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> Independent experts can inspect the code that runs on Apple silicon servers to verify privacy, and Private Cloud Compute cryptographically ensures that iPhone
by losvedir 2y ago
> Independent experts can inspect the code that runs on Apple silicon servers to verify privacy, and Private Cloud Compute cryptographically ensures that iPhone, iPad, and Mac do not talk to a server unless its software has been publicly logged for inspection.
Technically, the sentence could be read that experts inspect the code, and the client uses TLS and CA's to ensure it's only talking to those Apple servers. But that's pretty much the status quo and uninteresting.
It sounds like they're trying to say that somehow iPhone ensures that it's only talking to a server that's running audited code? That would be absolutely incredible (for more things than just running LLMs), but I can't really imagine how it would be implemented.
- ducadveritatem 2y agoThe details of their approach: https://security.apple.com/blog/private-cloud-compute/ https://security.apple.com/blog/private-cloud-compute/
- Hizonner 2y ago> I can't really imagine how it would be implemented. People do stuff that they claim implements it using trusted, "tamperproof" hardware. What they're ignoring is that not all of the assurance is "cryptographic". Some of it comes from trusting that hardware. It's particularly annoying for that to get glossed over by a company that proposes to make the hardware. You can also do it on a small scale using what the crypto types call "secure multiparty computation", but that has enormous performance limitations that would make it useless for any meaningful machine learning.
- warkdarrior 2y agoThere is no known solution to remote software attestation that does not depend on trusted hardware.
- Hizonner 2y agoThat's correct. But Apple is not making that clear, and is therefore misrepresenting what assurance can be offered.