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Five cryptologic giants to be inducted into NSA's Cryptologic Hall of Honor
- i8comments 3y ago[flagged]
- no-dr-onboard 3y agoI see your point, but be careful of throwing the baby out with the bathwater on this one. AES largely gained popularity in part by the NSA adopting it into the "Suite B Crypto" program. The NSA also helped strengthen and develop DSA & SHA during it's early years.
- adgjlsfhk1 3y agothe NSA has always liked somewhat weak encryption. specifically, they would really like if encryption could be broken in very roughly 1 week to 1 year on a super computer.
- sandworm101 3y agoPerhaps in the past, but the NSA are good at predicting trends. They know that something broken by a supercomputer today will likely be broken on a smartwatch tomorrow. Intelligence agencies, unlike most tech firms, need to futureproof their secrets for decades. While the NSA no doubt has an interest secret backdoors, I don't think they would today support mathematically weak encryption.
- tptacek 3y agoThat doesn't make sense as an NSA target, because NSA's adversaries all easily clear that threshold. What NSA supposedly wants are "NOBUS" weaknesses: keyed vulnerabilities for which only they hold the keys.
- user764743 3y agoIn the case of the Shadow Brokers, it revealed that those supposed "NOBUS" were low level vulnerabilities that did not need a supercomputer to break.
- tptacek 3y agoA vulnerability isn't "NOBUS" just because it exploits an unpublished zero-day. Dual EC was NOBUS because exploiting it required a curve private key that presumably only NSA had.
- tialaramex 3y agoNOBUS (Encryption which Nobody But Us can break) which is the rationale for DES weakness) doesn't make any sense any more today. Can the Americans spend a thousand times more on compute power than the Chinese today? Do they have uniquely intelligent mathematicians? No. So there's no point in popularizing any solutions that the US can break, because if they can the Chinese can break them too. I think lots of people have this idea that everybody thought DES was fine and so the reality of attacks on DES was astonishing, therefore AES won't be any better we're just in the dark somehow. That's just not true, DES was known to be purposefully weak, good enough but not actually good. 56-bit keys and 64-bit block sizes - you can't brute force that with a computer you can buy from the store, but it's not ludicrous and clearly somebody with government money can do it eventually. AES makes those numbers enough bigger that you just can't break it this way.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- chasil 3y agoActually, two of the awards are for codebreaking in the (relatively) distant past, far before modern practices. "Evelyn Akeley's... accomplishments during World War II were exceeded only by those of her students, who broke virtually every Japanese army code they encountered. "James Lovell... 'the [American] Revolution's one-man National Security Agency.' His pioneering work as a codebreaker and codemaker gave cryptology a singular role in the emergence of our new Nation. Leveraging Lovell's decrypts, George Washington knew of the approach of a British relief force and was able to warn his French allies, thus enabling a decisive victory at Yorktown."
- kosasbest 3y agoNSA are purple team (both red team and blue team), so they do defense aswell as offense. They need to sniff plaintext aswell as protect their own infra and IP with strong crypto standards like AES. The public also benefits from AES, often to the detriment of SIGINT efforts by the NSA, so there are caveats to this, and it's nuanced.
- keepamovin 3y agoYou really think they're using AES internally? Surely they're using classified ciphers.
- halJordan 3y agoThey're using fips like the rest of govt. i get that you don't know. That's fine, but when you start making up stuff to fill in the gap that's when you need to do a reality check.
- keepamovin 3y agoOh, I don't know. I seem to see it ok. How about you? Didn't you miss that they're using classified?
- Alpha3031 3y agoSuite A is fairly specialised. Nobody can publicly comment on specific use cases of course, but it's fairly well known that Suite B is used for most national security information, including TS/SCI. But yes, technically non-public algorithms exist and are in use, it's just not even nearly automatically applied to everything.
- keepamovin 3y agoCool! It would be fascinating to read more about the Suite A ciphers and compare them to known designs, see how they were inspired by, improved or differ. But I guess there's not much chance of that happening as they're classified, haha! :)
- paxys 3y agoThe two go hand in hand. If you don't put effort into cracking encryption you are never going to get stronger encryption.
- geoffmunn 3y agoI always assumed that the NSA 'hardened' versions of products or operating systems were a careful mix of fixes for things they wanted to be protected against, while still letting secret backdoors to be preserved.
- adrian_b 3y agoThose who have been added in the past to NSA's Cryptologic Hall of Honor are listed at: https://www.nsa.gov/History/Cryptologic-History/Historical-Figures/#honor https://www.nsa.gov/History/Cryptologic-History/Historical-F... While that list contains many important contributors, it is far from complete. The most notorious of the 2023 list is Joseph Mauborgne, and among his merits is written: "He is credited as the co-inventor of the One-Time Pad". Even if this claim, which appears to originate from the book "The Codebreakers" by David Kahn (1967) has been frequently repeated, there is no evidence for it and it seems very implausible. The "One-Time Pad" has been described for the first time in the non-classified literature in February 1926 by Gilbert Sandford Vernam in “Cipher Printing Telegraph Systems For Secret Wire and Radio Telegraphic Communications”. Because of that, it has become known as the "Vernam cipher", even if Vernam has not invented it. The "One-Time Pad" is an improvement of the so-called "running-key ciphers", which had been used already for many years before World War I. These are aperiodic substitution ciphers. Until the end of WWI it was believed that if the "running key", i.e. the stream of key symbols, is not periodic, that is enough to make an unbreakable cipher. The "running key" used for encryption was usually taken from the text of some book. In 1918, two employees of ATT, Gilbert Sandford Vernam and Lyman F. Morehouse have filed two patent applications for an electromechanical implementation of the running-key ciphers, where the plaintext, the ciphertext and the running key were stored on punched tape. Vernam's patent was for the use of bitwise addition modulo 2 for combining the running key with the plaintext or ciphertext, while Morehouse's patent was for using several running-key generators with coprime periods and combining their outputs to obtain a generator with a period equal to the product of the coprime periods. Both inventions of Vernam and Morehouse continue to be used today very frequently and they both deserve to be included in NSA's Cryptologic Hall of Honor more than most people already present there. In 1918, Vernam and Morehouse who were in contact with Mauborgne, because the US military was a very likely customer for their encrypted telegraph, were still believing that it is enough for the running key to be not periodic. Some time between 1918 and 1926, Vernam has learned that there is a second condition, the key symbols must be chosen at random, otherwise the cipher is breakable. Kahn supposes that Vernam has learned this from Mauborgne. This is possible, but in any case the idea cannot have originated from Mauborgne, but only from his subordinate Captain William F. Friedman. NSA's Cryptologic Hall of Honor includes, very appropriately, at its first two positions (i.e. in 1999), both William F. Friedman and his wife and coworker Elizebeth S. Friedman. In 1918, at the end of WWI, William F. Friedman has been the first who has succeeded to cryptanalyze documents encrypted with aperiodic running-key ciphers, busting the myth that such ciphers are unbreakable. Being the first who has created a deciphering method for aperiodic substitution ciphers that was based on the fact that the key symbols were not random, it is pretty obvious that he was also the first to understand that an unbreakable cipher must satisfy 2 conditions: the stream of key symbols must be aperiodic and random. His work was classified, so a few months later Vernam and Morehouse were still believing in the unbreakability of aperiodic running keys, regardless whether they are random or not. Mauborgne was Friedman's boss, so he must have learned immediately that the non-random running-key ciphers are breakable and that random aperiodic running-keys are required for unbreakability. In the following years Friedman has collaborated with Vernam and he has invented some improvements of Vernam's system, to make its running keys more random. So Vernam could have learned about the randomness condition either directly from Friedman or through Mauborgne. In any case, it seems impossible for Mauborgne to have had any direct contribution to the previous work of Friedman. Even if it is unlikely that Mauborgne has been any kind of "co-inventor of the One-Time Pad", he certainly had very important contributions so he deserves his place in the Hall of Honor. Nevertheless, nothing of what Mauborgne might have done is still in use today, unlike the inventions of Vernam and Morehouse, which are ubiquitous, so they deserve more than him a place there. Also Shannon (ATT), Hamming (ATT) and Feistel (IBM) are missing, while all modern cryptology is based on their work (Diffie is included on the list, despite his constant mistrust of NSA, so the list is not restricted to government employees). It is less known that Hamming had an essential contribution to modern cryptology. While his colleague Shannon had invented the components of all modern cryptographic algorithms, he believed that his strong ciphers are impractical for communications, due to the susceptibility to errors. The error-correcting codes invented by Hamming have solved this problem, as established later by Horst Feistel at IBM.
- wly_cdgr 3y agoCan't believe they printed the names in plaintext, smh
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- inasio 3y agoDoes anyone know anything about James Radford (James Radford - Jim Radford developed Special Purpose Devices that solved intractable analytic problems, often by enhancing the performance of supercomputers by a factor of hundreds)? I found that super interesting but couldn't find anything online about him, not even the era (Cold War, 911, recent). If anyone has any links or literature about things he did I would very much appreciate it.