6 ms·
> the backup system applied the same logic to the flight plan with the same result Oops. In software, the backup system should use different logic. When I work
by WalterBright 3y ago
> the backup system applied the same logic to the flight plan with the same result
Oops. In software, the backup system should use different logic. When I worked at Boeing on the 757 stab trim system, there were two avionics computers attached to the wires to activate the trim. The attachment was through a comparator, that would shut off the authority of both boxes if they didn't agree.
The boxes were designed with:
1. different algorithms
2. different programming languages
3. different CPUs
4. code written by different teams with a firewall between them
The idea was that bugs from one box would not cause the other to fail in the same way.
- wavemode 3y agoFirst thought that came to my mind as well when I read it. This failover system seems to be more designed to mitigate hardware failures than software bugs.
- WalterBright 3y agoI also understand that it is impractical to implement the ATC system software twice using different algorithms. The software at least checked for an illogical state and exited, which was the right thing to do. A fix I would consider is to have the inputs more thoroughly checked for correctness before passing them on to the ATC system.
- nightpool 3y agonot stronger isolation between different flight plans? it seems "obvious" to me that if one flight plan is causing a bug in the handling logic, the system should be able to recover by continuing with the next flight plan and flagging the error to operators to impact that flight only
- WalterBright 3y ago"unexpected errors" are not necessarily problems with the flight plans. They could be anything.
- xp84 3y agoI'm no aviation expert, but perhaps with waypoints: A B C D E / F G H I J If flight plan #1 is known to be going from F-B at flight level 130, and you have a (supposedly) bogus flight plan #2, they can't quite be sure if it might be going from A-G at flight level 130 at the same time and thus causing a really bad day for both aircraft. I'd worry that dropping plan #2 into a queue for manual intervention, especially if this kind of thing only happens once every 5 years, could be disastrous if people don't realize what's happening and why. Many people might never have seen anything in that queue and may not be trained to diagnose the problem and manually translate the flight plan. This might not be the reason why the developer chose to have the program essentially pull the fire alarm and go home in this case, but that's the impression I got.
- mannykannot 3y agoThe ATC system handled well enough (i.e. no disasters, and AFAIK, no near misses) something much more complicated than one aircraft showing up with no flight plan: the failure of this particular system put all the flights in that category. I mentioned elsewhere that any ATC system has to be resilient enough to handle things like in-flight equipment failure, medical emergencies, and the diversion of multiple aircraft on account of bad weather or an incident which shuts down a major airport. As for why the system "pulled the plug", the author of the article suspects that this particular error was regarded as something that would not occur unless something catastrophic had caused it, whereas, in reality, it affected only one flight and could probably have been easily worked around if the system had informed ATC which flight plan was causing the problem.
- bdavbdav 3y agoI'm not sure they're even used for that purpose - that side of thing is done "live" as I understand it - the plans are so that ATC has the details on hand for each flight and it doesn't all need to be communicated by radio as they pass through.
- mannykannot 3y ago> A fix I would consider is to have the inputs more thoroughly checked for correctness before passing them on to the ATC system. Thoroughly checking of the inputs as far as possible should be a given, but in this case, the inputs were correct: while the use of duplicate identifiers is considerably less than ideal, the constraints on where that was permitted meant that there was one deterministically unambiguous parsing of the flight plan, as demonstrated in the article. The proximate cause of the problem was not in the inputs, but how they were processed by the ATC system. For the same reason, multiple implementations of the software would only have helped if a majority of the teams understood this issue and got it right. I recall a fairly influential paper in the '90s (IIRC) in which multiple independent implementations of a requirements specification were compared, and the finding was that the errors were quite strongly correlated - i.e. there was a tendency for the teams to make the same mistakes as each other.
- gorgoiler 3y agoI wonder where most of the complexity lies in ATC. Naively you’d think there would be some mega computer needed to solve the puzzle but the UK only sees 6k flights a day and the scale of the problem, like most things in the physical world, is well bounded. That’s about the same number of buses in London, or a tenth of the number of Uber drivers in NYC. It would be interesting to actually see the code.
- tjohns 3y agoMuch of the complexity is in interop. Passing data between ATC control positions, between different facilities, and between different countries. Then every airline has a bidirectional data feed, plus all the independent GA flights (either via flight service or via third-party apps). Plus additional systems for weather, traffic management, radar, etc. Plus everything happening on the defense side. All using communication links and protocols that have evolved organically since the 1950s, need global consensus (with hundreds of different countries' implementations), and which need to never fail.
- ExoticPearTree 3y agoThe system should have just rejected the FPL, notify the admins about the problem and keep working. The admins could have fixed whatever the software could not handle. The affected flight could have been vectored by ATC if needed to divert from filed FPL. Way less work and a better doutcome than the “system throws hands in the air and becomes unresponsive”.
- dhx 3y agoThis would have been a 2oo2 system where the pilot becomes the backup. 2oo2 systems are not highly available. Air traffic control systems should at least be 2oo3[1] (3 systems independently developed of which 2 must concur at any given time) so that a failure of one system would still allow the other two to continue operation without impacting availability of the aviation industry. Human backup is not possible because of human resourcing and complexity. ATC systems would need to be available to provide separation under IFR[2] and CVFR[3] conditions. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triple_modular_redundancy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triple_modular_redundancy [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrument_flight_rules#Separation_and_clearance https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrument_flight_rules#Separa... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_flight_rules#Controlled_visual_flight_rules https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_flight_rules#Controlled...
- wcarss 3y agoThis reminds me of a backwoods hike I took with a friend some years back. We each brought a compass, "for redundancy", but it wasn't until we were well underway that we noticed our respective compasses frequently disagreed. We often wished we had a third to break the tie!
- jangxx 3y agoSounds like the joke about a man with one watch always being sure about what time it is, but a man with two being continuously in doubt.
- sparrowInHand 3y agoJust computate the average, then counter the documented drift vs a external source?
- jwr 3y agoMy grandfather was working with Stanisław Skarżyński, who was preparing for his first crossing of the Atlantic in a lightweight airplane (RWD-5bis, 450kg empty weight) in 1933. They initially mounted two compasses in the cockpit, but Skarżyński taped one of them over so that it wasn't visible, saying wisely that if one fails, he will have no idea which one is correct.
- borissk 3y agoDifferent teams often make the same mistake. The system you describe is not perfect, but makes sense.
- chii 3y agoif this is true, then would it be a better investment to have the 2nd team produce a fuzz testing/systematic testing mechanism instead of producing a secondary copy of the same system? In fact, make it adversarial testing such that this team is rewarded (may be financially) if mistakes or problems are found from the 1st team's program.
- awestroke 3y agoSuch incentives can lead to reduced collaboration. If I get paid every time you make mistakes, I won't want you to get better at your job
- iraqmtpizza 3y agothe whole point is that they're not collaborating so as to avoid cross-contamination. also you don't get paid unless and until you identify the mistake. if you decrease the reward over time, there is an additional incentive to not sit on the information
- WalterBright 3y agoI neglected to mention there was a third party that reviewed the algorithms to verify they weren't the same. Nothing is perfect, though, and the pilot is the backup for failure of that system. I.e. turn off the stab trim system.
- bdavbdav 3y agoIs this still the case for simple algorithms?
- 3y ago
- jojobas 3y agoWouldn't trim be an number of which a significant tolerance is permissible at any given time? Or does "agree" mean "within a preset tolerance"?
- WalterBright 3y agoNaturally, any comparator would have some slack in it to account for variations. Even CPU internals have such slack, that's why there's a "clock" to synchronize things.
- f1shy 3y agoI would be very interested in knowing which languages were used. Do you know which were? Thanks
- WalterBright 3y agoOne of them was Pascal. This was around 1980 or so.
- shatnersbassoon 3y ago"When a failsafe system fails, it fails by failing to fail safe." J. Gall
- fransje26 3y agoAs as side note, too bad they knowingly didn't reuse such an approach for the MAX..
- WalterBright 3y agoThe MAX system relied on the pilot remembering the stab trim cutoff switch and what it was for.
- fransje26 3y agoEven though the trim cutoff switch didn't work as it used to do on the previous generation of 737s, and the pilots were not notified about the change.