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> I think you fail to realize that the internet is a bunch of disparate networks that no one person controls. The internet is a bunch of disparate networks tha

> I think you fail to realize that the internet is a bunch of disparate networks that no one person controls. The internet is a bunch of disparate networks that no one person controls, exactly. That means that when someone tells you there's a fault in the kit that you have installed in your network, then that is 100% your problem and it is 100% on you to get it fixed. Once a vulnerability is known then someone out there is going to start exploiting it almost immediately. > backbone operators are more militant than Linus when it comes to: rule #1 is don't break user space. Backbone operators can have all the hubris they want, but it won't change the reality that the only effective action they can take when a vulnerability is found is to get it fixed ASAP. This is a security lesson that has been learnt in recent years by many sectors of the IT industry and, judging by the woeful response that Ben Cartwright-Cox describes in his post, it's one that the network backbone is going to be learning soon.

tw04 3y ago
>The internet is a bunch of disparate networks that no one person controls, exactly. That means that when someone tells you there's a fault in the kit that you have installed in your network, then that is 100% your problem and it is 100% on you to get it fixed. So you've never worked in a corporate environment. Here's how that conversation would go: Hey guys, some researchers found out if you use a test flag meant for the lab on the public internet, it breaks all our BGP sessions. OK, so drop their feed and block them? Great, done. >Once a vulnerability is known then someone out there is going to start exploiting it almost immediately. And yet the "vulnerability" in question was known, and was not being immediately exploited if you read through the mailing list or were participating in NANOG at that point in time. So your statement is provably false. >Backbone operators can have all the hubris they want, but it won't change the reality that the only effective action they can take when a vulnerability is found is to get it fixed ASAP. And yet we're having this conversation in 2023, they have operated the same way for 40+ years, and somehow the internet is still working. Bad actors get blackholed, it worked in the past, it'll continue working in the future. The reality is that backbone routing is expensive, and expecting everyone to update their kit on YOUR timeline isn't reasonable.
- gnfargbl 3y ago
  I am aware that network operators have behaved this way for very many years. The point I am making is that all of the IT industry used to attempt to "work around" security vulnerabilities in the same way, until log4shell and all the others gradually beat that propensity out of them. I am prophesying that a similar reckoning is likely to come upon the network backbone. You're arguing that the cost of entry to the game (BGP peering) is such that the old ways will continue to work. Let's hope you're right.
  - devonkim 3y ago
    Software ecosystems like libraries and frameworks have completely different propagation and remediation mechanics compared to federated systems like core Internet backbone routers and switches is the thing. Try as we might conceptualize otherwise the modern Internet from a packet’s purview is more like a loose confederation of ultimately privatized or state-run fiefdoms than a cellular automata digraph explosion. So actors that try to act maliciously against the network will be basically shut out given the rule of an iron fist being the default.
    - gnfargbl 3y ago
      Conceptually, there is no special difference between a remotely exploitable vulnerability in an HTTP server and a remotely exploitable vulnerability in a BGP router. It would have been theoretically possible to have dealt with log4shell by blocking every IP address that was sending malicious payloads, for instance. Practically, I accept that there is a real difference. ASNs are much harder to acquire than IP addresses, and there are far fewer of them. That difference might mean that blocking continues to be an effective mechanism. However, in a world where malicious actors are increasingly just nation states wearing a flimsy mask, I'm not sure that the difficulty of getting access to sufficient numbers of ASNs is going to be a forever mitigation. The main thing I have taken away from this thread is that when it comes to vulnerability management, network operators seem to be pretty far behind the curve in mindset terms. The arguments being made in here ("you can't break other people's stuff", "we have a lot of boxes and SLAs mean we can't patch quickly") aren't even slightly new. The well-proven reality is that threat actors don't give one single shit about any of that.
zamadatix 3y ago
The internet does not owe a negligent operator peering. No one person controls the internet but you sure as hell can find yourself kicked out if your goal is to be right on principals instead of a good peer. The only hubris which could be at play is someone thinking the rest of the internet should follow their desires instead of the other way around. Research is great but if you're poking around breaking things via DoS in the internet you're going to be judged as a bad peer regardless what the route daemon does. The security of the internet constantly moves forward but that doesn't mean the expectation of improving has to hold more precedence than the expectation of running. It's still very much a human to human system for all but the actual route exchange.

tw04 3y ago

>The internet is a bunch of disparate networks that no one person controls, exactly. That means that when someone tells you there's a fault in the kit that you have installed in your network, then that is 100% your problem and it is 100% on you to get it fixed. So you've never worked in a corporate environment. Here's how that conversation would go: Hey guys, some researchers found out if you use a test flag meant for the lab on the public internet, it breaks all our BGP sessions. OK, so drop their feed and block them? Great, done. >Once a vulnerability is known then someone out there is going to start exploiting it almost immediately. And yet the "vulnerability" in question was known, and was not being immediately exploited if you read through the mailing list or were participating in NANOG at that point in time. So your statement is provably false. >Backbone operators can have all the hubris they want, but it won't change the reality that the only effective action they can take when a vulnerability is found is to get it fixed ASAP. And yet we're having this conversation in 2023, they have operated the same way for 40+ years, and somehow the internet is still working. Bad actors get blackholed, it worked in the past, it'll continue working in the future. The reality is that backbone routing is expensive, and expecting everyone to update their kit on YOUR timeline isn't reasonable.

gnfargbl 3y ago
I am aware that network operators have behaved this way for very many years. The point I am making is that all of the IT industry used to attempt to "work around" security vulnerabilities in the same way, until log4shell and all the others gradually beat that propensity out of them. I am prophesying that a similar reckoning is likely to come upon the network backbone. You're arguing that the cost of entry to the game (BGP peering) is such that the old ways will continue to work. Let's hope you're right.
- devonkim 3y ago
  Software ecosystems like libraries and frameworks have completely different propagation and remediation mechanics compared to federated systems like core Internet backbone routers and switches is the thing. Try as we might conceptualize otherwise the modern Internet from a packet’s purview is more like a loose confederation of ultimately privatized or state-run fiefdoms than a cellular automata digraph explosion. So actors that try to act maliciously against the network will be basically shut out given the rule of an iron fist being the default.
  - gnfargbl 3y ago
    Conceptually, there is no special difference between a remotely exploitable vulnerability in an HTTP server and a remotely exploitable vulnerability in a BGP router. It would have been theoretically possible to have dealt with log4shell by blocking every IP address that was sending malicious payloads, for instance. Practically, I accept that there is a real difference. ASNs are much harder to acquire than IP addresses, and there are far fewer of them. That difference might mean that blocking continues to be an effective mechanism. However, in a world where malicious actors are increasingly just nation states wearing a flimsy mask, I'm not sure that the difficulty of getting access to sufficient numbers of ASNs is going to be a forever mitigation. The main thing I have taken away from this thread is that when it comes to vulnerability management, network operators seem to be pretty far behind the curve in mindset terms. The arguments being made in here ("you can't break other people's stuff", "we have a lot of boxes and SLAs mean we can't patch quickly") aren't even slightly new. The well-proven reality is that threat actors don't give one single shit about any of that.

zamadatix 3y ago

The internet does not owe a negligent operator peering. No one person controls the internet but you sure as hell can find yourself kicked out if your goal is to be right on principals instead of a good peer. The only hubris which could be at play is someone thinking the rest of the internet should follow their desires instead of the other way around. Research is great but if you're poking around breaking things via DoS in the internet you're going to be judged as a bad peer regardless what the route daemon does. The security of the internet constantly moves forward but that doesn't mean the expectation of improving has to hold more precedence than the expectation of running. It's still very much a human to human system for all but the actual route exchange.