. Zero-trust in network design assumes the bad guys already have the whole network. So what does Qubes OS do to protect against a hypervisor bug? Those must exist. How do you ensure that your systems are still working and retrieving data from databases, etc, when bad guys have the whole network and can block all communications?
  - nonrandomstring 2y ago
    The answer to both those questions is you can't. So you you either need to make other provisions at different levels of the stack or design your architecture to make them irrelevant to your security model.
bell-cot 2y ago
No, and I've no idea where you got that from. Here's the HN Title: "CrowdStrike debacle provides road map of American vulnerabilities to adversaries" My assertion: America's serious-threat adversaries already had far more detailed road maps, years ago. The intel value of whatever "road map" data they got from the CrowdStrike debacle was pretty marginal. Neither the HN Title nor I said anything about backdoors. And within 2 para's, the NYT story makes it clear that CloudStrike's Big Oopsied had nothing to do with bad guys hacking anything.
marcosdumay 2y ago
Did any large company clean their datacenters after they stopped using Solar Winds?

nonrandomstring 2y ago

> accept all its adversaries already have backdoors This is actually a really useful hypothetical standpoint to work out security from. Designing systems that start from the assumption of insecurity helps us build more robust protocols and management. Qubes OS starts from the position that all VMs are or soon will be compromised. Zero-trust in network design assumes the bad guys already have the whole network. Plenty out there would like to shrug and say "the endpoints are all rotten too" (especially with phones which are a veritable hell to secure) and move trust into the application via trusted execution methods. > and nothing can be done about it? No, That doesn't follow. It's prudent to be realistic about threats. but there's always a way out, at a cost. The cost, in a complexity crisis, is throwing away a lot of what we've done.

pdimitar 2y ago
Yeah I am completely with you and I agree. But it seems that reducing costs is more important even compared to preventing people on life support in hospitals from dying. What a world.
warkdarrior 2y ago
> Qubes OS starts from the position that all VMs are or soon will be compromised. Zero-trust in network design assumes the bad guys already have the whole network. So what does Qubes OS do to protect against a hypervisor bug? Those must exist. How do you ensure that your systems are still working and retrieving data from databases, etc, when bad guys have the whole network and can block all communications?
- nonrandomstring 2y ago
  The answer to both those questions is you can't. So you you either need to make other provisions at different levels of the stack or design your architecture to make them irrelevant to your security model.

bell-cot 2y ago

No, and I've no idea where you got that from. Here's the HN Title: "CrowdStrike debacle provides road map of American vulnerabilities to adversaries" My assertion: America's serious-threat adversaries already had far more detailed road maps, years ago. The intel value of whatever "road map" data they got from the CrowdStrike debacle was pretty marginal. Neither the HN Title nor I said anything about backdoors. And within 2 para's, the NYT story makes it clear that CloudStrike's Big Oopsied had nothing to do with bad guys hacking anything.

marcosdumay 2y ago

Did any large company clean their datacenters after they stopped using Solar Winds?