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> The Captain of the Air France flight had logged 346 hours of flying over the past six months. But within those six months, there were only about four hours in

> The Captain of the Air France flight had logged 346 hours of flying over the past six months. But within those six months, there were only about four hours in which he was actually in control of an airplane—just the take-offs and landings. The rest of the time, auto-pilot was flying the plane. Langewiesche believes this lack of experience left the pilots unprepared to do their jobs. They should really be talking about the First officer. The captain knew exactly what to do but wasn't at the controls of the plane until after it had already been stalled. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447

dkjaudyeqooe 3y ago
Not sure how flying a plane while it's essentially doing nothing is helpful to anyone. If anything airline pilots should be taught to troubleshoot a plane more and fly it less. Maybe if the First Officer understood the correct way to exit a high altitude stall and that applying inputs to his control cancelled out the other pilot's inputs the plane likely would not have crashed. A big plane in a normal condition doesn't require much attention and can fly itself. Humans are best at exceptional circumstances (in theory) and computers best at doing the boring and tedious work. Flight hours in this context are pretty meaningless, they should be judged by percentage of abnormal incidents survived in a simulator instead.
- lsh123 3y ago
  "You know nothing, Jon Snow"
- phamilton 3y ago
  > Not sure how flying a plane while it's essentially doing nothing is helpful to anyone. When we train engineers for oncall, we take a look at incidents they saw while shadowing. Just X days shadowing doesn't really cut it, they have to be meaningful. I see the comparison to flying pretty clearly. Chaos engineering and game days are excellent ways to get engineers more experience in a system. Does the aviation industry have something similar?
  - buildsjets 3y ago
    Commercial pilots perform frequent recurring training in highly accurate flight simulators which can recreate just about any kind of system failure or emergency situation. It is normal in this training that they are given multiple simultaneous failures, along with confusing or unhelpful ATC instructions. Some professional pilots choose to engage in leisure activities that improve their aviation skills. Sullenberger was a glider pilot. I know a few ATPs that fly aerobatic aircraft on the weekend.
    - sandspar 3y ago
      Many people who love flying really love flying. I once met an extremely attractive woman who was a pilot. The problem was that flying is all she ever wanted to talk about. (I should say that that's just a problem for me. If I loved flight too then I'd be head over heels.)
- c22 3y ago
  Maybe the whole cockpit should be disconnected after takeoff and turned into a simulator where the pilots can just practice disaster scenarios for the duration of the flight. Worst case they get a chance to ace a real disaster in the mix.
  - Terr_ 3y ago
    Projected Headline: "According to investigators, pilots mistakenly believed their readouts and controls were still in simulation mode until seconds before the aircraft struck the mountain, killing everyone aboard." I mean, yeah, practice for when the automation breaks is good, but during the flight? That's just creating more mode-switching error cases.
    - actionfromafar 3y ago
      The whole cookpit lighting could be changed during simulation to remind which mode they are in. Something like Star Trek alert levels.
      - hef19898 3y ago
        Why not remove guard rails and seatbelts why we are at it? And have the concoles explode randomly when lightining strikes? Star Trek is a perfect example of how not to design ships, planes, systems and basically everything else.
      - sandspar 3y ago
        Maybe the pilots can wear little simulation hats.
  - sandspar 3y ago
    I like the idea of what'd happen if there were some runaway misaligned incentives and it ends up that long haul pilots are forced to vividly relive airline crashes for their entire 14 hour flight to Australia. Years later everyone can agree that it's beneficial ("It's always been done that way") but they can't remember why they started doing it.
- hef19898 3y ago
  How to tell me you uave no idea how modern planes work without tellong me you have no idea how modern plabes work...
  - sandspar 3y ago
    Twas brillig...
- wkat4242 3y ago
  > If anything airline pilots should be taught to troubleshoot a plane more and fly it less. Air France 447 is generally viewed as showing the opposite need. The disaster happened because the pilots were not at all involved in the flying process and suddenly thrown into a problem situation without that situational awareness. If anything training is already very focused on troubleshooting. And yes systems knowledge could be better. But there's many cases where there's just no time for it and that human awareness is no important. But they are kinda zoned out, similar to when you're a passenger in a car and have less geographical awareness due to not being involved.
davidf18 3y ago
447 occurred from a design flaw in Airbus aircraft that have independent joysticks instead of the Yoke available on Boeing fly-by-wire. The first officer who had more experience than the pilot flying the plane was unaware that the pilot was pulling back on the joystick. If the plane were properly designed as Boeing fly-by-wire craft were designed, eg, 777 at the time, then the accident wouldn't have happened because the first officer would have realized the pilot was pulling back on the yoke for the stall. A principle in safety is that you want things encoded in the "hardware", eg, you can't put your car in reverse without putting your foot on the brake, even though you are taught this in driver's ed. The Airbus designers forgot this major principle by using independent joysticks, a lesson not forgotten by the Boeing fly-by-wire craft.
- rKarpinski 3y ago
  Sure it was a design flaw but again the captain wasn't at the controls. The first officer and the relief first officer were the ones who were at the controls. The relief first officer (who was the most experienced with that airplane of the pilots) wasn't aware the first officer (the most junior of the pilots) was pulling up on the stick because of the independent inputs.
- dssdsdods 3y ago
  Certainly it was a design flaw, but also a major fault in training. Any properly trained pilot should have been able to detect a stall situation and pushed stick forward.
- chgs 3y ago
  > you can't put your car in reverse without putting your foot on the brake I rarely put a car in reverse while putting a foot on the brake. Handbrake on sure, but my foot is almost always on the accelerator when reverse engages, same as with forward gear
- lucioperca 3y ago
  You can absolutely try switching to reverse at 200km/h in a manual transmission. car at cost of your tranmission and potentially your bones in you hand. If you do it while rolling forward it will make funny sounds. Apart from that the pilot flying the aircraft was totally confused and pulled the nose up while having stall warning and actually stalling. That is quite some remarkable screw up not understanding to stall and thinking having your nose at an high attack angle while having 100% engine thrust will solve anything in this situation. Sure with non-independent joysticks the other might have called the non nonsensical maneuvers earlier and prevented it. But the lack of awareness in instrument flight of that pilot is quite remarkable.
hef19898 3y ago
AF447 is often misunderstood, there simply is no easy root cause for that particular accident. Or any other aerospace accident, it always is a combination of multiple factors.
- fransje26 3y ago
  Yes, but also no.. That the instruments readings were contradictory is indisputable, but when the anti-stall alarms are blaring in the cockpit, and the plane is literally falling from the sky for 3.5 minutes, than pulling the stick full back is not the way to go. In fact, pulling the stick back, even when applying full power, never has been, and never will be the way to get out of a stall. The Thales pitot tubes were clearly faulty. The flight system output was absolutely contradictory. But understanding which instruments and which readings a pilot could potentially rely on in such a situation goes down to fundamental, basic airmanship. And for that, the blame lays solely on Air France and on their pilot training. Pulling back to avoid overspeed is important, but stalling is certain death. And if the VMO and flutter flight-test videos are anything to go by the plane will definitely let the aircrew know they are getting there.
  - hef19898 3y ago
    Agreed, the crew was confused and stuck in bubble where they believed pulling up would get them out of a stall, it didn't. Until the very end, they didn't come to the correct conclusion. Again, training, alarm logic combined with a, in itself trivial equipment failure, led to the disaster. Picking only one of those factors, and all those I didn't mention, is just ignorant.
  - rlpb 3y ago
    > In fact, pulling the stick back, even when applying full power, never has been, and never will be the way to get out of a stall. It works perfectly well in an Airbus when operating in normal law AIUI because of envelope protection. The problem is that it doesn't work in alternate law which was the active mode at the time. It suddenly became necessary to control the aircraft like a "real" aircraft without a computer altering the inputs, and the pilots weren't prepared for that.

dkjaudyeqooe 3y ago

Not sure how flying a plane while it's essentially doing nothing is helpful to anyone. If anything airline pilots should be taught to troubleshoot a plane more and fly it less. Maybe if the First Officer understood the correct way to exit a high altitude stall and that applying inputs to his control cancelled out the other pilot's inputs the plane likely would not have crashed. A big plane in a normal condition doesn't require much attention and can fly itself. Humans are best at exceptional circumstances (in theory) and computers best at doing the boring and tedious work. Flight hours in this context are pretty meaningless, they should be judged by percentage of abnormal incidents survived in a simulator instead.

lsh123 3y ago
"You know nothing, Jon Snow"
phamilton 3y ago
> Not sure how flying a plane while it's essentially doing nothing is helpful to anyone. When we train engineers for oncall, we take a look at incidents they saw while shadowing. Just X days shadowing doesn't really cut it, they have to be meaningful. I see the comparison to flying pretty clearly. Chaos engineering and game days are excellent ways to get engineers more experience in a system. Does the aviation industry have something similar?
- buildsjets 3y ago
  Commercial pilots perform frequent recurring training in highly accurate flight simulators which can recreate just about any kind of system failure or emergency situation. It is normal in this training that they are given multiple simultaneous failures, along with confusing or unhelpful ATC instructions. Some professional pilots choose to engage in leisure activities that improve their aviation skills. Sullenberger was a glider pilot. I know a few ATPs that fly aerobatic aircraft on the weekend.
  - sandspar 3y ago
    Many people who love flying really love flying. I once met an extremely attractive woman who was a pilot. The problem was that flying is all she ever wanted to talk about. (I should say that that's just a problem for me. If I loved flight too then I'd be head over heels.)
c22 3y ago
Maybe the whole cockpit should be disconnected after takeoff and turned into a simulator where the pilots can just practice disaster scenarios for the duration of the flight. Worst case they get a chance to ace a real disaster in the mix.
- Terr_ 3y ago
  Projected Headline: "According to investigators, pilots mistakenly believed their readouts and controls were still in simulation mode until seconds before the aircraft struck the mountain, killing everyone aboard." I mean, yeah, practice for when the automation breaks is good, but during the flight? That's just creating more mode-switching error cases.
  - actionfromafar 3y ago
    The whole cookpit lighting could be changed during simulation to remind which mode they are in. Something like Star Trek alert levels.
    - hef19898 3y ago
      Why not remove guard rails and seatbelts why we are at it? And have the concoles explode randomly when lightining strikes? Star Trek is a perfect example of how not to design ships, planes, systems and basically everything else.
    - sandspar 3y ago
      Maybe the pilots can wear little simulation hats.
- sandspar 3y ago
  I like the idea of what'd happen if there were some runaway misaligned incentives and it ends up that long haul pilots are forced to vividly relive airline crashes for their entire 14 hour flight to Australia. Years later everyone can agree that it's beneficial ("It's always been done that way") but they can't remember why they started doing it.
hef19898 3y ago
How to tell me you uave no idea how modern planes work without tellong me you have no idea how modern plabes work...
- sandspar 3y ago
  Twas brillig...
wkat4242 3y ago
> If anything airline pilots should be taught to troubleshoot a plane more and fly it less. Air France 447 is generally viewed as showing the opposite need. The disaster happened because the pilots were not at all involved in the flying process and suddenly thrown into a problem situation without that situational awareness. If anything training is already very focused on troubleshooting. And yes systems knowledge could be better. But there's many cases where there's just no time for it and that human awareness is no important. But they are kinda zoned out, similar to when you're a passenger in a car and have less geographical awareness due to not being involved.

davidf18 3y ago

447 occurred from a design flaw in Airbus aircraft that have independent joysticks instead of the Yoke available on Boeing fly-by-wire. The first officer who had more experience than the pilot flying the plane was unaware that the pilot was pulling back on the joystick. If the plane were properly designed as Boeing fly-by-wire craft were designed, eg, 777 at the time, then the accident wouldn't have happened because the first officer would have realized the pilot was pulling back on the yoke for the stall. A principle in safety is that you want things encoded in the "hardware", eg, you can't put your car in reverse without putting your foot on the brake, even though you are taught this in driver's ed. The Airbus designers forgot this major principle by using independent joysticks, a lesson not forgotten by the Boeing fly-by-wire craft.

rKarpinski 3y ago
Sure it was a design flaw but again the captain wasn't at the controls. The first officer and the relief first officer were the ones who were at the controls. The relief first officer (who was the most experienced with that airplane of the pilots) wasn't aware the first officer (the most junior of the pilots) was pulling up on the stick because of the independent inputs.
dssdsdods 3y ago
Certainly it was a design flaw, but also a major fault in training. Any properly trained pilot should have been able to detect a stall situation and pushed stick forward.
chgs 3y ago
> you can't put your car in reverse without putting your foot on the brake I rarely put a car in reverse while putting a foot on the brake. Handbrake on sure, but my foot is almost always on the accelerator when reverse engages, same as with forward gear
lucioperca 3y ago
You can absolutely try switching to reverse at 200km/h in a manual transmission. car at cost of your tranmission and potentially your bones in you hand. If you do it while rolling forward it will make funny sounds. Apart from that the pilot flying the aircraft was totally confused and pulled the nose up while having stall warning and actually stalling. That is quite some remarkable screw up not understanding to stall and thinking having your nose at an high attack angle while having 100% engine thrust will solve anything in this situation. Sure with non-independent joysticks the other might have called the non nonsensical maneuvers earlier and prevented it. But the lack of awareness in instrument flight of that pilot is quite remarkable.

hef19898 3y ago

AF447 is often misunderstood, there simply is no easy root cause for that particular accident. Or any other aerospace accident, it always is a combination of multiple factors.

fransje26 3y ago
Yes, but also no.. That the instruments readings were contradictory is indisputable, but when the anti-stall alarms are blaring in the cockpit, and the plane is literally falling from the sky for 3.5 minutes, than pulling the stick full back is not the way to go. In fact, pulling the stick back, even when applying full power, never has been, and never will be the way to get out of a stall. The Thales pitot tubes were clearly faulty. The flight system output was absolutely contradictory. But understanding which instruments and which readings a pilot could potentially rely on in such a situation goes down to fundamental, basic airmanship. And for that, the blame lays solely on Air France and on their pilot training. Pulling back to avoid overspeed is important, but stalling is certain death. And if the VMO and flutter flight-test videos are anything to go by the plane will definitely let the aircrew know they are getting there.
- hef19898 3y ago
  Agreed, the crew was confused and stuck in bubble where they believed pulling up would get them out of a stall, it didn't. Until the very end, they didn't come to the correct conclusion. Again, training, alarm logic combined with a, in itself trivial equipment failure, led to the disaster. Picking only one of those factors, and all those I didn't mention, is just ignorant.
- rlpb 3y ago
  > In fact, pulling the stick back, even when applying full power, never has been, and never will be the way to get out of a stall. It works perfectly well in an Airbus when operating in normal law AIUI because of envelope protection. The problem is that it doesn't work in alternate law which was the active mode at the time. It suddenly became necessary to control the aircraft like a "real" aircraft without a computer altering the inputs, and the pilots weren't prepared for that.