3 ms·
> decompilers ... converge to a fixed point but why would you assume that the decompiler is not backdoored? It would know to remove the backdoor code, so the
by chii 3y ago
> decompilers ... converge to a fixed point
but why would you assume that the decompiler is not backdoored? It would know to remove the backdoor code, so the fixpoint is not going to show anything.
- TeMPOraL 3y agoIn theory, any computer tool you use could've already been compromised. You can't be 100% certain (even if you bootstrap from hand-made punchcards, the backdoor could be hidden in hardware). In practice, you can push the likelihood of this down to arbitrarily small levels. Pick a decompiler that's as unrelated to your compiler as you can find. Then pick a second decompiler that's maximally unrelated to both the compiler and the first decompiler. It's highly unlikely all three tools will be backdoored in a fully compatible way.
- codeflo 3y agoNot if the backdoor is inserted into fopen/mmap calls in such a way that when any executable opens the binary for reading, it sees a version without the backdoor.
- wizzwizz4 3y agoThat can't be done without either changing the file size or being really obvious.
- acdha 3y agoMalware does that all the time - return different stat() results, change the contents for anything which isn’t execution, etc. It’s detectable but fundamentally you’re in a nasty race since the attacker can use the same tools you do.
- ericpauley 3y ago> In theory, any computer tool you use could've already been compromised. You can't be 100% certain (even if you bootstrap from hand-made punchcards, the backdoor could be hidden in hardware). This is the whole point of Thompson’s lecture, though.