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>Re-read what I wrote: Inserting a compromised USB drive into an industrial environment is harder than a remote attack, but it's still not particularly hard. A
by tw04 3y ago
>Re-read what I wrote: Inserting a compromised USB drive into an industrial environment is harder than a remote attack, but it's still not particularly hard.
And you're basing this on what? All of the OT networks I deal with are physically secured. You're swiping a badge and being recorded before you get anywhere near the production floor.
>Why does such an attack have to originate from Russia?
Because someone in the US compromising an OT network with ransomware is going to prison for a LONNNNG with little to nothing to gain from it?
>No, you have missed the point. Stuxnet shows that a USB attack can succeed even against a state actor. It does not show that a state actor is necessary to mount such an attack.
Go ahead and link some of the OT environments you've seen compromised by USB drive in the US. I work in the industry, you're going to be searching a lonnnnnnnnnnnnnng time to produce more than about 2 and both the ones I'm aware of were insiders who were immediately caught.
- lisper 3y ago> And you're basing this on what? My knowledge of what I could do as an employee if I were to go rogue. > Because someone in the US compromising an OT network with ransomware is going to prison for a LONNNNG with little to nothing to gain from it? If they were caught. > Go ahead and link some of the OT environments you've seen compromised by USB drive in the US. There aren't many, but it's not because it's a difficult attack to mount. It's because there is a lot of lower lying fruit. You don't have to outrun the bear.