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To be really pedantic, a $20,000 drone out of Yemen is 0.1% of Yemen GDP. A US interceptor of 0.000013% of US GDP. So, yes, I know, LOTS of details (like Iran

To be really pedantic, a $20,000 drone out of Yemen is 0.1% of Yemen GDP. A US interceptor of 0.000013% of US GDP. So, yes, I know, LOTS of details (like Iran) here, but the overall point being even if our $3M missile is more than their $20K drone in absolute dollars, we can afford it more than they can.

logicchains 3y ago
What percent of Iran's GDP is a $20k drone?
- JumpCrisscross 3y ago
  > What percent of Iran's GDP is a $20k drone? About what a third of $3mm is to the U.S. (15x larger) or U.S. defense budget (50x larger). A 3x production-cost advantage in an economically unconstrained conflict is not an advantage. It’s at best a Twitter PR point.
  - sudosysgen 3y ago
    The conflict is actually not far from being constrained by production, which is difficult to scale up for a 3mm$ munition, because private contractors expect lengthy contracts to justify long term amortization of increased capital expenditure. Given that Iran is producing thousands to tens of thousands of these missiles every year, and is looking to expand production even more, there actually really is a risk that the stockpiles will not keep up, after which dozens of billions of dollars will have to be expended to seriously ramp up production. This dynamic is also the reason why it's been so difficult to ramp up artillery production in support of Ukraine. Additionally, given that the expensive parts in these drones seem to be homemade in Iran (engines, fuselage, even some of the electronics), and given the sanctions, USD equiv. GDP isn't a great metric since there's no free market to convert Iranian production to USD. Then there's the problem that these missiles are sorely needed in case of a war in China, so actually going through a significant expenditure, even if money is allocated to increase production in 2-3 years, means that the US Navy may find itself with insufficient stockpiles to defend itself against the PLA, should the need arise. Its' ability to defend against credible Chinese saturation attacks is already marginal.
    - JumpCrisscross 3y ago
      > conflict is actually not far from being constrained by production If anyone is talking about escalation risk, production isn’t the bottleneck. We are nowhere close to being resource constrained in the Middle East. > the US Navy may find itself with insufficient stockpiles to defend itself against the PLA In a production contest it’s maximum sustainable flows, not stocks, that matter. (Stocks buy you time to get flows up.) To the extent challenging the PLA is a concern, boosting production to counter the Houthis is a net win. > ability to defend against credible Chinese saturation attacks is already marginal You’re arguing both ways. If their value is marginal, expending them now is fine. Your broader point—I think—is correct. America doesn’t want to spread itself thin. But that’s a constraint at the CVN level. Once the carrier strike force is positioned, it’s immaterial whether it’s firing off missiles or guns. Anyone positioning Iran et al v America et al is missing key pieces in the logistics of war.
      - sudosysgen 3y ago
        The stocks are not sufficient to buy time to get the flows. There are only around 500 SM-6 missiles (long range, suitable to protect large numbers of vessels at various distances, 5mm$ each), and there is only capacity to produce a few hundred for the short to medium term. The older SM-2s may have more plentiful stocks, but most of them have been deemed too dangerous to use after causing serious damage in test firings, and there are only around 180 modernized versions available, and the missile itself is no longer produced. Defending against a saturation attack means that the value experiences a step function. Either you have enough missiles to stop most low-tech enemy missiles, and you're going to be largely fine, or you don't, and your entire fleet might sink. It's not something you can afford to. The US Navy is never going to allow stocks to go under what is necessary to stop at least a long-range Chinese attack, and that means at least 600 missiles, which is a serious chunk of what remains. Boosting production to counter the Houthis is surely something the US will do. It will take 2-3 years to bear fruit. In the meantime, stocks are not sufficient to tank Iran's capability to produce these kinds of missiles. I think that the most likely outcome is either more shipping companies negotiating terms to transit unharmed, like China's COSCO has all but admitted to have done, or these detours to continue.
swashboon 3y ago
But its not Yemen, its Iran that's paying for it - with money from oil smuggled past sanctions.
- dragonwriter 3y ago
  Shipping from Iran to Yemen is also vulnerable, however.
  - nradov 3y ago
    Most of the missiles and other weapons are being smuggled in relatively small boats. It simply isn't practical to stop and search most of them. In theory the US and other nations could declare a blockade and simply sink any vessel that enters Yemeni territorial waters, but that would be a major escalation and require a lot more naval forces to be deployed
- meiraleal 3y ago
  Smuggled? Are you implying that any deal the US does not like is illegal? Wake up. This age is over.
darth_avocado 3y ago
The question isn’t how much each missile/drone costs. The question is, how many of those does each side have and how quickly can you get more? Maybe $3M missile isn’t that costly to the US, but if you have like 1000 of them and it takes 6 months to replenish the stock, while the other side has 10000 drones that they can replenish in 3 months, you have a massive problem at your hand. (The same problem Ukraine is having re: stockpiling artillery shells that are sourced from US/NATO)
- Retric 3y ago
  Edit: They where off by a factor of 1,000 for Yemen GDP. That said if they were actually 0.1% GDP each then 10000 * 0.1% GDP each = 100% of GDP for 10 years. Which would obviously not happen.
- Log_out_ 3y ago
  The problem is also the stock value of the industrial military complex. If your artisanal rockets are out competed by smart flying sand with a stick, your actual evaluation is in for a correction, fiscally as tactically.
onthecanposting 3y ago
Dollars aren't directly convertible to warmaking power. The factories and skilled labor that make weapons are a scarce resource that don't scale with mere market capitalization. That the Russian Federation has a small fraction of US GDP but has launched more cruise missiles in a single conflict (~7500) than the US has ever produced (4000 tomahawks) is an important example of this.
- ovi256 3y ago
  The 7500 RU launched cruise missiles haven't achieved a tenth as much as the Tomahawks the US hit Iraq with. After that, Iraq didn't have a working integrated air defence any more. The RU missiles have killed plenty of civilians though.
  - jopsen 3y ago
    True, but it's possibly fair to argue that its easier to scale up cheap drone production, than production of interceptors.
    - ceejayoz 3y ago
      At a certain point, US foreign policy tends to move from interceptors to flattening launch sites and key personnel.
      - jopsen 3y ago
        Yeah, I wouldn't be surprised.
        ethbr1 3y ago
        The point is to have a deterrence gradient, so you always have (1) deescalate (lower), (2) match (proportionate), and (3) escalate (higher) responses, for any level of attack. If there's a level at which you don't have all three options, there exist political situations that can leave you vulnerable. E.g. if the US has no proportionate response to a Russian tactical nuclear strike on Ukrainian soil, it may hazard towards not escalating. Similarly, why the talking points of US response strikes for the past few decades have generally been 'this was a proportionate response.' But after the last warning to the Houthis, I expect the next ASBM or large drone that hits a civilian ship prompts a large US/UK (and maybe France and Germany) strike.
ceejayoz 3y ago
> To be really pedantic, a $20,000 drone out of Yemen is 0.1% of Yemen GDP. Yemen's GDP is $21B, not $21M.
buzzdenver 3y ago
As an engineer, saying that $20k, the price of a cheap car, is 1/1000th of a GDP of a whole country does not pass the smell test. Google says that Yemen's GDP is $21.61b, so a drone is 0.0000925% of the GDP. In other words it's about a million drones per year for Yemen, and about 7.7 million interceptors per year for the US.
waffleiron 3y ago
Not 0.1%, you are off by a factor 1000. Their GDP is 20b not 20m. Would still be relatively more costly but a lot less extreme.
lr1970 3y ago
> To be really pedantic, a $20,000 drone out of Yemen is 0.1% of Yemen GDP. Are you saying that entire Yemen's GDP is just $20M ? Does not seem plausible.
- deleted 3y ago
  [deleted]
boplicity 3y ago
You're embedded assumption is that Yemen would be paying for these drones. Examined on its own, that's a bold claim.
pi-e-sigma 3y ago
Yemeni rebels don't pay for these, though. It's free 'aid' from Iran. So arguing costs doesn't make much sense. Similarly mujahedeen in Afghanistan got free Stingers MANPADs

logicchains 3y ago

What percent of Iran's GDP is a $20k drone?

JumpCrisscross 3y ago
> What percent of Iran's GDP is a $20k drone? About what a third of $3mm is to the U.S. (15x larger) or U.S. defense budget (50x larger). A 3x production-cost advantage in an economically unconstrained conflict is not an advantage. It’s at best a Twitter PR point.
- sudosysgen 3y ago
  The conflict is actually not far from being constrained by production, which is difficult to scale up for a 3mm$ munition, because private contractors expect lengthy contracts to justify long term amortization of increased capital expenditure. Given that Iran is producing thousands to tens of thousands of these missiles every year, and is looking to expand production even more, there actually really is a risk that the stockpiles will not keep up, after which dozens of billions of dollars will have to be expended to seriously ramp up production. This dynamic is also the reason why it's been so difficult to ramp up artillery production in support of Ukraine. Additionally, given that the expensive parts in these drones seem to be homemade in Iran (engines, fuselage, even some of the electronics), and given the sanctions, USD equiv. GDP isn't a great metric since there's no free market to convert Iranian production to USD. Then there's the problem that these missiles are sorely needed in case of a war in China, so actually going through a significant expenditure, even if money is allocated to increase production in 2-3 years, means that the US Navy may find itself with insufficient stockpiles to defend itself against the PLA, should the need arise. Its' ability to defend against credible Chinese saturation attacks is already marginal.
  - JumpCrisscross 3y ago
    > conflict is actually not far from being constrained by production If anyone is talking about escalation risk, production isn’t the bottleneck. We are nowhere close to being resource constrained in the Middle East. > the US Navy may find itself with insufficient stockpiles to defend itself against the PLA In a production contest it’s maximum sustainable flows, not stocks, that matter. (Stocks buy you time to get flows up.) To the extent challenging the PLA is a concern, boosting production to counter the Houthis is a net win. > ability to defend against credible Chinese saturation attacks is already marginal You’re arguing both ways. If their value is marginal, expending them now is fine. Your broader point—I think—is correct. America doesn’t want to spread itself thin. But that’s a constraint at the CVN level. Once the carrier strike force is positioned, it’s immaterial whether it’s firing off missiles or guns. Anyone positioning Iran et al v America et al is missing key pieces in the logistics of war.
    - sudosysgen 3y ago
      The stocks are not sufficient to buy time to get the flows. There are only around 500 SM-6 missiles (long range, suitable to protect large numbers of vessels at various distances, 5mm$ each), and there is only capacity to produce a few hundred for the short to medium term. The older SM-2s may have more plentiful stocks, but most of them have been deemed too dangerous to use after causing serious damage in test firings, and there are only around 180 modernized versions available, and the missile itself is no longer produced. Defending against a saturation attack means that the value experiences a step function. Either you have enough missiles to stop most low-tech enemy missiles, and you're going to be largely fine, or you don't, and your entire fleet might sink. It's not something you can afford to. The US Navy is never going to allow stocks to go under what is necessary to stop at least a long-range Chinese attack, and that means at least 600 missiles, which is a serious chunk of what remains. Boosting production to counter the Houthis is surely something the US will do. It will take 2-3 years to bear fruit. In the meantime, stocks are not sufficient to tank Iran's capability to produce these kinds of missiles. I think that the most likely outcome is either more shipping companies negotiating terms to transit unharmed, like China's COSCO has all but admitted to have done, or these detours to continue.

swashboon 3y ago

But its not Yemen, its Iran that's paying for it - with money from oil smuggled past sanctions.

dragonwriter 3y ago
Shipping from Iran to Yemen is also vulnerable, however.
- nradov 3y ago
  Most of the missiles and other weapons are being smuggled in relatively small boats. It simply isn't practical to stop and search most of them. In theory the US and other nations could declare a blockade and simply sink any vessel that enters Yemeni territorial waters, but that would be a major escalation and require a lot more naval forces to be deployed
meiraleal 3y ago
Smuggled? Are you implying that any deal the US does not like is illegal? Wake up. This age is over.

darth_avocado 3y ago

The question isn’t how much each missile/drone costs. The question is, how many of those does each side have and how quickly can you get more? Maybe $3M missile isn’t that costly to the US, but if you have like 1000 of them and it takes 6 months to replenish the stock, while the other side has 10000 drones that they can replenish in 3 months, you have a massive problem at your hand. (The same problem Ukraine is having re: stockpiling artillery shells that are sourced from US/NATO)

Retric 3y ago
Edit: They where off by a factor of 1,000 for Yemen GDP. That said if they were actually 0.1% GDP each then 10000 * 0.1% GDP each = 100% of GDP for 10 years. Which would obviously not happen.
Log_out_ 3y ago
The problem is also the stock value of the industrial military complex. If your artisanal rockets are out competed by smart flying sand with a stick, your actual evaluation is in for a correction, fiscally as tactically.

onthecanposting 3y ago

Dollars aren't directly convertible to warmaking power. The factories and skilled labor that make weapons are a scarce resource that don't scale with mere market capitalization. That the Russian Federation has a small fraction of US GDP but has launched more cruise missiles in a single conflict (~7500) than the US has ever produced (4000 tomahawks) is an important example of this.

ovi256 3y ago
The 7500 RU launched cruise missiles haven't achieved a tenth as much as the Tomahawks the US hit Iraq with. After that, Iraq didn't have a working integrated air defence any more. The RU missiles have killed plenty of civilians though.
- jopsen 3y ago
  True, but it's possibly fair to argue that its easier to scale up cheap drone production, than production of interceptors.
  - ceejayoz 3y ago
    At a certain point, US foreign policy tends to move from interceptors to flattening launch sites and key personnel.
    - jopsen 3y ago
      Yeah, I wouldn't be surprised.
      - ethbr1 3y ago
        The point is to have a deterrence gradient, so you always have (1) deescalate (lower), (2) match (proportionate), and (3) escalate (higher) responses, for any level of attack. If there's a level at which you don't have all three options, there exist political situations that can leave you vulnerable. E.g. if the US has no proportionate response to a Russian tactical nuclear strike on Ukrainian soil, it may hazard towards not escalating. Similarly, why the talking points of US response strikes for the past few decades have generally been 'this was a proportionate response.' But after the last warning to the Houthis, I expect the next ASBM or large drone that hits a civilian ship prompts a large US/UK (and maybe France and Germany) strike.

ceejayoz 3y ago

> To be really pedantic, a $20,000 drone out of Yemen is 0.1% of Yemen GDP. Yemen's GDP is $21B, not $21M.

buzzdenver 3y ago

As an engineer, saying that $20k, the price of a cheap car, is 1/1000th of a GDP of a whole country does not pass the smell test. Google says that Yemen's GDP is $21.61b, so a drone is 0.0000925% of the GDP. In other words it's about a million drones per year for Yemen, and about 7.7 million interceptors per year for the US.

waffleiron 3y ago

Not 0.1%, you are off by a factor 1000. Their GDP is 20b not 20m. Would still be relatively more costly but a lot less extreme.

lr1970 3y ago

> To be really pedantic, a $20,000 drone out of Yemen is 0.1% of Yemen GDP. Are you saying that entire Yemen's GDP is just $20M ? Does not seem plausible.

deleted 3y ago
[deleted]

boplicity 3y ago

You're embedded assumption is that Yemen would be paying for these drones. Examined on its own, that's a bold claim.

pi-e-sigma 3y ago

Yemeni rebels don't pay for these, though. It's free 'aid' from Iran. So arguing costs doesn't make much sense. Similarly mujahedeen in Afghanistan got free Stingers MANPADs