5 ms·
SeL4 Device Driver Framework 0.4.0
- snvzz 3y agoSome quotes from the document: >Measured performance shows a vast improvement over the CAmkES-based framework, as well as significantly better performance than Linux, despite the higher number of system calls and context-switches required. In particular we find that a highly componentised sDDF system easily distributes across cores, while each individual component being strictly sequential, reducing its complexity. >The framework, running on the Microkit, clearly over-achieves our goal of “performance comparable to Linux”, outperforming Linux by a significant margin under all configurations evaluated. Performance is vastly better than that of the CAmkES system adapted to our transport layer (which is already a significant improvement over the performance of the previous CAmkES-based driver framework). The performance comparison to Linux is especially encouraging, given that the Linux IP stack is supposedly well optimised (especially for multicore use), while we are using the simple lwip [Dunkels, 2001]. We find that even on multicore (the scenario most favourable to Linux) our per-packet costs are significantly lower.
- arghwhat 3y agoI feel like this needs some reproducible datapoints and references to be anything more than an unsupported anecdote. In recent times it also requires studying seL4's implementation of modern CPU vulnerability mitigations.
- snvzz 3y agoNote that not only does it have such mitigations, but seL4 has state-of-the-art[0] timing side channel prevention. 0. https://trustworthy.systems/projects/timeprotection/ https://trustworthy.systems/projects/timeprotection/
- arghwhat 3y ago1. The document you link states that seL4 requires a specific CPU design that is work-in-progress by Integrated Systems Lab (a RISC-V CPU of course) to provide the claimed guarantees. This makes no sense in the context of testing performance of mitigations, which are fixes to silicon or microcode bugs fixed in later CPUs or microcode updates. If seL4 can require a hypothetical CPU to be secure, I can also just respond with a hypothetical CPU and microcode where all known bugs are fixed so no mitigations are needed. In either case, you cannot have made benchmark on a hypothetical CPU, so the question becomes: does seL4 have appropriate mitigations for current buggy CPUs or does its security model just fall apart on those? 2. The document you link make it appear as if their focus is purely in the form of explicitly classified security partitions, and does not provide protections within the partition. This requires trust between all processes in a security partition, and I suspect in turn means that their performance between security domains is significantly worse. This makes me suspicious of performance tests that artificially boost results in ways that are not representative of real-world performance, by comparing an seL4 system with a few security domains that only apply mitigations occasionally, with a Linux systems that assign a "security domain" to every process and apply mitigations constantly. Design benefits aside, and ignoring the actual mitigation effectiveness, these would be very different security and trust profiles. This is why all benchmarks and performance claims need to include detailed test procedures to have any value whatsoever.
- snvzz 3y ago>The document you link states that seL4 requires a specific CPU design that is work-in-progress by Integrated Systems Lab (a RISC-V CPU of course) to provide the claimed guarantees. I did not link a single document, but an index of relevant documents. The specific award winning paper from 2021 you quote, however, is quite interesting, and elaborates on the hardware requirement, which is spearheaded by seL4, but not specific to seL4 in any way. RISC-V was inevitably chosen for this research; RISC-V has high suitability for research due to its openness/licensing. As for the mitigations you are interested on, they were implemented in a timely manner ages ago. Older documents cover that. You need to scroll way down to ~2018 for the relevant papers. >The document you link make it appear as if their focus is purely in the form of explicitly classified security partitions, and does not provide protections within the partition. This requires trust between all processes in a security partition, and I suspect in turn means that their performance between security domains is significantly worse. Refer to 10.2.2 in the same document. >This is why all benchmarks and performance claims need to include detailed test procedures to have any value whatsoever. Is it not just ipbench[0], which they published alongside the paper? 0. https://github.com/au-ts/ipbench https://github.com/au-ts/ipbench
- snapplebobapple 3y agois SeL4 anywhere near usability by regular humans? is that even it's design purpose? Are we going to see the equivalent of Arch Sel4 that I can install, run wayland to get a gui, and replace my linux stuff?
- thatguy27 3y ago>is that even it's design purpose? It is not. The closest thing you'll get to it that has the features you mention, is Qubes OS [0]. When it comes to the L4 family, Google's adoption of seL4 [1] might be interesting to you, and possibly L4Re [2] [3], which is open source (not their tooling, though) with commercial support. Edit: there's a bunch more open source activity in this field, but I'm not familiar with it. [0] https://www.qubes-os.org/ https://www.qubes-os.org/ [1] https://opensource.googleblog.com/2022/10/announcing-kataos-and-sparrow.html https://opensource.googleblog.com/2022/10/announcing-kataos-... [2] https://l4re.org/ https://l4re.org/ [3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x8jxINR-q40 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x8jxINR-q40
- thatguy27 3y agoA few completely uncurated L4Re links: https://github.com/kernkonzept/manifest/wiki#tutorials https://github.com/kernkonzept/manifest/wiki#tutorials https://l4re.org/rpi.html https://l4re.org/rpi.html https://l4re.org/doc/ https://l4re.org/doc/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oqm6GOniQ_k https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oqm6GOniQ_k https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WGjAxsEAWRI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WGjAxsEAWRI
- thatguy27 3y agoA pretty cool video on seL4 where they give the red team root access on a Linux VM running inside of seL4, which controls a helicopter. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6s5FDX5PkZI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6s5FDX5PkZI
- transpute 3y agoGoogle Research, https://github.com/AmbiML/sparrow-manifest https://github.com/AmbiML/sparrow-manifest > Sparrow is a project to build a low-power secure embeded platform for Ambient ML applications. The target platform leverages RISC-V and OpenTitan. The Sparrow software includes a home-grown operating system named CantripOS, that runs on top of seL4 and (ignoring the seL4 kernel) is written almost entirely in Rust. > Archived on Jan 4 2024
- superidiot1932 3y agoThey also announced a new OS called Lions OS: https://github.com/au-ts/lionsos https://github.com/au-ts/lionsos
- darksaints 3y agoAn easier-to-use driver framework seems like a step in the right direction. It also seems like the list of drivers is still extremely small. I understand that use as a general purpose OS by non-technical people is a long ways away, but is there a general/mature guide to porting applications from other OSes? How far away are we from being able to easily deploy things like robotics applications on platforms like RPi? For example: * GStreamer * ROS * OpenCV * custom-built applications in languages like Rust or Java
- pjmlp 3y agoJava is super easy to use in robotics, although probably not as free beer, that is a kind of market that keeps commercial Java vendors like PTC, Aicas and microEJ in business.
- darksaints 3y agoI know it’s easy to use in robotics, my problem is more that in order to use it, you have to use Linux or Windows or bypass the benefits of an OS altogether. Java on SeL4 would be great to have.
- bfrog 3y agoUsing shared rings of buffers is almost but not quite what io_uring provides? It looks like it takes an io_uring style approach and natively so unless I’m misreading? Have the performance numbers somewhere been validated?