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You raise a valid point that digital signatures and HTTPS alone cannot guarantee the authenticity of a recording. However, modern smartphones and other mobile d
by czl 2y ago
You raise a valid point that digital signatures and HTTPS alone cannot guarantee the authenticity of a recording. However, modern smartphones and other mobile devices have the capability to provide stronger assurances about the originality of recordings through the use of tamper-proof secure hardware.
Many high-end smartphones, such as iPhones and some Android devices, incorporate secure enclaves or trusted execution environments (TEEs). These are isolated, tamper-resistant hardware components that can securely store and process sensitive data. When a recording is made on such a device, the secure hardware can associate the recording with additional metadata, including the specific date, time, GPS coordinates, and user account information. This metadata is cryptographically bound to the recording itself.
Furthermore, the device can digitally sign the recording and its associated metadata using a unique key stored within the secure hardware. This digital signature serves as a testament to the recording's originality. Companies like Apple or Google, who manage the secure hardware and signing keys, can then vouch for the authenticity of the recording.
While this approach doesn't completely eliminate the possibility of fake recordings, it significantly raises the bar for creating convincing forgeries. Modifying the recording or its metadata would invalidate the digital signature, making it evident that tampering has occurred.
Of course, as you mentioned, trust in the entity verifying the signatures (e.g., Apple or Google) is still required. However, this trust is based on their reputation and the security measures they employ, rather than on the content of the recording itself.
- free_bip 2y agoNo such thing as tamper proof hardware, only tamper resistant hardware. Also the whole "sign what came from the sensor" idea is widely known to not work because you can easily record a playback of doctored footage. Lots of LLM-isms from this comment too.
- czl 2y ago> you can easily record a playback of doctored footage You believe this is easy when the device has multiple recording sensors and multidimensional information (such as spatial information, changes in focus sensors durning recording, etc) is part of recording that is digitally signed?
- free_bip 2y agoWho's proposing such a device to get widespread adoption? I've heard of sensor data signing [1] but not what you're describing. [1] https://pro.sony/ue_US/solutions/forgery-detection https://pro.sony/ue_US/solutions/forgery-detection
- czl 2y agoThe concept of sensor data signing to authenticate videos and images captured on mobile devices is still an emerging technology, not yet widely adopted. However, as AI-generated synthetic media becomes more prevalent and potentially problematic, solutions like this may gain traction. The key idea is to leverage the array of sensors built into modern smartphones and tablets - accelerometer, gyroscope, GPS, WiFi/cellular signal data, etc. - to cryptographically sign the sensor readings along with the visual data itself at the time of capture. This extra layer of verifiable sensor data would help establish that a recording originated from a real physical device in a particular place and time, as opposed to a purely digital fabrication. Historically, technologies like digital signatures and public key cryptography started out in niche military/government applications before becoming ubiquitous in the computer era. In a similar way, sensor-level authentication of audiovisual media could follow an adoption curve driven by the growing need to combat sophisticated AI forgeries.