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>Stochastic attacks have long been used against general populations or forces, though the morale effects may well backfire unless the lethality is truly overwhe

>Stochastic attacks have long been used against general populations or forces, though the morale effects may well backfire unless the lethality is truly overwhelming. The video is underwhelming. Futuristic technology is used to harass and kill people for no reason other than some CEO wanting to earn money from a secret investor sales pitch? The range of the weapons is limited so they need to be deployed near the university that is being attacked. The weapon leaves no impact other than some broken windows or dead bodies. Meanwhile in Ukraine Putin levels cities with indiscriminate artillery. Imagine if these cities were being attacked by face scanning weapons. Civilians would most likely not be on the list of enemies. If Putin does not have a database of Ukrainian soldier faces, then he can't target this weapon. He will have to target based on the uniform instead but then soldiers could just stop wearing uniforms or even intentionally dress like civilians. At some point the weapon must become indiscriminate again and once it is indiscriminate, it is not any different than being hit by bombs, artillery, nuclear weapons, etc. My prediction: We will keep using more artillery instead.

dredmorbius 3y ago
The bit about stochastic attacks was my own commentary. It's a description of one mode of current and recent (well, largely 20th-century onward) mode of warfare. The Slaughterbots premise though is specific targeted attacks against identified individuals. We've seen this to be effective in multiple theatres and modes throughout history, though recent trends have shown remarkable additional efficacy. Assassinations would be the original notion, though that's a messy practice when you're stabbing Caesar in the back. The ability to drop wet teams in on a specific target was improved with near-real-time surveillance, but still involved significant feet on the ground. An example is the 2010 assassination of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai, UAE, by 26 Israeli Mossad agents: <https://www.gq.com/story/the-dubai-job-mossad-assassination-hamas https://www.gq.com/story/the-dubai-job-mossad-assassination-...> Ten years later, when Israel again committed another assasination, this time of Iranina nuclear physicist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, they used a remotely-controlled machine gun mounted in a truck: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/11/iranian-nuclear-scientist-killed-by-israeli-automated-gun-report https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/11/iranian-nuclear-sci...> Nicholas Maduro, president of Venezuela, survived an attempted assassination using drones and explosives in 2018, in which seven soldiers were injured. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-45073385 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-45073385> Putin is well-known for targeting individuals for assassination, with Wikipedia listing at least 115 known instances since 1999, many within Russia against Russians. The killing of Ukrainian grain tycoon Oleksiy Vadatursky by missile is thought to have been a specifically targeted attack; his house, and specifically bedroom, was struck by a missile, killing Vadatursky and his wife. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62367356 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62367356> Similar attacks could be carried out against specific high-profile, high-value targets within Ukraine, including government, military, and business officials. On the battlefield itself, targeting priorities would likely be different, though officers and leadership roles might be individually identified. More likely though drones would be directed toward specific equipment or given the general characteristics of enemy soldiers (e.g., uniforms and insignia, or locations), and directed toward them. There are reasons why soldiers do wear uniforms, including identification by their own forces and avoidance of friendly fire. Rules of war and the Geneva Convention generally require distinctive uniforms and insignia "having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance", in part to avoid confusion with civilian populations. It's possible of course for such rules to be changed, but that's not the present situation. I don't think artillery is going away. But it has been supplemented by ever more precisely-directed weapons, and will likely continue to be with time. I do put heavy emphasis on the sorts of scenarios illustrated in the video, however. Specifically-targeted attacks in soft areas seem a distinct likelihood, and many nascent opposition movements can be crippled by incapacitating or cowing a small number of leaders. Though writing this does give me pause to think that one of the most effective tools Ukraine has for targeted elimination of Russian leadership to date as been VVP.

dredmorbius 3y ago

The bit about stochastic attacks was my own commentary. It's a description of one mode of current and recent (well, largely 20th-century onward) mode of warfare. The Slaughterbots premise though is specific targeted attacks against identified individuals. We've seen this to be effective in multiple theatres and modes throughout history, though recent trends have shown remarkable additional efficacy. Assassinations would be the original notion, though that's a messy practice when you're stabbing Caesar in the back. The ability to drop wet teams in on a specific target was improved with near-real-time surveillance, but still involved significant feet on the ground. An example is the 2010 assassination of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai, UAE, by 26 Israeli Mossad agents: <https://www.gq.com/story/the-dubai-job-mossad-assassination-hamas https://www.gq.com/story/the-dubai-job-mossad-assassination-...> Ten years later, when Israel again committed another assasination, this time of Iranina nuclear physicist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, they used a remotely-controlled machine gun mounted in a truck: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/11/iranian-nuclear-scientist-killed-by-israeli-automated-gun-report https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/11/iranian-nuclear-sci...> Nicholas Maduro, president of Venezuela, survived an attempted assassination using drones and explosives in 2018, in which seven soldiers were injured. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-45073385 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-45073385> Putin is well-known for targeting individuals for assassination, with Wikipedia listing at least 115 known instances since 1999, many within Russia against Russians. The killing of Ukrainian grain tycoon Oleksiy Vadatursky by missile is thought to have been a specifically targeted attack; his house, and specifically bedroom, was struck by a missile, killing Vadatursky and his wife. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62367356 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62367356> Similar attacks could be carried out against specific high-profile, high-value targets within Ukraine, including government, military, and business officials. On the battlefield itself, targeting priorities would likely be different, though officers and leadership roles might be individually identified. More likely though drones would be directed toward specific equipment or given the general characteristics of enemy soldiers (e.g., uniforms and insignia, or locations), and directed toward them. There are reasons why soldiers do wear uniforms, including identification by their own forces and avoidance of friendly fire. Rules of war and the Geneva Convention generally require distinctive uniforms and insignia "having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance", in part to avoid confusion with civilian populations. It's possible of course for such rules to be changed, but that's not the present situation. I don't think artillery is going away. But it has been supplemented by ever more precisely-directed weapons, and will likely continue to be with time. I do put heavy emphasis on the sorts of scenarios illustrated in the video, however. Specifically-targeted attacks in soft areas seem a distinct likelihood, and many nascent opposition movements can be crippled by incapacitating or cowing a small number of leaders. Though writing this does give me pause to think that one of the most effective tools Ukraine has for targeted elimination of Russian leadership to date as been VVP.