> [...] reported the leaked credentials and stopped. But, and this can be a significant differentiator from a legal standpoint in multiple jurisdictions[0], th

> [...] reported the leaked credentials and stopped. But, and this can be a significant differentiator from a legal standpoint in multiple jurisdictions[0], they did not use leaked credentials, nor did they circumvent any barriers. They used a publicly accessible endpoint to create their own, completely new user that just had access rights from the get-go. [0] Sticking solely with US examples, most notably United States v. Auernheimer which was in part overturned on jurisdictional issues, in part due to the following: "We also note that in order to be guilty of accessing “without authorization, or in excess of authorization” under New Jersey law, the Government needed to prove that Auernheimer or Spitler circumvented a code-or password-based barrier to access. See State v. Riley, 412 N.J.Super. 162, 988 A.2d 1252, 1267 (N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div.2009). Although we need not resolve whether Auernheimer's conduct involved such a breach, no evidence was advanced at trial that the account slurper ever breached any password gate or other code-based barrier. The account slurper simply accessed the publicly facing portion of the login screen and scraped information that AT & T unintentionally published."