7 ms·

> We were concerned about the phrasing of Article 45, that lays down a requirement for browsers to recognize any certificate ... So same as today but with less

> We were concerned about the phrasing of Article 45, that lays down a requirement for browsers to recognize any certificate ... So same as today but with less steps? Most govs are already in you browser/OS CA list. And every single government force you to download their own cert and add to your browser at some point. There's no way to add that cert and say "limit this to gov.in only"! after you added that cert it is game over. e.g. https://pki.treas.gov/crl_certs.htm https://pki.treas.gov/crl_certs.htm https://www.bit.admin.ch/bit/en/home/themes/swiss-government-pki/certificate-service-provider-csp/rootzertifikate/swiss-government-root-ca-ii.html https://www.bit.admin.ch/bit/en/home/themes/swiss-government... plus all the gov CAs already in your browser (looking at firefox source they include, guangdong, taiwan, honkkong, netherlands and Greece. IOS 16 contains spain, belgium, something called "Government Root Certification Authority 00 B6 4B 88 07 E2 23 EE C8 5C 12 AD A6 0E 06 A1 F2" :shrug, greece, hk, Netherlands, Switzerland.

barbazoo 3y ago
> And every single government force you to download their own cert Is that true though? I’ve immigrated quite a bunch (western world only) and never had to download a certificate when interacting with the government.
- Maken 3y ago
  They used yo. Now most governments just have their own "proper" CAs which are included by default in web browsers. If you look at the default CA list of Firefox or Chrome you will see most of them are public agencies.
  - theonlybutlet 3y ago
    I think Certificate transparency checks mean you should be able to tell if the certificate was fraudulently issued for a domain that is not with the CA. (This circumvents that.) In your scenario, if the domains CA is the government CA anyway, then it's fair game. Most domains' CA will be cloudflare or whatever not the government CA.
- asdffdasasdf 3y ago
  here's one example, the brazil irs https://www.receita.gov.br/ https://www.receita.gov.br/ good lucky finding the cert if you didn't download your firefox in brazilian portuguese or didn't register you apple device in brazil. I mean, it is not difficult to find the cert, but it is a pain for travelers.
  - grotorea 3y ago
    The problem seems to be "wrong domain", not "CA not recognized". You sure you have the right URL?
    - asdffdasasdf 3y ago
      i'm mobile. probably got the wrong url. only have bookmarks for the ca certs https://www.gov.br/iti/pt-br/assuntos/repositorio/repositorio-ac-raiz https://www.gov.br/iti/pt-br/assuntos/repositorio/repositori...
      - ric2b 3y ago
        But what do you need these certs for, is there a national website that gets an "insecure" warning if you visit it with a foreign version of Firefox?
        asdffdasasdf 3y ago
        yeah, the tax preparation website and others.
Astraco 3y ago
As far as I know my country doesn't force me to download any certificate, and Firefox doesn't have a cert issued by my government.
- ysofunny 3y ago
  nonetheless your government can force your ISP to do so many things
  - droffel 3y ago
    Without a valid certificate, any ISP MITM attacks would be obvious
  - Astraco 3y ago
    Yeah, and send somebody to my house yo shot me in the head. But none of them is happening.
- the_mitsuhiko 3y ago
  I’m curious though what CA your country uses for governmental services. Historically a lot of EU countries used some less than stellar CAs.
  - Astraco 3y ago
    My local government is using GlobalSign and the Tax Agency (and probably all of the central government) uses Entrust.
kmeisthax 3y ago
Currently the default trust list in your browser is solely decided by your browser. More specifically there's an organization called the CA/Browser Forum where all the browser vendors are. If you want to become a CA today, you go to the Forum, submit your proposal, and then the browser vendors decide whether or not you're trustworthy. If a CA misissues certificates or otherwise screws up security, that evidence goes to the Forum and then browsers decide how to deal with that CA. Notably, in the worst case scenario, the browser developers can and have decided to completely distrust an entire CA, completely destroying their business. This has happened multiple times. eIDAS changes this by, effectively, creating a special EU government analogue to the CA/Browser Forum. All browser developers in the EU have to trust eIDAS's CAs. This is a transfer of power from a voluntary industry consortium to appointed EU technocrats. All those existing government CAs are currently audited by CA/B. If Greece gets caught misissuing certificates they can have their CA roots revoked by the browser vendors. The concern is that under eIDAS, the EU could just not revoke the certificate, and the browser vendors' hands would be tied. They'd be forced to accept known bad CAs and every cert they sign, including the spyware ones.
- ko27 3y ago
  > This is a transfer of power from a voluntary industry consortium to appointed EU technocrats Or a transfer of power from US-centric companies to actual sovereign bodies. I don't want to live in a cyberpunk world. This sounds good to me. Note that browsers are still allowed to remove them if they are compromised.
  - danielheath 3y ago
    Browsers are allowed to ask permission to remove them if they are compromised. They still have to receive that permission before they can do it.
    - dataking 3y ago
      I believe it is well understood by now that users tend to ignore security warnings; anyone serious about computer security will not accept this as a solution. We don't even apply security-critical patches reliably.
tsimionescu 3y ago
The game is not over just because you trust a CA. If they sign a certificate for a domain, they have to also publish that they did (in the CT logs) before browsers will accept it. If they do so for an entity that didn't ask for it, that will be investigated by browser and OS vendors and it may easily end up with the CA becoming untrusted.
- theonlybutlet 3y ago
  Well this is it, they will no longer become untrusted. They can however, ask to have the offending certificate revoked if they have proof it's bad and once they have permission from the authorities (they kind of have to grant the permission if there's evidence but will be on the authorities timeline).
- rcxdude 3y ago
  AFAIK there is no requirement for CT in this regulation, and it prevents browsers from requiring it to accept the certificates.
neodypsis 3y ago
In my own country, for digital signature purposes, the official Windows installer provided by the government adds the country's Central Bank's CA for any purposes, even for software signatures. If you have a company, they also force you to use their own application for making some annual declarations. That software asks for your OS user password using a home-brew dialog so that it can update itself. If you don't provide the password then it blocks and you can't make the obligatory declaration. If you don't send said declaration, you are liable for big fines...
- theonlybutlet 3y ago
  Well that's dystopian.
  - neodypsis 3y ago
    The same central bank is asking banks (and other entities) for unanonymized information about costaricans, including bank deposits, to publish an "information package" indexed by geographical location. This under the pretext of being required by the IMF. I found it curious that nobody in the legislative commission (akin to a "congressional hearing") tasked with looking into the matter has mentioned the importance of differential privacy.
- noodlesUK 3y ago
  I’m curious what country this is, if you’re willing to share. I’m surprised any business filing is using a desktop app rather than on the web these days.
  - neodypsis 3y ago
    Costa Rica. And before you can download some of the installers, they ask for your unique digital signature card number.
  - neodypsis 3y ago
    > I’m surprised any business filing is using a desktop app rather than on the web these days. It's a complete nightmare. If you want to use some other digital services you are restricted to specific browser versions, some only allow you to use Windows, and in some cases the unsigned installer is only available via HTTP.
amluto 3y ago
I filed the obvious bug against Firefox ten years ago :( https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=953322 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=953322
- devman0 3y ago
  Do browsers check the CAA records for a domain if they exist? Seems like that would solve the issue.
  - ekr____ 3y ago
    As far as I know, they do not. Even if they did, it doesn't really address the problem. In order to mount an effective impersonation attack, the attacker needs to either control the network or the DNS. In either case, they will generally be able to remove or change the CAA record; remember that DNSSEC deployment is comparatively rare and browsers do not verify DNSSEC in any case.
  - g_p 3y ago
    No, and the standard (RFC 6844) says they must not. That's because, in the eyes of the standard, a CAA record is applicable at time of issuance, but a valid certificate could have been previously issued (and still be valid), even though you've moved to a new CAA record for your next certificate. "Relying Applications MUST NOT use CAA records as part of certificate validation." For what you're looking for, DANE (RFC 6698) would be more useful and enable the browser to check the presented certificate against DNS (so effectively CAA on the client).

barbazoo 3y ago

> And every single government force you to download their own cert Is that true though? I’ve immigrated quite a bunch (western world only) and never had to download a certificate when interacting with the government.

Maken 3y ago
They used yo. Now most governments just have their own "proper" CAs which are included by default in web browsers. If you look at the default CA list of Firefox or Chrome you will see most of them are public agencies.
- theonlybutlet 3y ago
  I think Certificate transparency checks mean you should be able to tell if the certificate was fraudulently issued for a domain that is not with the CA. (This circumvents that.) In your scenario, if the domains CA is the government CA anyway, then it's fair game. Most domains' CA will be cloudflare or whatever not the government CA.
asdffdasasdf 3y ago
here's one example, the brazil irs https://www.receita.gov.br/ https://www.receita.gov.br/ good lucky finding the cert if you didn't download your firefox in brazilian portuguese or didn't register you apple device in brazil. I mean, it is not difficult to find the cert, but it is a pain for travelers.
- grotorea 3y ago
  The problem seems to be "wrong domain", not "CA not recognized". You sure you have the right URL?
  - asdffdasasdf 3y ago
    i'm mobile. probably got the wrong url. only have bookmarks for the ca certs https://www.gov.br/iti/pt-br/assuntos/repositorio/repositorio-ac-raiz https://www.gov.br/iti/pt-br/assuntos/repositorio/repositori...
    - ric2b 3y ago
      But what do you need these certs for, is there a national website that gets an "insecure" warning if you visit it with a foreign version of Firefox?
      - asdffdasasdf 3y ago
        yeah, the tax preparation website and others.

Astraco 3y ago

As far as I know my country doesn't force me to download any certificate, and Firefox doesn't have a cert issued by my government.

ysofunny 3y ago
nonetheless your government can force your ISP to do so many things
- droffel 3y ago
  Without a valid certificate, any ISP MITM attacks would be obvious
- Astraco 3y ago
  Yeah, and send somebody to my house yo shot me in the head. But none of them is happening.
the_mitsuhiko 3y ago
I’m curious though what CA your country uses for governmental services. Historically a lot of EU countries used some less than stellar CAs.
- Astraco 3y ago
  My local government is using GlobalSign and the Tax Agency (and probably all of the central government) uses Entrust.

kmeisthax 3y ago

Currently the default trust list in your browser is solely decided by your browser. More specifically there's an organization called the CA/Browser Forum where all the browser vendors are. If you want to become a CA today, you go to the Forum, submit your proposal, and then the browser vendors decide whether or not you're trustworthy. If a CA misissues certificates or otherwise screws up security, that evidence goes to the Forum and then browsers decide how to deal with that CA. Notably, in the worst case scenario, the browser developers can and have decided to completely distrust an entire CA, completely destroying their business. This has happened multiple times. eIDAS changes this by, effectively, creating a special EU government analogue to the CA/Browser Forum. All browser developers in the EU have to trust eIDAS's CAs. This is a transfer of power from a voluntary industry consortium to appointed EU technocrats. All those existing government CAs are currently audited by CA/B. If Greece gets caught misissuing certificates they can have their CA roots revoked by the browser vendors. The concern is that under eIDAS, the EU could just not revoke the certificate, and the browser vendors' hands would be tied. They'd be forced to accept known bad CAs and every cert they sign, including the spyware ones.

ko27 3y ago
> This is a transfer of power from a voluntary industry consortium to appointed EU technocrats Or a transfer of power from US-centric companies to actual sovereign bodies. I don't want to live in a cyberpunk world. This sounds good to me. Note that browsers are still allowed to remove them if they are compromised.
- danielheath 3y ago
  Browsers are allowed to ask permission to remove them if they are compromised. They still have to receive that permission before they can do it.
  - dataking 3y ago
    I believe it is well understood by now that users tend to ignore security warnings; anyone serious about computer security will not accept this as a solution. We don't even apply security-critical patches reliably.

tsimionescu 3y ago

The game is not over just because you trust a CA. If they sign a certificate for a domain, they have to also publish that they did (in the CT logs) before browsers will accept it. If they do so for an entity that didn't ask for it, that will be investigated by browser and OS vendors and it may easily end up with the CA becoming untrusted.

theonlybutlet 3y ago
Well this is it, they will no longer become untrusted. They can however, ask to have the offending certificate revoked if they have proof it's bad and once they have permission from the authorities (they kind of have to grant the permission if there's evidence but will be on the authorities timeline).
rcxdude 3y ago
AFAIK there is no requirement for CT in this regulation, and it prevents browsers from requiring it to accept the certificates.

neodypsis 3y ago

In my own country, for digital signature purposes, the official Windows installer provided by the government adds the country's Central Bank's CA for any purposes, even for software signatures. If you have a company, they also force you to use their own application for making some annual declarations. That software asks for your OS user password using a home-brew dialog so that it can update itself. If you don't provide the password then it blocks and you can't make the obligatory declaration. If you don't send said declaration, you are liable for big fines...

theonlybutlet 3y ago
Well that's dystopian.
- neodypsis 3y ago
  The same central bank is asking banks (and other entities) for unanonymized information about costaricans, including bank deposits, to publish an "information package" indexed by geographical location. This under the pretext of being required by the IMF. I found it curious that nobody in the legislative commission (akin to a "congressional hearing") tasked with looking into the matter has mentioned the importance of differential privacy.
noodlesUK 3y ago
I’m curious what country this is, if you’re willing to share. I’m surprised any business filing is using a desktop app rather than on the web these days.
- neodypsis 3y ago
  Costa Rica. And before you can download some of the installers, they ask for your unique digital signature card number.
- neodypsis 3y ago
  > I’m surprised any business filing is using a desktop app rather than on the web these days. It's a complete nightmare. If you want to use some other digital services you are restricted to specific browser versions, some only allow you to use Windows, and in some cases the unsigned installer is only available via HTTP.

amluto 3y ago

I filed the obvious bug against Firefox ten years ago :( https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=953322 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=953322

devman0 3y ago
Do browsers check the CAA records for a domain if they exist? Seems like that would solve the issue.
- ekr____ 3y ago
  As far as I know, they do not. Even if they did, it doesn't really address the problem. In order to mount an effective impersonation attack, the attacker needs to either control the network or the DNS. In either case, they will generally be able to remove or change the CAA record; remember that DNSSEC deployment is comparatively rare and browsers do not verify DNSSEC in any case.
- g_p 3y ago
  No, and the standard (RFC 6844) says they must not. That's because, in the eyes of the standard, a CAA record is applicable at time of issuance, but a valid certificate could have been previously issued (and still be valid), even though you've moved to a new CAA record for your next certificate. "Relying Applications MUST NOT use CAA records as part of certificate validation." For what you're looking for, DANE (RFC 6698) would be more useful and enable the browser to check the presented certificate against DNS (so effectively CAA on the client).