Wait, are you saying this something you read in both the Tractatus and the PI? They are quite opposed as texts! That's kinda why he wrote the PI at all.. I d

Wait, are you saying this something you read in both the Tractatus and the PI? They are quite opposed as texts! That's kinda why he wrote the PI at all.. I don't think Wittgenstein would agree, first of all, that there is a "natural logic" to language. At least in the PI, that kind of entity--"the natural logic of language"--is precisely the kind of weird and imprecise use of language he is trying to expose. Even more, to say that such a logic "allows" for anything (like metaphors) feels like a very very strange thing for Wittgenstein to assert. He would ask "what do you mean by 'allows'"? All we know, according to him (in the PI), is that we find ourselves speaking in situations. Sometimes I say something, and my partner picks up the right brick, other times they do nothing, or hit me. In the PI, all the rest is doing away with things, like our idea of private language, the irreality of things like pain, etc. To conclude that he would make such assertions about the "nature" of language, of poetry, whatever, seems like maybe too quick a reading of the text. It is at best, a weirdly mystical reading of him, that he probably would not be too happy about (but don't worry about that, he was an asshole). The argument you are making sounds much more French. Derrida or Lyotard have said similar things (in their earlier, more linguistic years). They might be better friend to you here.