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the falsifiability criterion is equally unfalsifiable
by fsckboy 3y ago
the falsifiability criterion is equally unfalsifiable
- namaria 3y agoAnd words are defined in words. Also a deep sounding but ultimately meaningless statement.
- foldr 3y agoSurely a meaningful and true statement that most Popperians would accept. Popper’s demarcation criterion, correctly understood, may not ultimately be undermined by the fact that it is not itself a scientific theory that can be corroborated according to its own lights, but it’s perfectly meaningful to point out this feature of it.
- namaria 3y agoGödel and Turing already showed that logical systems need to be bootstrapped by axioms they cannot encompass. This is trivial, not insightful.
- foldr 3y agoThat's not exactly what the incompleteness theorem entails. I pointed out that the statement is not 'meaningless'. You now argue that it's trivial. That entails that it at least means something, so I don't think we disagree in a relevant way.
- throw310822 3y agoWhat do you mean? It sounds perfectly falsifiable to me: you just need to show a well accepted scientific theory that cannot be falsified even in principle.
- foldr 3y agoThe problem with this is that Popper wanted the criterion to function normatively. So for example, he argued that Marxism and Darwin's evolutionary theory were not falsifiable and hence not scientific. Since at least the latter was a well accepted scientific theory, it's clear that Popper didn't put forward falsificationism as an empirical generalization about which scientific theories are well accepted. (Popper later changed his mind about evolution.)
- tnecniv 3y agoHow is it not unfalsifiable? It’s a logical framework. You can argue it isn’t a good model but I’m confused how it is unfalsifiable as that doesn’t really seem to fit. However I don’t know much about it beyond the basic concept.
- thiagoharry 3y agoPopper recognizes that on any knowledge, there may be an unfalsified basis. After all, science is not the basis of our assumptions, science must begin from philosophical assumptions (like materialism, empirism, none of them can be falsified). If not mistaken, he calls these things metaphisics.