3 ms·
"director that could not be fired by the President except for cause" This is the same as the FTC and others. "This Court, as the majority acknowledges, has su
by majormajor 3y ago
"director that could not be fired by the President except for cause"
This is the same as the FTC and others.
"This Court, as the majority acknowledges, has
sustained the constitutionality of the FTC and similar in-
dependent agencies. See ante, at 2, 13–16. The for-cause
protections for the heads of those agencies, the Court has
found, do not impede the President’s ability to perform his
own constitutional duties, and so do not breach the separation of powers."
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf
- pyuser583 3y agoIt’s different from the FTC because its funding comes directly from the federal reserve. So it’s independent of both the President and Congress. It’s more independent than many courts. What could possibly go wrong?
- kadoban 3y ago> What could possibly go wrong? They might accidentally get something done that helps people?
- tivert 3y ago>> What could possibly go wrong? > They might accidentally get something done that helps people? Since you're missing the point: make me dictator, so I can finally get stuff done that helps people. Too much independence is a recipe for serious problems, even if (theoretically) it could be used accomplish major things.
- kadoban 3y agoIf there's serious problems, then Congress can act. The structure just makes it harder for Republicans to kill it quietly for an unsupportable reason.
- butlerm 3y agoIt is quite difficult for Republicans to reverse any act of Congress without another act of Congress. The assent of the House, the Senate, and (usually) the President is required.
- kadoban 3y agoAnything that specifically needs a law passed to undo it is safer than one that can just have its budget ~zeroed out in the yearly budget, or any of the more-than-yearly CRs and debt-ceilings and whatever other nonsense negotiations. This is for both reasons of public scrutiny (there's so much in the budget that it's easy for things to get relatively lost), but also because the budget, in practice, just needs 50+1 votes. Usual laws need 60 due to Senate procedures. Ignoring the House since there's not much difference there.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- rgbrenner 3y agoIt’s different from the FTC because its funding comes directly from the federal reserve. So the CFPB--a bureau within the federal reserve--cannot be funded by the federal reserve? So it’s independent of both the President and Congress. Just like the federal reserve. The federal reserve doesn't just set interest rates and lend money... they're also tasked with regulation of the financial system. So it makes sense that the CF(inancial)PB would be part of it. In fact, the creation of the CFPB was just the consolidation of work done by several bureaus, including the federal reserve. Kind of like when DHS was created--just a reorganization.
- pyuser583 3y agoThe Federal Reserve is quite different from the FTC, so my statement still stands.
- dragonwriter 3y ago> This is the same as the FTC and others. No, its not; the Fed has a board of five commissioners, not a single director. This is rather the norm for independent executive-branch agencies with leadership that can be removed only for cause.
- majormajor 3y ago> No, its not; the Fed has a board of five commissioners, not a single director. This is rather the norm for independent executive-branch agencies with leadership that can be removed only for cause. Is there a specific Constitutional requirement for a board as well as a Chair if it's for-cause-only? Because otherwise that seems like a very narrow difference to ask the Court to rule on regarding the appointment/firing of the head...
- dragonwriter 3y ago> Is there a specific Constitutional requirement for a board as well as a Chair if it’s for-cause-only? Well, no. The specific rule is that for-cause-only removal is inconsistent in general with the vesting of executive power in the President in Article II, with two exceptions: (1) Agencies with a role similar to that of the FTC in 1935 that exercise no part of the executive power but serve solely as a legislative/judicial aid, and (2) Inferior officers (not principal officers of agencies) with limited duties and no policymaking role. (While each of these rules comes from separate lines of cases, they were summarized together and referenced in support of the decision by which the Supreme Court struck down the for-cause-only rule at the CFPB [0], which specifically found that the for-cause-only provision combined with the single-director structure would clearly violate separation of powers as a reason not to further extent the existing exceptions to the prohibition of for-cause-only restrictions to allow the one at the CFPB.) > Because otherwise that seems like a very narrow difference to ask the Court to rule on regarding the appointment/firing of the head… The Court has already ruled against that, the present challenge is to the funding structure. [0] https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-7_new_bq7d.pdf https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-7_new_bq7d.pd...