The late author of ZeroMQ, Pieter Hintjens, advocated for a practice called Optimistic Merging[1], where contributions would be merged immediately, without revi

The late author of ZeroMQ, Pieter Hintjens, advocated for a practice called Optimistic Merging[1], where contributions would be merged immediately, without reviewing the code or waiting for CI results. So your approach of having lax merging guidelines is not far off. While I can see the merits this has in building a community of contributors who are happy to work on a project, I always felt that it opens the project to grow without a clear vision or direction, and ultimately places too much burden on maintainers to fix contributions of others in order to bring them up to some common standard (which I surely expect any project to have, otherwise the mishmash of styles and testing practices would make working on the project decidedly not fun). It also delays the actual code review, which Pieter claimed does happen, to some unknown point in the future, when it may or may not be exhaustive, and when it's not clear who is actually responsible of conducting it or fixing any issues. It all sounds like a recipe for chaos where there is no control over what eventually gets shipped to users. But then again, I never worked on ZeroMQ or another project that adopted these practices, so perhaps you or someone else here can comment on what the experience is like. And then there's this issue of malicious code being shipped. This is actually brought up by a comment on that blog post[2], and Pieter describes exactly what happened in the xz case: > Let's assume Mallory is patient and deceitful and acts like a valid contributor long enough to get control over a project, and then slowly builds in his/her backdoors. Then careful code review won't help you. Mallory simply has to gain enough trust to become a maintainer, which is a matter of how, not if. And concludes that "the best defense [...] is size and diversity of the community". Where I think he's wrong is that a careful code review _can_ indeed reduce the chances of this happening. If all contributions are reviewed thoroughly, regardless if they're authored by a trusted or external contributor, then strange behavior and commits that claim to do one thing but actually do something else, are more likely to be spotted earlier than later. While OM might lead to a greater community size and diversity, which I think is debatable considering how many projects exist with a thriving community of contributors while also having strict contribution guidelines, it doesn't address how or when a malicious patch would be caught. If nobody is in charge of reviewing code, there are no testing standards, and maintainers have additional work keeping some type of control over the project's direction, how does this actually protect against this situation? The problem with xz wasn't a small community; it was *no* community. A single malicious actor got control of the project, and there was little oversight from anyone else. The project's contribution guidelines weren't a factor in its community size, and this would've happened whether it used OM or not. [1]: http://hintjens.com/blog:106 http://hintjens.com/blog:106 [2]: http://hintjens.com/blog:106/comments/show#post-2409627 http://hintjens.com/blog:106/comments/show#post-2409627