5 ms·
16 years of CVE-2008-0166 – Debian OpenSSL Bug
- egberts1 3y agofor those interested in deploying BIMI, I wrote this HOWTO. > If the complexity of using BIMI exceeds your desire, you must at a minimum provide for one BIMI DNS TXT record that tells everyone that your BIMI is “disabled” … just to prevent others from impersonating you. > The TXT record for a properly disabled BIMI must look like this: default._bimi.example.test. TXT "v=BIMI1; l=; a=;" While, I have said it is expensive and not recommended, it is there for those trying to understand BIMI. Also how to breakdown BIMI certificates too * https://egbert.net/blog/articles/smtp-bimi-howto.html https://egbert.net/blog/articles/smtp-bimi-howto.html * https://egbert.net/blog/articles/smtp-bimi-pki.html https://egbert.net/blog/articles/smtp-bimi-pki.html
- yjftsjthsd-h 3y agoI enjoyed the... I guess "narrative Q&A" style would be a good enough way to describe it? Regardless, it's fun. > The security team at Seznam - a Czech search engine and email provider - did not believe me when I reported this issue. They assume that as they are not actively using that key (beta._domainkey.seznam.cz), that means that it cannot be used to forge emails. This is, of course, not true. Maybe consult a lawyer first, but the entertaining answer would surely be to tell them about the problem in an email from their own domain? (Though seriously, double-check that that's not illegal; funny isn't worth getting arrested.)
- Sebb767 3y agoThat's the IT sec version of placing your CV on their server to apply :) That being said, a company which is that lax with reported vulnerabilities is not likely to handle "fun" well and even if what you are doing is legal, being involved in a lawsuit is no fun and probably not worth it, since, in the end, you are trying to help them.
- aspenmayer 3y ago> That's the IT sec version of placing your CV on their server to apply :) Has this actually ever happened or been solicited? That’s an interesting thought experiment. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calling_card_(crime) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calling_card_(crime) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Website_defacement https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Website_defacement https://attrition.org/mirror/ https://attrition.org/mirror/ https://www.zone-h.org/archive https://www.zone-h.org/archive
- throwaway6272 3y agoI did this, kind of. I was interviewing for a financial company that went to some effort to hide their location for operational security, met them at a local cafe where we talked about physical security, and then casually mentioned that I was staying at an airbnb across the road from their office and we could walk back together. It took a couple of calls to find someone who happily told me their registered address. They were creeped out but hired me anyway.
- aspenmayer 3y agoWouldn't their registered address be public information? I understand that corporations may use agents/lawyers for that kind of thing, with layers of shell companies, but in theory this kind of info is able to be discovered and deduced from tax records, incorporation documents, and for publicly traded companies, SEC filings, etc. Cool story! I'm glad you got the job! Anything else about your sleuthing you'd care to add? I'm intrigued.
- rcxdude 3y agoA business needs a registered address, but it doesn't need to be the address of their main offices. It's quite common to have a registered address which is just a forwarding agency.
- aspenmayer 3y ago
- jsiepkes 3y agoWhile you can forge the DKIM signature there is a good chance there is also SPF configured. SPF tells which servers are allowed to send mail for the domain. So your email would likely still end up in the spam folder.
- aaronmdjones 3y agoDMARC only requires one of SPF or DKIM to pass. DKIM passing and SPF failing won't deter DMARC; the message will land in the inbox.
- joveian 3y agoIt turns out there is a bit of an exception to this, which is that plain SPF only applies to the envelope from address, not the From: field, and failure of plain SPF is sometimes (I don't know how often) considered independently from DMARC.
- jsiepkes 3y agooh wow, didn't know that. That's actually pretty bad. Why on earth was it designed in such a way that didn't require both tests to pass if both of them are configured.
- aaronmdjones 3y agoBecause both of them rely on DNS. DKIM is trivial to bypass if you can create a TXT record with your own key, and SPF is trivial to bypass if you can create a TXT record containing an SPF record with your own IP address / hostname / whatever. Presumably if you can compromise one of them, you can compromise both.
- LeonM 3y ago> DKIM is trivial to bypass if you can create a TXT record with your own key This is exactly what DMARC prevents. With DMARC the alignment requirement is added, so signing an email with a different domain key will no longer work. For a DMARC pass you need DKIM alignment. DKIM alignment means that the email is correctly signed with a DKIM key that is published under the sender (rfc5322.From) domain.
- hxelk1 3y agoCouple of years ago, I noticed some weird Outlook headers on our internal company e-mails and decided to take a look. It turned out our company Outlook (or Exchange? who knows) mail server was configured to relay mail through some 3rd-party SPAM filter and the SPAM filter trusted some headers which weren't stripped on ingress. So you could send an e-mail with the headers set and they would reach the SPAM filter unmodified. As the company had a 3rd-party SPAM filter, all Outlook security was disabled. This allowed me to send e-mail with forged sender. Outlook in its amazing brilliance would attach the "sender's" company photo and show some kind of a "Trusted" badge or something. I reported the issue and the admins weren't impressed. They insisted that this wasn't a major problem since the only way to make the e-mail appear to come from somebody in the company was to use you company account (outside e-mail would be filtered correctly). After some back and forth, I just told the admin to check his mailbox. It said something like, "if you don't think this is serious, you're fired" and it was "from" the CEO, with his smiling photo next to the name. That finally did the trick. EDIT: typos.
- themoonisachees 3y agoYou're allowed to say that the 3rd party spam checker was mailinblack. If it wasn't, then I know from experience they would have reacted the same.
- jmclnx 3y agoSo to check your keys, you are asked to grab a pip package. That is OK, but I heard there were lots of security issues with pips too. From one issue to maybe another ? If you are worried, I would just recreate your keys.
- westurner 3y agoPyPI has only implemented the "server signs whatever's uploaded with that account" part of TUF; there are no Publisher Signatures for packages uploaded to pypi (because GPG ASC support was removed from PyPI, the ad-hoc signature support was removed from wheel, and only server signatures are yet implemented). https://SLSA.dev/ https://SLSA.dev/ recommends TUF and Sigstore.dev and trusted containers for build-signing. Someday, Twine should prompt a PyPI package uploader to sign the package before uploading it, and download it to (prime the CDN cache and) check the Publisher and Package repo signature(s) at least once.
- woodruffw 3y agoPyPI doesn’t currently implement any part of TUF in a public facing manner, so I’m not sure where you got that from :-). There’s some limited deployment experiments with rstuf, but these are not part of any current server-side package signing scheme. PEP 740 does the rest of what you’ve described, however. And twine already has initial support for it, although it isn’t part of a release yet.
- westurner 3y ago"Roadmap for PEP 458" https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/issues/10672 https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/issues/10672
- gsich 3y agoThat's why you don't change upstream code without reason.
- ckastner 3y agoNot only did they have a reason, they discussed the reason and the proposed change with upstream.
- gsich 3y agohttps://lwn.net/Articles/282038/ https://lwn.net/Articles/282038/ comments here read differently.
- grayhatter 3y agoThis is why you don't change any code without understanding. Is it broken? no? then don't fix it! I find it super hard to believe this wasn't the very first supply chain attack discovery. (If anyone knows of a verified early one, I'd love to be corrected!)
- Karellen 3y agoIf it were a supply chain attack, I find it hard to believe that a) it would have originated from Debian at all, and b) that the people making the patch would have posted to the openssl-dev mailing list to ask their opinion on the correctness of the patch before including/shipping it. https://lwn.net/Articles/282038/ https://lwn.net/Articles/282038/
- yjftsjthsd-h 3y ago> That's why you don't change upstream code without reason. They did have a reason; they were running analysis on the code, and one of their tools specifically called openssl out for using uninitialized memory, which is absolutely a red flag. But not to worry; rather than blindly patching it to fix the bug, they went out of their way to go ask upstream about it, appeared to get a favorable response to their patch, and then went ahead.
- zer00eyz 3y agoI think the maintainer needs to update the OpenSSL package and remove all the networking features.... https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40320166 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40320166 To soon? (Note I run Debian all over the place, and am generally happy with it.)
- Kwpolska 3y agoWell, this OpenSSL bug was caused by Debian maintainers messing with the code they package too much…
- ris 3y agoI love this case, because every time someone cites it as a reason packagers shouldn't patch upstream software I get to point out that they had to go back over a decade to find an example of it going bad. Soon it's going to be two decades.
- tredre3 3y agoThe xz backdoor was caused by packagers patching OpenSSH. Just because it was caught you don't get to pretend it doesn't count.
- asveikau 3y agoThat was one factor of multiple, and the malicious actor chose to exploit it that way. liblzma is in enough critical stuff that they could have chosen to exploit something different had it not been for that.
- mistrial9 3y agothis is such a spin! that bug was two years worth of James Bond-level insertions into a situation that "was caused" by systemd ! if you want to get creative in the rewriting of fact
- hxelk1 3y agoThis isn't about systemd. OpenSSH is one of the most (if not the most) security-critical program in the distribution. Many systems run with just ssh enabled. That's why you don't mess with it. Which library pulled the vulnerability in is mostly irrelevant.
- b112 3y agoWhen the init system won't reliably start openssh, and insists the only fix is to patch, then blame the horrible init system. And that was what happened with systemd.
- 3y ago
- anonbanker 3y agoEvery day, Ted Unangst is vindicated more and more[1] for his work forking OpenSSL. If you do a little digging, you'll see that there was no real technical reason why your distro of choice has abandoned implementing LibreSSL[2][3], or just never implemented it at all[4]. They just somehow wanted to keep using the faulty software with exploit mitigation countermeasures[5][6]. Totally organic. 1. https://flak.tedunangst.com/post/analysis-of-openssl-freelist-reuse https://flak.tedunangst.com/post/analysis-of-openssl-freelis... 2. https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/LibreSSL https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/LibreSSL 3. https://github.com/void-linux/void-packages/issues/20935 https://github.com/void-linux/void-packages/issues/20935 4. https://lwn.net/Articles/841664/ https://lwn.net/Articles/841664/ 5. https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-misc&m=139698531410614&w=2 https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-misc&m=139698531410614&w=2 6. https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-misc&m=139698608410938&w=2 https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-misc&m=139698608410938&w=2
- tedunangst 3y agoI don't think that has anything to with this, though.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- throw20240511 3y agoAs soon as I started reading this I knew it was Hanno. Love your work dude.