3 ms·
A solution that was rarely implemented was batch keys, where your secrets installed by the OEM were diversified somehow so when attackers eventually extracted y
by motohagiography 3y ago
A solution that was rarely implemented was batch keys, where your secrets installed by the OEM were diversified somehow so when attackers eventually extracted your TPM secrets from one device, it would not compromise all devices. It still has a terrible and unacceptable failure mode when peoples lives depend on it, but for infrastructure, I think the risk is more managable.
- hsbauauvhabzb 3y agoIf your threat model involves people sniffing TPM signals in transit, you’re in a different league to me. In most cases I assume physical security (security guards, epoxy the motherboard, etc) become the mitigating factors. I’m just trying to avoid evil maids.
- loup-vaillant 3y agoMaking an TPM genie isn’t that hard, and once we have that the Evil Maid can fairly easily unplug the discrete TPM, plug the Genie, and plug the TPM into the genie. And voilà, you can now sniff TPM signals in transit. Only works with discrete TPMs of course, but Man-in-the-Middle is not out of this world. https://github.com/nccgroup/TPMGenie https://github.com/nccgroup/TPMGenie
- hsbauauvhabzb 3y agoI’m more referring to laptops. If you’re using a desktop, you also have other issues (like key injectors unless you inspect the cable going from your pc to your desk every time, etc).