6 ms·
Such hyperbole. This was a bad breach, for sure, and we may not fully understand its scope at this point. But... > They were able to implant #backdoors, self-m
by insanitybit 3y ago
Such hyperbole. This was a bad breach, for sure, and we may not fully understand its scope at this point. But...
> They were able to implant #backdoors, self-made keys, ... all over the place.
I mean, emphasis on able to, as in "in theory, based on what I know, it is POSSIBLE", not that they did.
> If you didn't understand until now: basically EVERYTHING at Microsoft got hacked and Microsoft can't (or won't) get rid of the intruders. Everything authenticated by Microsoft is tainted. Even #Windows auth.
Microsoft's response also seems to clearly state that they have rotated the keys, moved them to a more secure storage, etc. They don't say they've removed the attackers, I guess, but they certainly don't indicate that the attack is ongoing. Certainly they don't indicate that all auth is forever broken.
I feel like the conclusions being drawn are extreme.
https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2023/09/results-of-major-technical-investigations-for-storm-0558-key-acquisition/ https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2023/09/results-of-major-tec...
- bilekas 3y ago> This was a bad breach, for sure, and we may not fully understand its scope at this point > I mean, emphasis on able to, as in "in theory, based on what I know, it is POSSIBLE", not that they did. When you consider the potential implications, and possible scenarios, from a security perspective you have to assume that they're not just "possible" but a reality. If you find a zero day exploit, you don't just ignore patching it because "well nobody else probably has it".
- jerska 3y agoOf course you patch it, but you don’t assume that every system affected by this 0-day got exploited. You try to check if some were and it’s obvious that people at Microsoft are doing exactly that. Not saying that MS’s response was great, but I agree with GP that the whole thing is hyberbolic.
- bogwog 3y ago> Of course you patch it, but you don’t assume that every system affected by this 0-day got exploited. Uhh, what? Of course you do. Why give the benefit of the doubt to hackers who hacked you with malicious intentions? That's the type of security nonsense that I'd expect from... Well, Microsoft lol
- insanitybit 3y agoSo every time a 0day is released you buy a net new device? Cause there are 0days like... every day.
- justwalt 3y agoIt's one thing if it's your laptop, but another if it's a system with billions of users.
- bilekas 3y agoA released 0day is an oxymoron..
- insanitybit 3y agoI have a 0 day. I release it. I released the 0 day.
- insanitybit 3y ago> When you consider the potential implications, and possible scenarios, from a security perspective you have to assume that they're not just "possible" but a reality. No you don't. You definitely don't want to assume otherwise and you spend the time derisking and investigating, but if you have zero evidence to support the situation you don't just consider it the case anyways.
- mycall 3y agoI'm sure Microsoft is provided all the resources they need to flush out any embedded binaries and ill-configurations including every federal agency available.
- eqvinox 3y ago> I feel like the conclusions being drawn are extreme. You linked Microsoft's investigation report on the exploit. The attackers first managed to get access to Microsoft's development network, noticed a crashdump, understood the possible significance of that, dug through it, found a private key, then acquired enough insight into Microsofts authentication systems to understand how this key could be used beyond its intended purpose and then executed on that. And you don't believe they left persistent backdoors in some high-profile targets? The conclusions being drawn are … entirely appropriate. Your argument maaaaaybe makes some sense applied to general public random cloud customers. Backdooring indiscriminately just increases the risk of discovery. But large companies and government users? You have to assume compromise, anything else is incredulously naïve. cf.: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/14/analysis-of-storm-0558-techniques-for-unauthorized-email-access/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/14/ana... > Storm-0558 operates with a high degree of technical tradecraft and operational security. The actors are keenly aware of the target’s environment, logging policies, authentication requirements, policies, and procedures. Storm-0558’s tooling and reconnaissance activity suggests the actor is technically adept, well resourced, and has an in-depth understanding of many authentication techniques and applications.
- insanitybit 3y agoI think there's a huge difference between "maybe there is a backdoor" versus "literally all of microsoft, across all orgs, is owned and they have to shut it all down and start from scratch", call me crazy.
- arendtio 3y agoTo me it sounds more like: Most likely backdoors have been planted. So the question is how you handle such a situation.
- eqvinox 3y agoThat's really wishful thinking. Which is fine if you're a small company throwing non-sensitive things into Azure. If OTOH you were working as a SIEM at some company providing 2nd-order cloud services, this is where I would start questioning your qualifications and that company's overall policies. (… especially when you're not even bringing up the fact that the compromised key was mainly usable to access e-mail)
- draw_down 3y ago[dead]
- archon810 3y agoPlot twist: the hackers have already taken over Microsoft and were the ones who published blog posts about how they'd handled the breaches.