> In my opinion it makes no sense in signing your email (whether it is S/MIME or DKIM) to prove that the email is authentic, and then complaining that there is

> In my opinion it makes no sense in signing your email (whether it is S/MIME or DKIM) to prove that the email is authentic, and then complaining that there is no way to deny that the email is authentic once stuff goes bad. It is also rather futile, since the prover can get the messages timestamped (myriads of ways, myriads of platforms), perhaps even steganographically in the correspondence, before the key is rotated. the denialists can still rotate after shorter and even shorter intervals, but at some point the client software can't keep up and verify the email provider during usage, or rather resulting absence of usage... it's pretty sad when technologists cave in under pressure from governments, politicians, lawyers and big firms keeping the lid on scandals... reducing the usage of cryptography to a purely symbolic cargo cult token or gesture... Cryptography configured for exhibition only... but not in any court.