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In the past decade, I wonder how many stalker victims have discovered HaveIBeenPwned as the easy directing tool that their abuser used to discover and invade th

In the past decade, I wonder how many stalker victims have discovered HaveIBeenPwned as the easy directing tool that their abuser used to discover and invade their accounts and privacy.. Yes, yes, I know, the site maintains that it's the victim's responsibility, prior to any bad actor taking advantage of the service, to sign up and then disable their information from showing up in the search. Because the shock and awe of other users seeing 'Your info is out there!' immediately after entering their address, instead of after some kind of email verification, is more important than user safety.

Kwpolska 3y ago
E-mail verification would make the service much more costly to run, maybe not sustainable. If you’ve got someone’s email address, do you really need HIBP to figure out where it’s used? Wouldn’t Google give you a lot of results already?
- heroprotagonist 3y ago
  Yes, you enter an email and you get a list of the hacks it's been found in, along with the type of data that's in the data breach. At that point you just go grab the data breach from some other location and pull the data. Including passwords, which will often be reused across other services and give you access to other accounts. The breach data (or subsequent accounts accessed from the passwords) may have a lot of additional data, like location, personal preferences, message contents, etc.. It's _much_ more impactful than simply Googling someone's email address.
  - tokamak-teapot 3y ago
    “Just go grab the data breach from some other location” Do you have examples you can point to where this has happened? I would be interested in cases where this kind of approach has been taken, as my intuition is that Troy’s service wouldn’t make this significantly easier or cheaper.
    - heroprotagonist 3y ago
      It would definitely make this significantly easier and cheaper. Imagine you want data on a specific individual. You can locate and obtain ALL available data breaches, then search through each one individually looking for references to your target. OR, you can enter their email into a search and get back a list of which SPECIFIC data breaches have information on your target AND the types of information included in the breach. This narrows the scope of effort by orders of magnitude. How does that not make it significantly easier and cheaper?
IshKebab 3y ago
I agree. It's kind of worse because it gives attackers 90% of the information they need, but it doesn't tell the victims what data was leaked. I want to see the hash so I can figure out which password was compromised.
phantomathkg 3y ago
Can you elaborate how could HIBP be used to abuse? It just checks your email is in a leak.
- heroprotagonist 3y ago
  It points anyone who has an email address to specific leaks that have that email address. These leaks contain additional data beyond the email address, like passwords, location data, message contents, etc. This enables bad actors to quickly and easily figure out which leaks they need to go look at to find further data related to the email address they searched on. It'd be a great service if it hadn't spent the last decade deliberately ignoring a fundamental principle of security: Assume there will be bad actors. It takes a bit of cognitive dissonance to leave the problem unaddressed for so long. eg, if you assume there are no bad actors, there's no need for the service to exist. And if you assume bad actors DO exist, the service needs to protect its core functionality better against being an engine for abuse.

Kwpolska 3y ago

E-mail verification would make the service much more costly to run, maybe not sustainable. If you’ve got someone’s email address, do you really need HIBP to figure out where it’s used? Wouldn’t Google give you a lot of results already?

heroprotagonist 3y ago
Yes, you enter an email and you get a list of the hacks it's been found in, along with the type of data that's in the data breach. At that point you just go grab the data breach from some other location and pull the data. Including passwords, which will often be reused across other services and give you access to other accounts. The breach data (or subsequent accounts accessed from the passwords) may have a lot of additional data, like location, personal preferences, message contents, etc.. It's _much_ more impactful than simply Googling someone's email address.
- tokamak-teapot 3y ago
  “Just go grab the data breach from some other location” Do you have examples you can point to where this has happened? I would be interested in cases where this kind of approach has been taken, as my intuition is that Troy’s service wouldn’t make this significantly easier or cheaper.
  - heroprotagonist 3y ago
    It would definitely make this significantly easier and cheaper. Imagine you want data on a specific individual. You can locate and obtain ALL available data breaches, then search through each one individually looking for references to your target. OR, you can enter their email into a search and get back a list of which SPECIFIC data breaches have information on your target AND the types of information included in the breach. This narrows the scope of effort by orders of magnitude. How does that not make it significantly easier and cheaper?

IshKebab 3y ago

I agree. It's kind of worse because it gives attackers 90% of the information they need, but it doesn't tell the victims what data was leaked. I want to see the hash so I can figure out which password was compromised.

phantomathkg 3y ago

Can you elaborate how could HIBP be used to abuse? It just checks your email is in a leak.

heroprotagonist 3y ago
It points anyone who has an email address to specific leaks that have that email address. These leaks contain additional data beyond the email address, like passwords, location data, message contents, etc. This enables bad actors to quickly and easily figure out which leaks they need to go look at to find further data related to the email address they searched on. It'd be a great service if it hadn't spent the last decade deliberately ignoring a fundamental principle of security: Assume there will be bad actors. It takes a bit of cognitive dissonance to leave the problem unaddressed for so long. eg, if you assume there are no bad actors, there's no need for the service to exist. And if you assume bad actors DO exist, the service needs to protect its core functionality better against being an engine for abuse.