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Okta hit by third-party breach, stealing employee data
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- gumballindie 3y agoOkta is so lame no wonder is so popular among corporate mediocrity.
- danielmarkbruce 3y agoOut of interest - what makes you say this? I'm not disagreeing, just want to understand the general (and seemingly commonly held) belief that they suck.
- mc32 3y agoThey have lots of ready to go connectors which makes it easy to integrate lots of apps instead of figuring out all the SAML settings... but any SAML provider will work as long as you can map the right fields. But people like easy things and Okta makes it easy. Many apps who don't have a connector will have docs on how to set things up with Okta, for others you'll have to take the Okta instructions and figure out what that means for an alternate provider. There are other things like counter-signatures which may be easier to do with Okta but also possible with others, if you have the right docs.
- danielmarkbruce 3y agoThank you. Ok another question - where do you see Cerby fitting into that mix?
- uxp8u61q 3y agoI'm a bit confused, this seems like a list of pros or at least neutral things?
- mc32 3y agoPeople use them because they are easy to use, on the other hand their security issues over the past few years could make clients consider alternatives.
- starttoaster 3y agoAs far as SaaS SSO providers go, I think they're pretty cool. But all the breach related news lately has me wondering what the best alternatives are. You sound like you would have opinions.
- PaulWaldman 3y agoWhat is your preferred alternative?
- dijit 3y agoOut of interest, why would you not just use the directory services that you get bundled with google workspace, azureAD (Now: Entra) or freeipa/keycloak? All of these support oauth2 and SAML, and dynamic groups for less than the cost of each and okta (it seems to be the case everywhere I have seen okta used, another of the above providers is used additionally).
- samcat116 3y agoIf you have AzureAD you don’t typically also have Okta. Also the features you listed are like 20% of Okta’s functionality here.
- patmorgan23 3y agoIf you have office licenses you have AzureAD. Lots of places have office licenses for all of or most of their employees and still have Okta.
- samcat116 3y agoAzureAD licenses near the feature equivalent of Okta are much more expensive than base office licenses that only give you access to the office apps and cloud storage.
- latchkey 3y agoI kind of wondered the same thing the last time they were hacked... someone answered with this: "Okta: comprehensive scim allowing your IT instead of random application admins throughout your company to manage user provisioning / deprovisioning. Start pages that don't require users to remember urls but instead show them a list of applications they can use. Adaptive MFA with IT-administered settings (though Google's super-enterprisey solutions may have sth here.)" https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37995670 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37995670 Personally, I just go with the Google Workspace and call it a day. Start page is one of those nice to have, but not required features in my book.
- agilob 3y agoAgain? Does anyone keep a list of all their breaches and hacks? The one on wiki doesn't seem complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Okta,_Inc.#Security_incidents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Okta,_Inc.#Security_incidents
- Aaronstotle 3y agoNot really Okta's fault here, just so happened that Okta was a client of this benefits company. Still, not a good look for Okta.
- jlarocco 3y agoDoes that matter, though? The message I get is that Okta isn't good with security, and they're not good at choosing vendors who are good with security.
- clintonb 3y agoYes, context matters. If you discount every company that might be impacted by a third-party breach of employee data, you will be left with no vendors. At some point you have to decide what is acceptable, and have insurance/indemnity for the risks. I would not discount Okta because of a decision made by HR.
- bink 3y agoMost large companies vet their vendors to some extent. It's hard to know if that happened in this case or not, but it's still part of the normal procurement process to perform a security review. These reviews have varying levels of security requirements depending on what type of PII will be stored or processed. Considering this breach included SSN's I'd have expected this to be one of the more thorough reviews.
- jerf 3y agoThose "assessments" amount to sending over a document that says 1. Are you secure? 2. Are you secure? 3. Are you secure? 4. Are you secure? ... 37. Are you secure? and the company sends back 1. Yes. 2. Yes. 3. Yes, definitely. 4. Oh yes. ... 37. Yes. There's a lot more words, but not necessarily a lot more value in those words then what I have here. Some, I admit, but not necessarily a lot. Maybe at the high government end a real assessment is done where the experts of the client's choosing go into the provider's actual environment and makes a real assessment. But from what I've seen it's self-reporting the vast majority of the time, and the provider could honestly believe they're running a tight ship and not realize there's one setting in one AWS account that's just a bit too open and oh no my database. (Or perhaps rather "oh no your database".)
- anotherhue 3y agoI guess we have to decide if as customers, our security is treated better or worse than their employees'.
- purpleblue 3y ago> We have no evidence to suggest that your personal information has been misused against you. What a fucking horribly disingenuous statement. They are trying to say that nothing bad happened, but their SSN and information was stolen!! The information is going to be sold and at a later date it could be used. But they're not saying that, they're trying to say "Nothing to see here, your information wasn't misused so don't worry!" I would never trust them after giving this statement.
- vineyardmike 3y agoNot to discount your point- you’re right it’s so disingenuous. BUT we’re quickly approaching a world where every American has been in a leak that affects their data and SSN. Not 100% of course (simply because young people haven’t had a chance to be screwed over) but at some point we should assume that the information is public for a large enough portion of the population and we need to set new expectations.
- deathanatos 3y ago> we’re quickly approaching a world where every American has been in a leak that affects their data and SSN. Not 100% of course (simply because young people haven’t had a chance to be screwed over) … that number, presently, has to be a rounding error from being 100%. My SSN was first breached when I was in high school, at least. But yeah, I agree, we should set new expectations. There could definitely be a better system, and I would like to see companies held to account, but material fines against corps are basically unicorns in America.
- bee_rider 3y agoWe need a bunch of case law indicating that banks and credit card companies that don’t authenticate past this widely leaked PII are on the hook for the loss of money (rather than the uninvolved third parties who are being impersonated).
- vineyardmike 3y ago
- 0xbadcafebee 3y agoDid anyone read the article? It's literally not a compromise of Okta. It's a compromise of a healthcare provider that Okta is a customer of. Has absolutely nothing to do with Okta's products, at all, whatsoever. This is bordering on yellow journalism. I am all for giving shitty companies their due when they fuck up, but that's not what this is at all.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- bastard_op 3y agoA friend of mine jokingly told me they got a "confidential" report from Okta today that apt actors were up in them for 3 weeks. I wonder who all else got this, said friend is at a high-profile enterprise/retail account for them.
- graypegg 3y agoIf this is directly related to negligence at Okta or not (which seems like it’s not in this case) doesn’t really matter when “Okta” and “Data Breach” seem to show up close together in headlines a lot. Rough task for people tasked with holding together the “brand”
- libraryatnight 3y agoIt'd be more forgivable if they weren't so bad at listening to their customers when they report things, technical or security related. The best thing Okta has going for them right now is that a lot of these companies are so bloated and slow that changing platforms takes a long time to pull off even the initial agreement that they'll be changing, so they have plenty of time to let things settle even if you're mad at them because switching everything to a new idp is "just not something the business can prioritize right now" They probably look like hot garbage to customers shopping around but I'd venture with most existing clients over a certain size they'll just ask them for a statement they can email out then the Okta sales guys will treat a few directors to happy hour and a ball game, delaying the long process of being dumped from even starting.
- bee_rider 3y ago> “The types of personal information contained in the impacted eligibility census file included your Name, Social Security Number, and health or medical insurance plan number,” a letter sent to affected Okta employees stated. “We have no evidence to suggest that your personal information has been misused against you.” That seems like a pretty ridiculous statement. Is it supposed to be reassuring or something? Like, obviously Okta has no way of knowing whether or not their employees PII, having been leaked, will be exploited, and when it does get exploited, it almost certainly will be the employees who find out about it, not Okta.
- constantly 3y agoSounds like the statement is referencing the past not the future. I think it’s a reasonable thing for them to say: this was stolen, and that sucks, but perhaps a little reassuringly we haven’t detected this being misused. idk.
- bee_rider 3y agoTo the extent that it is reassuring, it is misleading, right? Unless they have some way of being reasonably sure that the fact that they haven’t detected misuse implies that it hasn’t happened.
- ethbr1 3y agoI think there's probably a legal reason that's included, as it's in all info leak announcements I've seen.
- bee_rider 3y agoIt seems like the most reassuring/misleading thing that can be said without technically lying.
- ethbr1 3y agoOr there's a legal responsibility to disclose if you know anything? So everyone has to explicitly say they don't? IANAL, so not sure. That it's always included and worded exactly the same makes me suspect legal instead of PR.
- ryanisnan 3y agoWhat a misleading and click-baity title choice by Ars Technica. This had nothing to do with Okta's platform, as implied. A third-party Vendor Okta used for health insurance information was breached, and personal information on Okta employees was stolen. I'm disappointed in Ars Technica, and Dan Goodin. edit: Updated to be more specific about what part of Okta this had nothing to do with.
- ta1243 3y agoOkta (or any company) can't outsource its responsibility when it outsources to a supplier. If Okta printed all that personal data and left it in a box on the street they would be liable.
- ryanisnan 3y agoOk, but that's not what the article says. It says Okta was breached. Okta was not breached.
- arrakeenrevived 3y agoIt says Okta was "hit by" a breach, which it was. A breach happened, and Okta was impacted. Furthermore, it happened to data which Okta is ultimately responsible for, and Okta should be held responsible for their choices which led to their employees' data being stolen. I'm not sure why you're splitting hairs on this.
- ethbr1 3y ago"another" is the weasel word It implies this breach is the same as the previous breach, which it's not. Ars has gone to shit over the last decade.
- arrakeenrevived 3y agoI don't think I agree that the use of the word "another" implies that the breaches were equal, but I can see why others might interpret it that way. I won't disagree with opinion on the quality of Ars' reporting or this particular article, but I do disagree with the original comment's statement that "this had nothing to do with Okta".
- dr_faustus 3y agoI don’t know why people are all pretending like this is irrelevant to Okta's security. An employee list like that is a goldmine for all sorts of social engineering and phishing attacks.
- nakon 3y agoIt’s not that it isn’t relevant, it’s the clickbait-y headline and insinuation that Okta itself was compromised again. Any major company using third-party vendors would be in the same position (and for all we know, this healthcare company provided services to multiple other companies). Fault Okta for not doing enough vendor due diligence, sure, but don’t use clickbait to imply Okta itself was breached.
- ryanisnan 3y agoThe real takeaway for Okta in 2023, if they didn't know it already, is they are dealing with nation state threat actors, and if they think they are over-investing in security, they probably aren't.
- dr_faustus 3y agoBe it as it may, it does not really matter, whether it came from a Okta database or of any other company. It further compromises Okta's security which is pretty bad because being secure is basically their primary service proposition.
- BeefWellington 3y agoFirstly, the title literally does what you're asking: > Okta hit by another breach, this one stealing employee data from 3rd-party vendor You have to read the whole thing. Secondly, let's assume you were right and the title was simple "Okta hit by another breach" and there were no other words. Do you not view it as problematic that the company has in two months had a major compromise of its own services via phishing, as well as that of a company supplying health-related services to its own employees? Do you not view that as potentially hazardous and concerning? They chose this company. Effectively, they vetted this company and believed them to be doing things in a way that was secure for their employees. If that vetting process is terrible, then it speaks to how organization-wide the issues there are.
- vinni2 3y agoFor a moment I got scared. But then I got angry at the clickbaity title.
- ezekiel68 3y agoA whole lotta nothing. Unless you are an Okta employee.
- Terretta 3y agoOr unless you're someone who depends on Okta employees' security to keep yourself secure. Which has been a problem, and this enables being more of a problem.
- frostyj 3y agoReading the article, it says Okta and its employees are the actual victims here.. couldn't be more misleading..
- Terretta 3y agoConnecting a few dots why, while the headline seems misleading, it might matter. 1. Okta employee PII and foreign key to employee health info (a particularly sensitive class of PII) may be exposed. “On October 12, 2023, Rightway informed Okta that an unauthorized actor gained access to an eligibility census file maintained by Rightway in its provision of services ...” https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24110001-okta-individual-notice-general?responsive=1&title=1 https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24110001-okta-indivi... The file contained the following information on current and former Okta employees and their dependents: - Full names - Social Security Numbers (SSNs) - Health or Medical Insurance plan number 2. Okta and its customer pool are known to be under an aggressive series of phishing and social engineering attacks. 3. This type of information makes those attacks more effective. So while this particular breach starts as a Rightway problem, the nature of what was taken puts Okta itself at additional risk, as attackers build their social engineering / phishing dossier while looking for ways to get into Okta and/or get to Okta's customers in bulk.
- ryanisnan 3y agoThanks for this. Posts like this are why I like Hacker News. This is a valid problem for Okta, and I think accurately frames the problem. Real-talk, if you were calling the shots at Okta, what would you do here? Enforce hardware-key MFA everywhere, for every vendor service? Impose a no-professional-social-media policy for all employees? This probably is too late to do any good, but it's pretty clear phishing is a hot vector right now.
- Terretta 3y agoGood question. From their incident report yesterday it looks as though Okta started by blaming the victims, taking half a month to realize Okta itself was the problem. Then they clamped down on Chrome's automatic exfil of company credentials. https://sec.okta.com/harfiles https://sec.okta.com/harfiles That feels narrow. What seems evident, but not addressed, is their initial reaction of victim customer blaming, the identification of suspicious behavior by multiple different customers before seeing it themselves, and the previous latitude for Chrome, likely trace back to lax culture and behavior, particularly around insider threat: not behaving as if they really believe "the problem is us". So, address the specific faults as Okta did, but attribute those to a 'root cause' need for a stronger 'security mindset' with active insider threat modeling across all employees and roles, and insider focused detective controls. Something like, "We spend all our time helping less secure customers level up their security and it's easy to feel good about how much more secure we are than most. But we ourselves don't have to be just better than our customers which probably seems easy. We have to be better than the threats who want to use us against our customers, and that's incredibly hard. Clearly we can do better." Then double down on security mindset training (for customers to be secure, we have to be secure), and as part of that do comprehensive insider threat modeling and tabletop exercises across roles (even janitors or receptionists), with internal incentives to identify frictionless 'detection and response' controls opportunities across processes and systems. In parallel I'd pick a new red team pen test firm (more than one, with different strengths and different cultural backgrounds outside US, e.g. Eastern Europe, Israel, Asia), adding a bonus above the standard fixed bid for every avenue identified. But for the biggest backlog of things to fix, I'd have them do a round inside, with privilege. No room for the idea "if they're inside we already lost" since they will get inside. If I don't know to prevent things like what the insider pentests find, could I at least have seen those types of things? We need to hear less whack-a-mole prevention in breached firms' writeups, more recognition of insider vantage threat, with visibility and detection. - - - TL;DR: Think through: (1) How do we become more worthy of trust. (2) How do we make trust irrelevant?