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Signal is useless for many use cases where email is widely used. For example, it requires a phone number which just makes it useless for anything where people w

Signal is useless for many use cases where email is widely used. For example, it requires a phone number which just makes it useless for anything where people want to use a (possibly short-lived) pseudonym. And note that I specifically said "people who just want to encrypt the bodies of their emails". That is still incredibly useful, even if the metadata is (obviously) not encrypted.

woodruffw 3y ago
My understanding is that Matrix is widely considered to have acceptable design tradeoffs for pseudonymous E2EE. It isn't perfect[1], but it's miles better than the theatre of PGP encrypted emails. > That is still incredibly useful, even if the metadata is (obviously) not encrypted. To whom? What is the threat model in which a user who is serious about the security of their messages is better served by PGP-over-email?
- chlorion 3y ago
  PGP over email is used in the real world and used successfully. Research about online black markets (which serves as a nice "case study") will show that the main form of communication between people there have been pasting a PGP encrypted message into a text box and sending it, and sometimes literally using email. In a situation like this, where anonymity and privacy are critical, signal is not even remotely an option because it requires a phone number. Matrix may be possible to use, but it would require that someone run a matrix server that allow people to make accounts with no information required for sign up, and allow signup and use of the server over tor, which are all unlikely. PGP over email or pasted into a web form is simple, it doesn't require signing up with a phone number or any PI, it can be used over tor, and it can be done with basic utils installed on almost any Linux distro. I suspect a lot of cryptographers have not done research about what goes on "in the real world" or "in the wild". It would be interesting for them to setup a mock situation where two people attempt to send messages to each other without doing anything that could identify them in any way, completely anonymously, to emulate what using these tools in the real world would be like for a whistleblower or journalist or whatever.
  - woodruffw 3y ago
    It's worth reading through the criminal complaints against various Silk Road people[1]. You'll notice two things: (1) the government nails these people despite encrypted messages, because their email metadata is more than sufficient, and (2) people whose literal lives depend on using PGP correctly fail to do so (e.g. by sending some messages without encryption, or forwarding previously encrypted messages as unencrypted). PGP is not a serious answer here. [1]: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/30/criminal_complaint_forcev2.pdf https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releas...
    - chlorion 3y ago
      I agree that it's error prone and far from ideal, and that most people should be using signal or matrix or something, but I'm not sure what other practical answers there are for more intense cases where people don't have access to those things.
      - woodruffw 3y ago
        That's the thing: Signal and Matrix are still the right answer for those cases! Consider the ANOM[1] case: the FBI found it easier to FUD criminals into using a backdoored chat app than to break actual chat apps. [1]: https://slate.com/technology/2021/12/fbi-fake-encrypted-messaging-platform-anom-sky-global.html https://slate.com/technology/2021/12/fbi-fake-encrypted-mess...
    - 0xDEAFBEAD 3y ago
      There's a selection effect here -- the criminal complaints are the people who got caught. And drug dealers aren't exactly known for technical literacy. I think the usability complaints here are very valid, but chlorion has a good point that PGP still wins for particular use cases. Heck, if you're really paranoid [and metadata is not your primary concern], use PGP over Signal. I don't think any of the alternatives proposed in this thread are chainable in this way like PGP.
      - 3y ago
- beeboobaa 3y ago
  > To whom? What is the threat model in which a user who is serious about the security of their messages is better served by PGP-over-email? Sending credentials to a coworker, for example. I don't care who knows that I emailed them. I don't even care if they know what it's about (database credentials), as long as they can't get the actual credentials simply by accessing the mail server. I don't have to set up any new infrastructure (not realistic within most orgs), all that is needed is for both parties to use gpg.
  - woodruffw 3y ago
    What kind of fakakte organization is encouraging you to email credentials? Even the most haphazard, incompetent companies I've worked with have managed to configure an off-prem 1Password group.
    - beeboobaa 3y ago
      Small businesses. But sure, let's hand over our credentials (and a ton of money) to the americans instead of using an open source solution that has worked fine for over a decade.
- anticensor 3y ago
  ERROR: Failed to resolve citation [1].

woodruffw 3y ago

My understanding is that Matrix is widely considered to have acceptable design tradeoffs for pseudonymous E2EE. It isn't perfect[1], but it's miles better than the theatre of PGP encrypted emails. > That is still incredibly useful, even if the metadata is (obviously) not encrypted. To whom? What is the threat model in which a user who is serious about the security of their messages is better served by PGP-over-email?

chlorion 3y ago
PGP over email is used in the real world and used successfully. Research about online black markets (which serves as a nice "case study") will show that the main form of communication between people there have been pasting a PGP encrypted message into a text box and sending it, and sometimes literally using email. In a situation like this, where anonymity and privacy are critical, signal is not even remotely an option because it requires a phone number. Matrix may be possible to use, but it would require that someone run a matrix server that allow people to make accounts with no information required for sign up, and allow signup and use of the server over tor, which are all unlikely. PGP over email or pasted into a web form is simple, it doesn't require signing up with a phone number or any PI, it can be used over tor, and it can be done with basic utils installed on almost any Linux distro. I suspect a lot of cryptographers have not done research about what goes on "in the real world" or "in the wild". It would be interesting for them to setup a mock situation where two people attempt to send messages to each other without doing anything that could identify them in any way, completely anonymously, to emulate what using these tools in the real world would be like for a whistleblower or journalist or whatever.
- woodruffw 3y ago
  It's worth reading through the criminal complaints against various Silk Road people[1]. You'll notice two things: (1) the government nails these people despite encrypted messages, because their email metadata is more than sufficient, and (2) people whose literal lives depend on using PGP correctly fail to do so (e.g. by sending some messages without encryption, or forwarding previously encrypted messages as unencrypted). PGP is not a serious answer here. [1]: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/30/criminal_complaint_forcev2.pdf https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releas...
  - chlorion 3y ago
    I agree that it's error prone and far from ideal, and that most people should be using signal or matrix or something, but I'm not sure what other practical answers there are for more intense cases where people don't have access to those things.
    - woodruffw 3y ago
      That's the thing: Signal and Matrix are still the right answer for those cases! Consider the ANOM[1] case: the FBI found it easier to FUD criminals into using a backdoored chat app than to break actual chat apps. [1]: https://slate.com/technology/2021/12/fbi-fake-encrypted-messaging-platform-anom-sky-global.html https://slate.com/technology/2021/12/fbi-fake-encrypted-mess...
  - 0xDEAFBEAD 3y ago
    There's a selection effect here -- the criminal complaints are the people who got caught. And drug dealers aren't exactly known for technical literacy. I think the usability complaints here are very valid, but chlorion has a good point that PGP still wins for particular use cases. Heck, if you're really paranoid [and metadata is not your primary concern], use PGP over Signal. I don't think any of the alternatives proposed in this thread are chainable in this way like PGP.
    - 3y ago
beeboobaa 3y ago
> To whom? What is the threat model in which a user who is serious about the security of their messages is better served by PGP-over-email? Sending credentials to a coworker, for example. I don't care who knows that I emailed them. I don't even care if they know what it's about (database credentials), as long as they can't get the actual credentials simply by accessing the mail server. I don't have to set up any new infrastructure (not realistic within most orgs), all that is needed is for both parties to use gpg.
- woodruffw 3y ago
  What kind of fakakte organization is encouraging you to email credentials? Even the most haphazard, incompetent companies I've worked with have managed to configure an off-prem 1Password group.
  - beeboobaa 3y ago
    Small businesses. But sure, let's hand over our credentials (and a ton of money) to the americans instead of using an open source solution that has worked fine for over a decade.
anticensor 3y ago
ERROR: Failed to resolve citation [1].