4 ms·

Messages are by definition not end-to-end encrypted if anyone other than the participants can surmise anything about the content of the messages. So the questi

Messages are by definition not end-to-end encrypted if anyone other than the participants can surmise anything about the content of the messages. So the question does not even make sense as asked. But I guess we all know the whole point is not about making sense, it's about justifying an agenda.

clipsy 3y ago
If there was a "CSAM oracle" that could run on-device and prevent E2EE transmission of CSAM without phoning home, wouldn't that satisfy the EU's proposal without informing anyone other than the participants about the content of the message? I don't know that such a thing is feasible today (Apple tried and infamously failed), but given rapid improvements in ML and on-device TPU's I'm hesitant to rule it out in the near future.
- deafpolygon 3y ago
  > Apple tried and infamously failed Didn't they infamously reject the idea after attempting to build it?
  - clipsy 3y ago
    ...Yes?
    - deafpolygon 3y ago
      Saying "failed" implies they weren't able to do it. It's my understanding they had it all figured out and was about to roll it out when they decided not to.
      - clipsy 3y ago
        I describe it as failed because once they went public with it they were faced with how easily it could be abused and -- quite reasonably in my opinion -- decided to abandon it.
- brokenmachine 3y ago
  >without phoning home Then how do the "Service providers" find out about it?
  - RetroTechie 3y ago
    They wouldn't. This would be more like "your own device won't let you do x" because it has detected x, and software is designed to prevent x. There's a few problems though: If software including such 'feature' were open source, wouldn't you simply remove that feature? I know I would. If closed source, which party would be trusted to develop that 'feature'? App developer? OS vendor? Government? Network provider? Note there's good & bad ones among each of those. So how would you know it doesn't phone home? You wouldn't. And thus... back to square 1. Which (imho) makes that E2EE and "think of the children" are mutually exclusive. Either messages are truly private (and bad things may happen), or they're not (and bad things may happen anyway, or even worse things when citizen-hostile governments get involved).

clipsy 3y ago

If there was a "CSAM oracle" that could run on-device and prevent E2EE transmission of CSAM without phoning home, wouldn't that satisfy the EU's proposal without informing anyone other than the participants about the content of the message? I don't know that such a thing is feasible today (Apple tried and infamously failed), but given rapid improvements in ML and on-device TPU's I'm hesitant to rule it out in the near future.

deafpolygon 3y ago
> Apple tried and infamously failed Didn't they infamously reject the idea after attempting to build it?
- clipsy 3y ago
  ...Yes?
  - deafpolygon 3y ago
    Saying "failed" implies they weren't able to do it. It's my understanding they had it all figured out and was about to roll it out when they decided not to.
    - clipsy 3y ago
      I describe it as failed because once they went public with it they were faced with how easily it could be abused and -- quite reasonably in my opinion -- decided to abandon it.
brokenmachine 3y ago
>without phoning home Then how do the "Service providers" find out about it?
- RetroTechie 3y ago
  They wouldn't. This would be more like "your own device won't let you do x" because it has detected x, and software is designed to prevent x. There's a few problems though: If software including such 'feature' were open source, wouldn't you simply remove that feature? I know I would. If closed source, which party would be trusted to develop that 'feature'? App developer? OS vendor? Government? Network provider? Note there's good & bad ones among each of those. So how would you know it doesn't phone home? You wouldn't. And thus... back to square 1. Which (imho) makes that E2EE and "think of the children" are mutually exclusive. Either messages are truly private (and bad things may happen), or they're not (and bad things may happen anyway, or even worse things when citizen-hostile governments get involved).