8 ms·
Microsoft employees exposed internal passwords in security lapse
- speps 3y agoIs it Nelson again with his shenanigans? For reference: https://www.wsj.com/articles/microsoft-employees-are-hooked-on-the-companys-training-videos-c8684a1 https://www.wsj.com/articles/microsoft-employees-are-hooked-...
- alternatex 3y agoSecurity trainings just that, trainings. Some teams and even EMs don't pay enough attention to actually following them. Also, in many orgs within Microsoft there's a lot of legacy setup that was there before the trainings or before the org became a part of Microsoft and sometimes there is no capacity within the teams to address/fix this legacy setup. And if they're unlucky enough, someone will exploit it. In some of the orgs and products there are zero career incentives for addressing legacy setups and there are big incentives for pushing out new features and initiatives. I've never heard of anyone being promoted for driving an initiative to fix obscure technical debt like this. It's a systemic issue that won't be resolved with security trainings.
- AtlasBarfed 3y agoBecause corporate security is about "compliance" and "training", not solutions. Awareness is one weapon, but really security is so technically complex to do well is that security needs to offer good solutions. Think of it like a GPT prompt: "give me a test harness for user profiles" "give me a secure login process" "give me a SSO service" Instead security groups want to "review"/"approve" which is just shitty compliance overhead. Because of course they don't want to be the ones to blame for bad security code. They want their compliance review checkbox, and everything else was the "evil rogue programmer/hacker" to blame. And alas, the security people I've seen in large corporations I've worked at have been almost morons. Internal support portals for enterprise passwords? Dumb password rotation rules, 6-8 character limits, and chrome complaining about obsolete ssl suite usages. Degrees from specious Florida universities that mostly seem to be about tuition collection and beach access than actual academics. Asking them about major breaches and the technical basis of them and getting blank stares. No idea what the vaunted Amazon or Microsoft do, hopefully it is better. Amazon abuses its employees, so that opens them to a rich array of social attacks and leaking, in addition to the high probability that Amazon farms its customers for business strategy. Microsoft has always been about monopolistic sociopathy trumping technical concern. Cloud providers are a high customer support business and it is resoundingly obvious that Amazon and Microsoft view those in as high regard as most SV organizations and really all corps in general: low paid and overworked, if any. Corporate management will only invest in things they see are worth the reduction in managerial bonus payout, kinda shareholder value, kinda risk reduction (at least within the period of time their stock grants are active). There's really no good aligned incentive, just like environmentalism because it is an unquantifiable risk to the great religion of economics and finance, and therefore doesn't exist.
- jabroni_salad 3y ago>"give me a test harness for user profiles" "give me a secure login process" "give me a SSO service" > Internal support portals for enterprise passwords? Dumb password rotation rules, 6-8 character limits, and chrome complaining about obsolete ssl suite usages. I'm curious as to why these would require some outside security group to deal with? These all seem like issues that should be solved either by someone in the devops category. Update your dependencies, disable unused protocols, have a QA guy find your improper memory glitches, and now 99% of the security establishment is irrelevant to you. These are operational issues. Most security issues are just operational issues.
- darknavi 3y agoMicrosoft employee here and I actually really enjoy the standards of business training. Generally I find that I mirror the effort I put into training to the effort the creators put in. If a training is just 20 slides of text to speech, I will put that on 2x on a background thread. If the training is a well-produced video series I'll watch the full thing at normal speed.
- sergiomattei 3y agoApparently people do watch parties for Trust Code around these parts!
- ChrisMarshallNY 3y agoThis seems to be a common theme. Someone inside a company sets up an Azure/AWS instance, to do sandboxing, and doesn't secure it. Many of these giant data breaches, are because some Marketing person, set up an AWS instance, dumped their entire user DB into it, and did a bunch of data mining. I think that most cloud providers are now defaulting to locked-down, but the issue seems to be, that folks are still going outside their org, to do this. I suspect that having some kind of secure internal cloud setup would be helpful. However, and this is a biggie: It needs to be easy to use. So many times, security has so many roadblocks, that folks work around it, simply to be productive. In my opinion, security needs to be the easiest path. If it is not, then that is the fault of the Security folks; not the end user. I worked for a company that had such terrible security policy, that it basically completely stopped all productivity. You could tell who was violating policy, because they accomplished their goals. Having a policy is worthless, if it is too difficult to follow.
- Kalium 3y agoMaking doing things right has to be easy. You also need excellent monitoring, because it's inevitable someone will do something else no matter how easy. There are plenty of people and teams who just want a button to push to run their build. That's not so hard. Give them a CI/CD system and they'll use it. The problem becomes the people who want to use weird, wildly divergent build processes made of fifteen shell scripts strung together and downloading arbitrary content from random remote servers because they enjoyed engineering it. They'll insist on having a blank slate of a cloud tenancy because no build system can meet their needs. The CI/CD team does not take this case seriously and will never meaningfully support it. Security is in no way staffed to build out a major extension of the CI/CD service. Perhaps it's the data team, who has decided they would like to datamine large quantities of private information at their leisure, in contravention of privacy policies and contractual language. So they'll jump through hoops and contortions and share passwords every which way in order to do the thing they want. They will deliberately set out to disable monitoring systems because they resent the implications. At no point will they pause to consider if any of this is a good idea. It's not just about making it easy to be secure. It's also about being able to find and stop people being insecure. One of the important things a security policy - and security organization - does is set boundaries for what activity is and isn't permitted. Crossing those boundaries needs to be watched closely... and yes, punished.
- cjk2 3y agoDoesn't surprise me. I know a managed service provider who keeps all his clients' AD domain passwords on a text file on his desktop. How do I know this? I saw it on a screen share.
- jorams 3y ago> The researchers notified Microsoft of the security lapse on February 6, and Microsoft secured the spilling files on March 5. That's pretty abysmal response time for what seems like it should be a simple fix for a serious problem.
- bsuvc 3y agoIt sounds like the credentials were embedded in code, so the fix probably involved all the steps of any production code change and deployment. I'm not defending it, because it is abysmal, just explaining probably why it took so long.
- k8svet 3y agoI want to be snarky, but even MS isn't that slow at deploying these days. Unless things have seriously regressed.
- bastawhiz 3y agoFaced with leaking internal data or having a broken system, you pretty much always choose the latter. You simply don't leave your front door open. Roll the secrets, break the system, and then fix the mess. The system was already broken from the moment credentials were leaked (or if you're a purist, from the moment they were hard coded into a file). The impact just wasn't realized or felt yet.
- bsuvc 3y agoAgreed, 100% I'm definitely not defending it, just saying the red tape in some orgs can be nearly impossible to defeat. This problem should have escalated as high as needed though to bypass the red tape and fix the security issue immediately. Probably a failure of weak middle management not having the guts to communicate the problem up.
- sunnybeetroot 3y agoSoftware isn’t black and white. You weigh the impact of both options.
- bsuvc 3y agoDidn't Microsoft create Azure Key Vault for storing and managing secrets? Why in the world would they not use it? > The researchers notified Microsoft of the security lapse on February 6, and Microsoft secured the spilling files on March 5. What??? This doesn't leave me confident of the security of any data in Microsoft's possession.
- TurningCanadian 3y agohttps://www.securityweek.com/scathing-federal-report-rips-microsoft-for-shoddy-security-insincerity-in-response-to-chinese-hack/ https://www.securityweek.com/scathing-federal-report-rips-mi... > The panel said the intrusion, discovered in June by the State Department and dating to May “was preventable and should never have occurred,” blaming its success on “a cascade of avoidable errors.” What’s more, the board said, Microsoft still doesn’t know how the hackers got in. ... > It said Microsoft’s CEO and board should institute “rapid cultural change” including publicly sharing “a plan with specific timelines to make fundamental, security-focused reforms across the company and its full suite of products.”
- sidewndr46 3y agoThere is no real penalty for Microsoft here, so there isn't much urgency to address something like this.
- sofixa 3y ago> This doesn't leave me confident of the security of any data in Microsoft's possession. Why would you have ever had confidence in them? They have by far the worst cloud in terms of security, and it isn't even close. A random selection of serious security incidents: just from Wiz from the past 2-3 years, and of course they aren't the only ones: https://www.wiz.io/blog/secret-agent-exposes-azure-customers-to-unauthorized-code-execution https://www.wiz.io/blog/secret-agent-exposes-azure-customers... https://www.wiz.io/blog/storm-0558-compromised-microsoft-key-enables-authentication-of-countless-micr https://www.wiz.io/blog/storm-0558-compromised-microsoft-key... https://www.wiz.io/blog/azure-active-directory-bing-misconfiguration https://www.wiz.io/blog/azure-active-directory-bing-misconfi... https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-o... https://www.wiz.io/blog/chaosdb-explained-azures-cosmos-db-vulnerability-walkthrough https://www.wiz.io/blog/chaosdb-explained-azures-cosmos-db-v... of course Microsoft AI researchers sucking at security: https://www.wiz.io/blog/38-terabytes-of-private-data-accidentally-exposed-by-microsoft-ai-researchers https://www.wiz.io/blog/38-terabytes-of-private-data-acciden... Nice overview from Corey Quinn that predates some of those but things were already horrifically bad: https://www.lastweekinaws.com/blog/azures-terrible-security-posture-comes-home-to-roost/ https://www.lastweekinaws.com/blog/azures-terrible-security-... Oh and there's also this, them selling your usage patterns to partners (hopefully they've stopped): https://twitter.com/QuinnyPig/status/1359769481539506180 https://twitter.com/QuinnyPig/status/1359769481539506180 Oh and another one where they bungled the response: https://twitter.com/QuinnyPig/status/1536868170815795200 https://twitter.com/QuinnyPig/status/1536868170815795200 I find it impossible to believe that Azure as a whole organisation takes security seriously. There might be individuals that do, but definitely nobody with decision making power. Half of the above described exploits are trivial and should have never passed any sort of competent review process.
- mvkel 3y agoPeople will always choose convenience over security. I'd figure out what the least-technical person (with data access) in the company needs to do their job, and find the friction points that prompt this person to find the path of least resistance. 2FA in general makes a bad solution worse all for the sake of security; it's not long for this world.
- ziddoap 3y ago>2FA in general makes a bad solution worse all for the sake of security; it's not long for this world. Can you expand on this? With reasonable setups (trusted locations and trusted devices) the friction is absolutely minimal. And it isn't even a question, the security benefits are astronomical. I am not understanding how you can say 2FA is "not long for this world".
- mvkel 3y ago1. Traditional way: - type email/username - type password - click submit 2. 2FA way - type email - type password - click submit - switch to secondary email/text app - wait for email/text to arrive - copy text string (not consistent, depends on input method) - switch back to main app - paste or manually type text string - click submit 3. Hybrid (passkey?) setups are a great step in the right direction. Even more convenient than passwords, and more secure, without app switching, which is the huge friction point.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- ziddoap 3y agoYou're purposefully writing #2 in a way to be more convoluted than it is, to prove your point, I guess? #3 is still MFA.
- crysin 3y agoHow did they write #2 to be more convoluted than it is? The way I read it literally describes my average experience for any "2FA" login.
- dboreham 3y agoWhere is the report that is the basis for this article? The article basically says "these dudes told us they found some passwords for databases on an open machine". Ok, well a) that may not be true and b) they may not be passwords with high value. Just because something is a "password" doesn't mean it is useful for anything. There seems to be nothing on the web about this incident besides more articles repeating the TC mother article.