>If you accept that the only real claim I've made is that we're too ignorant to say definitively whether these systems are or are not conscious I think your im

>If you accept that the only real claim I've made is that we're too ignorant to say definitively whether these systems are or are not conscious I think your implicit claim is it's likely to be conscious, or at least likely enough to be a topic of discussion, since one doesn't generally discuss absurdly unlikely possibilities. >> ChatGPT being conscious is roughly as plausible as a "hello world" program being conscious. >Under a scientific interpretation, that's absurd. You've already conceded that Chat GPT may not be conscious. But now you are making the fun argument that if ChatGPT is not conscious, it's still more "scientifically" likely to be conscious than something that is not conscious. Okay. "Unless it wasn't your intent to dismiss all of the compelling indications of human-level intelligent responses as no more interesting or compelling than a chair that squeaks when you sit down?" I don't know what "human level intelligent responses" means-- my calculator can do "human level intelligent responses" at multiplication. I do think these models don't "learn" (they are altered by a training pipeline but that's an outside entity, it's like saying a car is learning when the factory screws it together) and they don't really form memories (the context might be a sort of memory but not one they can use very well- they basically need to be finetuned to do anything with the memory). A lot of your argument just seems handy wavy anthropomorphism.