I'm looking forward to someone explaining to me why Chinese telecom equipment should continue to be off limits. Is the problem that we are afraid of possible Ch

I'm looking forward to someone explaining to me why Chinese telecom equipment should continue to be off limits. Is the problem that we are afraid of possible Chinese backdoors, or that Chinese telecom equipment isn't backdoored by the NSA? An interesting question I'd like answered: Are the TPM 2.0 modules that Microsoft is requiring for Windows 11 installs similarly backdoored? https://www.theverge.com/2013/6/6/4403868/nsa-fbi-mine-data-apple-google-facebook-microsoft-others-prism https://www.theverge.com/2013/6/6/4403868/nsa-fbi-mine-data-... I think it's a safe assumption that all American microprocessors have backdoors. What does this mean for OpSec? If I am a dissident (or garden-variety cyber criminal), how do I evade my online activities being tracked by a sufficiently determined team at the NSA? We've known (or have assumed to know) for years that CPUs produced by AMD, Intel, and Apple have backdoors. If my machine lacks any personally identifying information, only interacts through the internet through a network device that uses a VPN and encrypted tunneling, then I should be fine in spite of CPU/OS backdoors. However, using a VPN with encrypted tunneling doesn't seem to be enough if my router also has a backdoor, and the data or encryption keys can be intercepted and tied to the personal information I've given my ISP. Where do we go from here? Do I need a Loongson-based PC and a Chinese router on top of an encrypted VPN? Obviously we have to assume that these are all backdoored as well, but that shouldn't matter as my activities don't likely won't make me a target of the PRC.