4 ms·

And how are you planning on getting a USB drive from Russia onto an air-gapped steel press in the US? It is several orders of magnitude more difficult to get m

by tw04 3y ago

And how are you planning on getting a USB drive from Russia onto an air-gapped steel press in the US? It is several orders of magnitude more difficult to get malware onto an air-gapped network on the other side of the world that you know absolutely nothing about than to attack it when it's connected to the internet. How are you reconning what actual PLCs Bob is using? How do you know what versions are on those controllers? How do you even know the address of someone who works in a position that has physical access to the OT network in the first place? I'm not using a logical fallacy, you're pretending that Stuxnet is applicable to the average business and it just isn't for a dozen reasons I can think of and probably 2 dozen I can't.

lisper 3y ago
Re-read what I wrote: Inserting a compromised USB drive into an industrial environment is harder than a remote attack, but it's still not particularly hard. > And how are you planning on getting a USB drive from Russia onto an air-gapped steel press in the US? Why does such an attack have to originate from Russia? > you're pretending that Stuxnet is applicable to the average business No, you have missed the point. Stuxnet shows that a USB attack can succeed even against a state actor. It does not show that a state actor is necessary to mount such an attack.
- tw04 3y ago
  >Re-read what I wrote: Inserting a compromised USB drive into an industrial environment is harder than a remote attack, but it's still not particularly hard. And you're basing this on what? All of the OT networks I deal with are physically secured. You're swiping a badge and being recorded before you get anywhere near the production floor. >Why does such an attack have to originate from Russia? Because someone in the US compromising an OT network with ransomware is going to prison for a LONNNNG with little to nothing to gain from it? >No, you have missed the point. Stuxnet shows that a USB attack can succeed even against a state actor. It does not show that a state actor is necessary to mount such an attack. Go ahead and link some of the OT environments you've seen compromised by USB drive in the US. I work in the industry, you're going to be searching a lonnnnnnnnnnnnnng time to produce more than about 2 and both the ones I'm aware of were insiders who were immediately caught.
  - lisper 3y ago
    > And you're basing this on what? My knowledge of what I could do as an employee if I were to go rogue. > Because someone in the US compromising an OT network with ransomware is going to prison for a LONNNNG with little to nothing to gain from it? If they were caught. > Go ahead and link some of the OT environments you've seen compromised by USB drive in the US. There aren't many, but it's not because it's a difficult attack to mount. It's because there is a lot of lower lying fruit. You don't have to outrun the bear.
deleted 3y ago
[deleted]

by tw04 3y ago

lisper 3y ago

Re-read what I wrote: Inserting a compromised USB drive into an industrial environment is harder than a remote attack, but it's still not particularly hard. > And how are you planning on getting a USB drive from Russia onto an air-gapped steel press in the US? Why does such an attack have to originate from Russia? > you're pretending that Stuxnet is applicable to the average business No, you have missed the point. Stuxnet shows that a USB attack can succeed even against a state actor. It does not show that a state actor is necessary to mount such an attack.

tw04 3y ago
>Re-read what I wrote: Inserting a compromised USB drive into an industrial environment is harder than a remote attack, but it's still not particularly hard. And you're basing this on what? All of the OT networks I deal with are physically secured. You're swiping a badge and being recorded before you get anywhere near the production floor. >Why does such an attack have to originate from Russia? Because someone in the US compromising an OT network with ransomware is going to prison for a LONNNNG with little to nothing to gain from it? >No, you have missed the point. Stuxnet shows that a USB attack can succeed even against a state actor. It does not show that a state actor is necessary to mount such an attack. Go ahead and link some of the OT environments you've seen compromised by USB drive in the US. I work in the industry, you're going to be searching a lonnnnnnnnnnnnnng time to produce more than about 2 and both the ones I'm aware of were insiders who were immediately caught.
- lisper 3y ago
  > And you're basing this on what? My knowledge of what I could do as an employee if I were to go rogue. > Because someone in the US compromising an OT network with ransomware is going to prison for a LONNNNG with little to nothing to gain from it? If they were caught. > Go ahead and link some of the OT environments you've seen compromised by USB drive in the US. There aren't many, but it's not because it's a difficult attack to mount. It's because there is a lot of lower lying fruit. You don't have to outrun the bear.

deleted 3y ago

[deleted]