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> reassess their reaction once the anger subsides. You have completely missed the point. It is because things go unnoticed that security minded folks are upse

by junon 3y ago

> reassess their reaction once the anger subsides. You have completely missed the point. It is because things go unnoticed that security minded folks are upset. We don't get off from finding security problems, we get off on being safe to begin with.

rcxdude 3y ago
But the whole reaction here was 'this makes it more difficult to find security problems' (running a binary is not intrinsicly a security problem, if instead you are just going to compile it and then run it, it's just harder to audit a binary) and yet no-one was even doing the easy bit (auditing the source code). If someone had injected malicious code into the build.rs file it would have exactly the same effect.
- progval 3y ago
  > yet no-one was even doing the easy bit (auditing the source code). Someone did: the Fedora maintainer who raised the issue. One of the reasons I avoid installing from wild-west package managers like Cargo/NPM/..., is specifically because Debian/Fedora/... maintainers performs some basic checks like this so I don't have to.
  - worthless-trash 3y ago
    The fedora/rhel builds also go through virus/malware / security checks as part of the release process. Each exception needs to be documented and specific.
veec_cas_tant 3y ago
Respectfully, I think we agree? The current proc macro situation allows security vulnerabilities and a potentially dangerous change went unnoticed for weeks. This RFC aims to address that, at least in part. If the comments I read reflected your view, I wouldn't have made my snarky remark. Unfortunately, I read many comments full of fury aimed at dtolnay while ignoring the system that enabled it.
- junon 3y ago
  I agree with the comments about dtolnay's decision and lack of communication here.
  - veec_cas_tant 3y ago
    Oh, I misunderstood. I believe you are missing the forest for the trees but can't fault you for feeling angry if you believe trust was broken.

by junon 3y ago

rcxdude 3y ago

But the whole reaction here was 'this makes it more difficult to find security problems' (running a binary is not intrinsicly a security problem, if instead you are just going to compile it and then run it, it's just harder to audit a binary) and yet no-one was even doing the easy bit (auditing the source code). If someone had injected malicious code into the build.rs file it would have exactly the same effect.

progval 3y ago
> yet no-one was even doing the easy bit (auditing the source code). Someone did: the Fedora maintainer who raised the issue. One of the reasons I avoid installing from wild-west package managers like Cargo/NPM/..., is specifically because Debian/Fedora/... maintainers performs some basic checks like this so I don't have to.
- worthless-trash 3y ago
  The fedora/rhel builds also go through virus/malware / security checks as part of the release process. Each exception needs to be documented and specific.

veec_cas_tant 3y ago

Respectfully, I think we agree? The current proc macro situation allows security vulnerabilities and a potentially dangerous change went unnoticed for weeks. This RFC aims to address that, at least in part. If the comments I read reflected your view, I wouldn't have made my snarky remark. Unfortunately, I read many comments full of fury aimed at dtolnay while ignoring the system that enabled it.

junon 3y ago
I agree with the comments about dtolnay's decision and lack of communication here.
- veec_cas_tant 3y ago
  Oh, I misunderstood. I believe you are missing the forest for the trees but can't fault you for feeling angry if you believe trust was broken.