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This goes to show that security and privacy conscious users should always prefer the web version, if the choice is available, as the browser is a better sandbox
by bad_user 15y ago
This goes to show that security and privacy conscious users should always prefer the web version, if the choice is available, as the browser is a better sandbox, even in the context of these tightly controlled mobile platforms and app stores.
However, I feel that these default permissions are really not that awful. There's always a balance between giving fine-grained control to the user over permissions and ease of use and these are not orthogonal issues, as the user suddenly ends up with more choices to make. What the user really wants to know ... is this mallware? Is this going to delete my files? Is this going to violate my privacy? ... and that's about it.
If Android required separate permissions for absolutely everything you could do in an app, you know what the average user would do if presented with a list of 30 permissions requested, amongst which there would be phrases like "allow the app to open the web browser"?
The average user would just click "Yes, please" without reading it (I'm even doing that myself from time to time). And that seems better for technical inclined folks like us, but it really isn't for average users, because it trains them to blindly accept anything while giving the impression of security - and I feel that's worse than no security at all.
- ge0rg 15y agoThe average user would just click "Yes, please" without reading it (I'm even doing that myself from time to time). This is happening most of the times anyway. There is no way to see from the installer screen, why an app requests a certain permission. One example: most launcher replacements require the CALL_PHONE permission, which comes with a big warning. This is technically required if you want to place a contact shortcut on your desktop. A better, security-wise, solution would have been to ask on-demand, when the app actually performs a permissions-requiring action, like it is done in J2ME. I suppose this was not done in Android either for software patent or for convenience reasons. Or maybe it would have gone against the usability of ad networks if you could deny the virtual Golf app access to GPS and internet...
- fpgeek 15y agoAsking on-demand for everything lands you in the usability mess that is Vista's UAC. There are plenty of places where permissions should be more fine-grained, but doing that in a usable way is not easy. Personally, I'd like to see a distinction between "required" and "optional" permissions (with always deny, prompt and always grant alternatives for optional ones). Of course, there would still be a lot of tricky issues to sort out (e.g. how do you encourage developers to expose some permissions as optional not required?), but I think that exposing more permissions for direct user management, while trying to minimize the effort required might might strike a better balance over the long run.
- ge0rg 15y agoAsking on-demand for everything lands you in the usability mess that is Vista's UAC. Please let me clarify: a properly designed system should allow the user to "always grant" that one permission to that one app, so the total number of permissions dialog goes from 1 per app to N per app with N=number of required permissions. The advantage would be, that opposed to Windows (where you only grant one rather opaque "Administrator" permission) you will see how your current action caused the permission request. To come back to my example: you tap on the contact shortcut on your desktop, and Android asks you: "Launcher requests the permission to perform a (possibly billed) phone call. [Grant] [Grant always] [Deny] [Deny always]" Of course this model does not work for all possible permissions and applications, but it is still a vast improvement over what we have now.
- fpgeek 15y agoOh, absolutely. That's pretty much the model I was trying to suggest as well, with the extra detail that users only get that prompt for "optional" permissions. "required" permissions (e.g. a browser accessing the Internet) would still be take-it-or-leave-it at installation. Though, thinking back to a Google+ post by a member of the Android team that I don't have at hand right now, there's also a place for self-certifying UI elements. IIRC, their example was a system-provided Contacts widget (where if you selected a contact using that widget from within an app, you were clearly giving the app access to that contact data). My favorite example is the crash reporter. If click the "Send Crash Report" button, you're clearly giving permission to share some, potentially private, data about the crash (and sharing even more if you also check off sending the crash log). When you can pull off those sorts of UI elements, it is ideal, but they're not general enough for everything.
- TazeTSchnitzel 15y ago>ask on-demand, when the app actually performs a permissions-requiring action, like it is done in J2ME. I own a cheap feature phone with MIDP app support. (J2ME) I don't think that's a wise choice. In Opera Mini I press through the "allow network access" screen every single time I use it, because, presumably for security reasons, I can't choose "always allow" (maybe because app isn't signed by carrier certificate??) It's even worse than asking once as you train yourself to click/tap/press through the prompt whenever you use the app, so if it suddenly changed from "access internet" to "make phone calls", I might not notice.
- rbarooah 15y agoI thought the whole selling point of Android is that it is not tightly controlled.
- fpgeek 15y agoNo, the selling point is that the user is in control (or at least gets more control than on other platforms). Clear and visible permissions are a part of that.
- rbarooah 15y agoAccepting your framing of the selling point, the OP clearly shows that it is not being delivered on.
- rbarooah 15y agoTo follow up - the OP shows that the permissions are far from clear and visible. Would people reasonably expect that the contents of their SD card and a list of all their purchases could be silently uploaded by an app they'd given no permissions to? If not, this is clearly not delivering control to the user.
- jellicle 15y ago>What the user really wants to know ... is this malware? Yes. And unfortunately the permissions don't do anything, at all, to help you with that. Permissions for a really useful, non-malware app: access address book, internet, blah-blah. Permissions for a really terrible, malware app: access address book, internet, blah-blah. Permissions are security theatre. The app store management may continue to use them but they should be hidden from the user - they are completely useless to the end user.
- biafra 15y agoThey are not completely useless. If a user doesn't want an app to send or receive SMS or make calls this can be prevented by permissions. This is true for several other permissions.
- glhaynes 15y agoThey are useless for a very large class of users - it can be argued that those users should educate themselves more if they want to be safer, but it doesn't seem escapable that hardware vendors (and others, including ISVs and network providers) have some incentive to promote solutions that have [what they consider to be] a better rate of solving the problem satisfactorily.
- jimktrains2 15y ago> Permissions are security theatre. I wouldn't say that. They aren't just there just to be there, they do restrict access. It allows me to choose if I want an app based on what the app wants to know about me. Yes, it can't tell me if an app is malware, but it does tell me if some photo editing app needs to see my address book.
- gcb 15y agodoesn't help that google play now does not even show permissions changes as it did in the past when auto/batch updating.
- Dylan16807 15y agoAre you sure about that? Just yesterday the play-branded market app made me manually update adobe reader because it wanted sd write permission.